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16 December 1983

EAST EUROPE REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MASS MEDIA MUST PROMOTE IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 10, (no date given) (signed to press 2 Sep 83)  
pp 15-26

[Article by Karel Horak, deputy chief of the CPCZ Central Committee Mass Media Department (former editor-in-chief of TRIBUNA): "Concern of the Entire Party"]

[Text] One of the basic goals of building socialism and its indispensable prerequisite is the creation of a new man, whose thinking and behavior stems from socialist principles. The process of educating people is an inseparable part of the transformations which occur after the takeover of power by the working class under the leadership of the Communist Party. The struggle for the realization of the socialist program is not only a struggle for qualitative changes in the economic and political structure of the society and the relations on which that society is based, but also a complex and longlasting struggle for the consciousness of the people. It is a struggle for overcoming ideological postulates and ideas, habits, attitudes and actions inculcated into the working class for centuries by the capitalist system and its ideologues. It is also a struggle for the formulation of such thinking by the broad masses of the working people whose basis is the scientific world view--Marxism-Leninism.

During the process of socialist construction in our country in the past 35 years, we have experienced a basic change in the consciousness of the people. Character, moral and personal qualities, the characteristics of the citizens of a socialist society and the resulting attitudes and actions, such as socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, identification with the ideals of communism, active civic relations and interest in the solution of public and social affairs, self-motivated creative attitude toward work, and many other things are characteristic of the majority of members of our society.

As experience shows, as we progress with building socialism, as this new social order becomes more mature, we can see the consolidation and improvement of our people's socialist consciousness. Even if there is a lot of mutual interaction between the level and results of socialist transformations and the level of socialist consciousness of the broad masses of our people, socialist consciousness does not occur automatically even during the period of building a developed socialist society after all social relations have changed qualitatively. Socialist consciousness always was and still is today a result

of a complex process of development in which the party's ideological work plays an indispensable and irreplaceable role. What had been emphasized by V.I. Lenin in his book "What to Do" written over 80 years ago is still valid, namely, that the people do not acquire a socialist consciousness automatically but that it is necessary to create their socialist consciousness by inculcating into it the scientific world view. Such a role, as Lenin repeated many times and as has been confirmed in practice, cannot be fulfilled by any other but a Marxist-Leninist party.

Any underestimation of these permanently valid principles, of the significance of ideological work and its formal implementation or the succumbing to opinions according to which the significance of the party's ideological and educational work declines with the development of socialist construction, leads to serious mistakes and negative consequences. This was fully proven in our country and party during the 1960's. The underestimation of ideological work and its insufficient development, the overestimation of the influence of social conditions on the formation of socialist consciousness under socialism and poor attention paid by the party, social organizations and the entire society to teaching the scientific world view, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism--all this encouraged the growth of opportunistic and revisionistic tendencies. All this also led to a situation where workers, including many party members, were not ideologically ready for the appearance of the political Right and the revisionists at the end of the 1960's and were unable to orient themselves in the flood of pseudosocialist slogans, cliches and theories and often succumbed to the demagogic propaganda of the enemies of socialism. On the other hand, it is well known how aggressive ideological work, consistently based on Marxist-Leninist positions, introduced by the leadership of the CPCZ headed by Gustav Husak during the process of consolidation, significantly contributed to the uncovering of the antisocialist goals of the Right, bringing the party and society out of the crisis and reviving socialist construction on a higher qualitative level.

The significance of ideological work and of its individual parts is not any less important even today, when we are building a developed socialist society as a result of a program adopted at the 14th and amended at the 15th Party Congresses. The fulfillment of tasks which at present the party and, under its leadership, the entire society secure to achieve further development of all aspects of socialism urgently requires a permanent growth of activity, initiative and involvement not only of communists but of all citizens. Even now when the relationship between the party and the people is strong and becomes stronger daily and when the overwhelming majority of the working people support the policy of the CPCZ and actively participate in its implementation, not all our people profess the same level of activity and consciousness as far as the understanding of party policy is concerned. Many individuals exhibit outdated thinking and behavior, incorrect attitudes toward work, attempts to cheat our society, and so on.

Imperialism and its representatives, too, have not given up their plans to liquidate socialism. They are constantly looking for new ways and means by which they might influence the thinking and behavior of citizens in the socialist countries in an anticommunist and anti-Soviet spirit, how to

undermine the socialist countries from within and disrupt the unity of the socialist community, and especially the alliance and friendship of the socialist countries with the Soviet Union. We could list numerous illustrations of the ideologically hostile activity of various anticommunist centers which serve as instruments for the efforts of bourgeois ideology and governments of the imperialist countries aimed at our country and other fraternal socialist countries during the past 15 years. It is characteristic that attacks against socialism are becoming increasingly strong and that they have gradually changed into psychological warfare against the socialist countries.

The struggle against Marxism-Leninism and world socialism is no longer the province of ideological institutes and special agencies. It has become part of the foreign policy of the United States and its allies. This qualitative change is convincingly proved by a program of crusade against communism declared by President Reagan in the British Parliament in June 1982. According to his perception, the efforts of the collective forces of world imperialism will leave "Marxism-Leninism behind on the scrap-heap of history." In order to implement this program, the U.S. Government adopted a 30-page document (to which the implementing plans must also be added) entitled "Program of Democracy and Public Policy" on 7 February of this year. Its goal--as shown in the financial, organizational and political measures approved for its implementation--is to unite all governmental and nongovernmental institutions, including intelligence units and the armed forces of the United States and other NATO countries into a joint struggle against socialism and thus wage maximum psychological warfare against the countries of the socialist community and all progressive forces in the world.

It is no accident that the 15th Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, held in March 1980, and the 14th Party Congress emphasized the need consistently to improve ideological work, increase its effectiveness, and develop it in such a way as to become a significant factor in the explanation of the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party and in winning over the working people for active participation in the realization of these policies. This basic task, which was assigned to the entire ideological front--and not only to it alone--has permanent validity. At the present time, because of the development of the international situation and the tasks we are solving in order to secure the transition of our economy from an extensive toward an intensive path of development, this task is even more urgent.

The need constantly to improve ideological work and permanently improve its effectiveness is not the basic task of the CPCZ alone. This task received priority at both meetings of secretaries responsible for international and ideological matters of the central committees of other fraternal parties held this year. Also the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee made this task a priority as far as the Soviet communists are concerned.

Experience of the Leninist party and experience from building socialism, experience from the solution of all tasks which the process of building a socially just society brings about, and experience from the internal activity of the Soviet party was for us in the past, and today remains, an invaluable



fountain of learning. This experience is an inspiration for our work and a source of guidance in solving all tasks of building socialism. Practice has shown that creative use of this experience and its implementation in the activity of our communist party brings positive results and helps us to progress faster in securing our own goals.

Also, the results of the June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed topical questions of ideological and mass political work of the CPSU, were found to be of great interest and were carefully studied not only by the ideological aktiv but by the entire party. The complex solution of the specific problems stemming from the present stage of the development of socialism and the complex international situation, the determination of tasks in the individual sectors of ideological work based on the need to solve the most important political and economic goals, as well as the theoretical conclusions have general validity and great significance for our work also. This is because in spite of all the differences in the conditions under which our fraternal parties work, we are solving a number of common or similar tasks. The result is that the documents approved at the CPSU Central Committee plenum contain numerous ideas also for the further development and improvement of ideological work in our party.

If we think over the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, it is necessary to emphasize that this plenum does not determine qualitative new tasks but builds on the resolutions adopted at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979, on the decisions adopted at the 26th CPSU Congress and other party documents which include the main directions for improving ideological and political-educational work under current conditions. The plenum of June 1983 reviewed the implementation of the adopted resolutions, discussed ways to improve this implementation, and concentrated on those main questions which are still valid and topical in the light of the resolutions of the 15th CPCZ Central Committee Plenum. Our goal is to implement these decisions--in accordance with changed domestic and international conditions--in practical life.

The June CPSU Central Committee plenum emphasized that one of the prerequisites for the further improvement of ideological work is the strengthening of aggressive propaganda and of every aspect of ideological work. This demand stems from the contemporary international situation which was brought about by the U.S. and its NATO allies through their policy of feverish armament and preparations for placing new American missiles in Europe. Their goal is to achieve military supremacy and to use it for stopping progressive changes in the world, win back the positions they lost in the past, and liquidate socialism.

In order to achieve these aims, imperialism and its representatives have launched their ever-increasing attacks on the socialist community and Marxist-Leninist ideology. They have done so on such a large scale that it is without analogy in the history of class struggle as far as ideology is concerned. Using lies and demagoguery and instigating numerous provocations, they have tried to discredit socialism in the eyes of the public in the capitalist and developing countries and present socialist and Marxist-

Leninist ideology as the cause of all evil in the world. One of the most recent illustrations is the South Korean plane incident, which the U.S. Government--in accordance with a carefully prepared scenario--has used to wage a crude and slanderous anti-Soviet campaign. In this manner they have tried to justify their own policy aimed at the acceleration of the arms race and aggravation of international tension. The imperialists have tried their best to blame international socialism and especially its pillar, the Soviet Union, for the tense situation existing in international relations. Not even our republic is spared this attention by the imperialist circles. It is sufficient to mention how many lies concerning developments in Czechoslovakia have been fabricated in the past 15 years by the propaganda centers of imperialism in connection with the 15th anniversary of international assistance rendered to our country in 1968, what distorted representations are made of the results we have achieved during this period under the leadership of the CPCZ, in what dark colors the life of the working people in our country is being pictured, and so on. All this is done with the goal of setting our people against the policy of the CPCZ implemented since the 1969 April and May plenums of the CPCZ Central Committee and to defend the counterrevolutionary aims of the Right during the crisis years. The resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the need to strengthen the aggressive character of ideological work, especially of propaganda and education, is fully applicable to our own work. Our aim is to remove from our party's propaganda and educational work deep-rooted stereotypes, boring lectures and the use of well known and thus unpersuasive facts and arguments. We must overcome formalism, fight those phenomena where by our lecturers or educators evade burning problems and do not offer understandable and ideologically clear answers to questions involving our domestic and foreign policy.

In spite of the improvements we have achieved in many instances since the 15th Plenum, we cannot be satisfied with the existing level of our ideological work. Let us only look at how often the seriousness of the existing international situation and its causes are superficially explained at meetings, lectures or discussions, how insufficiently we use political education in our social organizations and often even civic or Marxist-Leninist classes in our schools to formulate a negative attitude toward the policy of imperialism in order that our people--and especially our youth--deeply understand rationally and emotionally that imperialism is the main enemy of socialism, of each and every citizen, that it is imperialist policy which endangers his interests, fulfillment and orderly life.

It does not help to see that our propaganda and educational work are affected by verbosity. Many of those responsible for this endeavor lack the necessary fire. Many propagandists and educators fail to serve as an example. In evaluating the results in party and regular schools, we are often satisfied with ascertaining the level of knowledge, and those who evaluate the achieved results are less interested in the real convictions, attitudes and actions of the evaluated.

The increasingly aggressive character of propaganda and education requires that we adopt a fighting and persuasive spirit in our work. We must show the policy of imperialism in such a light that each and every citizen



understands its perfidy and its antipopular and antidemocratic character. It is our duty to show by the facts how the United States and its allies and satellites always and under all circumstances, whenever people express their desire for freedom, do not hesitate to use the most brutal methods to prevent such manifestations. Imperialism has left and is leaving its ineffaceable bloody trail in Korea, Vietnam, Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Lebanon and many other countries. This fact must be inculcated more effectively than in the past into the conscience of our people in order that they fully understand that imperialism and its aggressive policy are the cause of all the evil, wars, poverty, degradation of human dignity and suppression of rights and freedoms in the world.

At the same time, it is necessary to pay much greater attention to the explanation and clarification of the qualitative difference of the policy of the socialist countries and the advantages of socialism. This aspect must not be underestimated because it is an integral part of the aggressive character of propaganda. Our goal must be to persuade the working classes to be fully aware that our socialist present and the achievements of our socialist society, namely, permanently favorable conditions of life and social security, are not a result of some automatic development but of the struggle and work of the Communist Party and of the millions of the working people led by the party.

Even if this is well-known and often repeated and generally recognized, it is necessary in connection with the demand for an improvement in the aggressive character of ideological work once again to recall and emphasize that the underestimation of these facts can lead to serious negative consequences. It is the underestimation of these aspects of our propaganda and education on which our class enemy counts. It tries in all possible ways to sow in the minds of our people, especially young people, antisocialist attitudes, evaluations and opinions which show capitalist society in rosy colors involving absolute freedoms, democracy and unlimited possibilities for everybody, and socialism as a social system containing all the deficiencies which, in fact, are specifically found under imperialism.

If we emphasize the need to make our propaganda and education more aggressive, this does not mean that we must use strong words. What we have to do is to react quickly and persuasively to all topical political, ideological and economic problems in our country and abroad, uncover the goals and substance of the policy of imperialism, and attractively explain the approach and policy of our party and of the countries of the socialist community, especially the Soviet Union. The aggressive character of this work also means that we must not ignore, but have an answer to every incorrect attitude or stand whenever we meet one.

The increasingly aggressive character of our ideological work requires a regular evaluation of the political thinking in places of residence and in plants and the adoption of the measures needed to counteract incorrect opinions. Even if the party organizations have done a lot in this respect, there are many weak spots and shortcomings. It is the duty of communists, regardless of where they work, to make sure that the adoption of the aggressive character of propaganda and educational work be viewed as their major and urgent task.

The June plenum of the CPSU Central Committee paid great attention to the task of actively formulating a new type of economic thinking aimed at initiative and socialist entrepreneurship, increased responsibility and creative search for ways leading to the best results in the national economy with minimal expenditures.

For our work, too, the struggle for a correct understanding of the present economic tasks has a decisive significance. It is well known that our highest party organs have emphasized more than once in recent years that the economy is the most decisive field of the struggle where a decision concerning the future successes of building socialism will be made. Unless we convert our economy into a more intensive economy and unless we use the results of scientific and technical development in practice, we will not be able to achieve better results, advance at a faster rate, and fully satisfy the growing consumption needs of our working people.

Fast growth in the social productivity of labor, conservation of fuel, energy, materials and raw materials, in updating products and introducing new ones, in meeting the needs of foreign and domestic trade by manufacturing desirable and quality goods, achieving a diversified economy and improving the quality of our manpower--these are some of the tasks which we have to tackle. The 16th CPCZ Congress and the subsequent Central Committee plenum dealt responsibly with these tasks. And a meeting of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee of 19 August of this year once again examined them.

The development of the national economy during the seventh 5-Year Plan shows that the implementation of these tasks requires a struggle. This struggle is more difficult than those in the past because we must overcome outdated approaches to the development of the economy which are very much ingrained in the minds of certain workers and because many measures needed to achieve our tasks (for example, improvement in technological and labor discipline, differentiation in remuneration, observing work schedules, insistence on a creative approach toward work, etc.) are not too popular.

The economic development laws, however, show no mercy. We either introduce the measures approved by the party organs which are listed in the Set of Measures for Improving the System of Planned Management of the National Economy in the Period Following 1980, in the resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee, in the decision of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee of 19 August 1983 concerning the building industry, and in a number of other resolutions, implement them, and set our national economy on the road to dynamic development, or our national economy will remain at less than its optimal levels which will be reflected in the achieved results. Objections that propaganda and education have not yet succeeded in solving any economic problem will not hold. Certainly they have not. The most beautiful words will not create a new and technically progressive product and will not lead to the fulfillment of dozens of other pressing tasks. However, Karl Marx noted that theory--in other words, an idea--will become a material force as soon as it takes hold of the masses, if it is aimed directly at the people, if it questions the very root of the problem. Only under such circumstances are the people willing to accept the idea and actively start to implement it and struggle for its realization. And this is our goal today. We must see to it that the consciousness of the

broad masses of working people (including economic managers) is deeply penetrated by the idea that unless we speedily intensify the development of our national economy there is no other way forward. We must do our best to have this consciousness a moving force in the work of each and every individual and working collective. And here lies the irreplaceable task of propaganda and education and all their resources--starting with party schools and ending with education at secondary and advanced schools.

It is necessary to formulate new economic thinking in such a way as to be able as a whole and as part of public opinion to create effective pressure on the implementation of measures leading to the improved dynamics of the national economy and at the same time fight the manifestations of abuses such as slipshod work, failure to meet one's responsibilities and misunderstood egalitarianism, etc. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize the need for new approaches in propaganda and education. We must quickly look for new forms and methods, overcome the gap between propaganda and the tasks being solved in our economy, decisively reject the underevaluation of the work of lecturers and propagandists as well as the attitudes of certain economic workers who insist that they have on their mind more important goals than to think about propaganda. We must systematically insist it is precisely these economic workers familiar with most of these tasks and the necessary solutions who should take full part in the education of the working people.

Propaganda and education can explain, clarify, and win over the others; they also can mobilize, criticize shortcomings, organize people and lead them to the fulfillment of their tasks. Much depends on the goals we determine for them and what authority we give them to implement these goals. And here very much depends primarily on the dissemination and organization of propaganda and education in each and every plant, enterprise, cooperative or farm, on the way in which propaganda will reflect and explain the concrete tasks we face.

Hence, it is necessary to emphasize and give priority to the need for political-organizational, economic and ideological-educational activity. The principle according to which each economic task not only must be secured organizationally, but also required to win over people for its fulfillment, if still valid. Without it we cannot achieve good results. So far, however, we have undertaken only the first steps in this respect. Under the leadership of party organs and organizations, it is necessary to overcome the attitude of those economic workers who underestimate ideological preparation in securing the economic tasks; and in those instances where this grave mistake is repeatedly manifested, it is necessary energetically to remedy the situation.

When formulating a new type of economic thinking we are not trying to create some narrow economic view toward the solution of tasks which would not take into consideration general societal interests and which, ignoring such interests, pursues personal, group or enterprise interests. Our goal is--and this we must keep in mind all the time--to educate responsible socialist economic workers and to see that such behavior of the working people calling for a responsible approach toward work, toward the fulfillment of tasks, which is initiative, activity and discipline, occurs. We have in mind behavior stemming from the principle of socialist ownership of the means of production



and conscious relation toward socialist society, behavior which gives priority to general societal interests.

The meeting of the CPSU Central Committee justifiably emphasized the special role of the mass media in the improvement of ideological influence and political management of society. "Mass communications and propaganda media," states a report delivered by K.U. Chernenko, "are an effective instrument of communist education and organization of workers, an instrument of an ideological securing of domestic and foreign policy of the party, in fact, a nationwide tribune." The activity of the mass media, as confirmed by Soviet and our experiences, today influences to a great extent the effectiveness of party propaganda and a number of other sectors of ideological work.

Also the Central Committee of our party and the communists working in the mass media try to improve their effectiveness. Their goal is to make the articles and television and radio programs free of generalities and routine approach and see to it that they objectively picture our reality and decisively help in the fulfillment of the tasks determined by the party. Especially, the mass media can do a lot of good for improving the offensive character of propaganda, in formulating new economic thinking, and in securing all other tasks which are on the party's priority list. Organs of the CPCZ Central Committee regularly deal with the work of the mass media and adopt measures whose purpose is to improve their work. In this respect, the resolutions concerning the development of economic propaganda and improvement of political reporting and publicity are still valid. Without exaggeration, we can say that they played an important role in the improvement of activity in these sectors. In spite of that, however, it is necessary to recognize that in introducing these resolutions into practical life there are still numerous problems. Even in the work of the mass media, in fulfilling their Leninist mission, namely, to be a collective propagandist, agitator and organizer, much more could be done.

We, too, agree with the conclusion emphasized at the CPSU plenum that all published materials, to be effective, must be true and realistic, that it is necessary to pay more attention to the letters of workers addressed to editors, not to give space to unjustified praise to individual enterprises, effectively to popularize good experience, manifestations of labor heroism, etc. A significant consideration was also given at the meeting to criticism which can be used by the mass media as a sword. The conclusion that critical material is no sensation but a signal whose only purpose is to eliminate shortcomings must be fully applied in the editorial offices as well as in organizations and enterprises which are being criticized. It is imperative to fight, with the effective help and support of territorial party and government organs, against the efforts of certain workers to prevent the publication of critical materials and at the same time to start from the premise that each criticism must be true, verified, and must not harm the interest of society. We must aim criticism at those problems which are soluble. Even if much has improved in the reaction to published criticism, much work can be done as far as economic organizations are concerned.

It is appropriate for the workers of the mass media as well as for the workers of the entire ideological front constantly to compare the results of their work with the needs of party and society, subject their own work to self-criticism, and consider as their main criterion the effectiveness of published materials and broadcast programs.

The results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum concerning the topical questions of ideological and mass political work are a great lesson for us and an inspiration in all other sectors with which the plenum dealt. In each resolution we can find numerous important ideas which enrich our view and approach toward new knowledge, new experience which we need to apply creatively in our everyday work. Hence, it is a duty not only of the ideological aktiv but of all party functionaries and members, functionaries of social organizations and state organs to refer constantly to the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee, to study them and use them in their own work.

Ideological work is unusually complex, multifaceted, has many forms and parts, and there is no single recipe or model for its implementation. In developing ideological work, there are no simple solutions suitable for every period, for every place or workplace. Tasks we are facing in this respect cannot be solved through campaigns. Any success depends on systematic uninterrupted and goal-oriented work. This can be achieved only if, as was emphasized at the CPSU Central Committee, "...each communist, each leading writer will consistently apply Lenin's principle that ideological work is the concern of the entire party..."

It is the duty of each of us to implement consistently principles verified in practice and also included in the resolutions of our central committee. This is a tested way which will help ideological work in each place and plant make more effective, increase its level and thus create prerequisites which make it possible for it to fulfill its mission even more effectively. The experience of the Soviet communists and of Lenin's party were and are for us invaluable help in the fulfillment of this significant task.

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STRUCTURE OF CPCZ BASIC ORGANIZATIONS DELINEATED

Prague ZIVOT STRANY in Czech No 21, (no date given) (signed to press 10 Oct 83) pp 34, 35

[Excerpt from the soon to be published Manual for Party Officials: "Committee of the Basic Organization, Trustee and His Deputy"]

[Text] The committee occupies an important place in the organizational buildup and activity of the basic organization. In accordance with the party statutes, it organized the implementation of resolutions passed by the membership meetings, directs the work of the basic organizations between the membership meetings and submits every month a report on its activity and situation in the organization to the membership meeting. The level of the committee's managerial, political and organizational work to a considerable extent affects the activity of the entire organization and the leading role of the party in the area of its jurisdiction.

Basic Tasks of the Committee

The contents and extent of committees' activity are predetermined by the principal tasks of basic organizations as laid down by the party statutes. The committee creates conditions for fruitful work of the entire organization, all its members and candidate members.

It directs communists to the fulfillment of principal tasks in the implementation of the party policy. It secures the influence of the party organization on the economy, consistent exercise of the right to control the economic management. It follows up the fulfillment of assignments, systematically discusses with management personnel measures for the implementation of party resolutions and solution of urgent problems. It organizes ideological and mass political work within the jurisdiction of the basic organization.

It bears responsibility for the proper preparation and agenda of membership meetings. It organizes and controls the implementation of party resolutions and specific assignments. It responsibly evaluates and secures proper handling of comments and suggestions made by the communists and other working people. It advises in due time and objectively the higher party organs of the political situation in the area under the jurisdiction of the basic organization, of the mood in public opinion and response of workers to the

important international and domestic political events. It prepares the work plans which it then submits to the membership meeting for approval. It directs the work of subsidiary organizations, party groups and activists. It generalizes and popularizes time-honored experiences from party work. It guides communists in the nonparty organs to the consistent implementation of party policies and party resolutions. It bears responsibility for keeping precise records and statistics on party members and candidate members, for other party paperwork, collection and correct payment of membership dues and financial management.

### Collective and Individual Responsibility

The committee discusses and decides collectively all fundamental questions and tasks within its jurisdiction. None of its members, not even its chairman, can make decisions on important party matters independently of the committee. All committee members are responsible to the basic organization for the decisions made between the membership meetings. The collective nature of committee work is precisely the guarantee of the thorough knowledge and evaluation of problems and tasks, a time-tested weapon against subjectivism, voluntarism, routinism and other malpractices in party work. It is therefore one of the most important duties of the chairman of the basic organization to create prerequisites for the consistent and correct application of the leninist principle of party leadership--collectivity of work.

Practice has confirmed that the organization's committee successfully performs its mission only when it works collectively, when all its members actively and with initiative participate not only in its discussions and decisionmaking, but also in its other work. Collectivity, however, in no case substitutes for and does not rule out, but, on the contrary, requires the personal responsibility of each committee member not only for the proper examination of problems and search for the best possible and effective solution, but also for the implementation of tasks set by the party resolutions or associated with the function to which they were appointed. An indispensable prerequisite of the success of every committee as a collective organ is the most precise delineation and consistent insistence on personal responsibility. This is also the basis of the division of labor in the committee of the basic organization.

### Division of Labor in the Committee

An indispensable prerequisite of good work of the organization's committee is the purposeful division of labor, distribution of functions and delineation of personal responsibility for individual areas of the party life. In distributing work in the committee not only the nature of tasks, but also the ability and experiences of its individual members must be taken into account.

The decision on the distribution of specific functions is made by the organization's committee right after the annual membership meetings. On the basis of the recommendation of the okres committee, it elects the chairman of the basic organization, who must have been party member for at least

3 years. In justified instances the okres committee can grant an exemption. From among its members the committee elects usually one and eventually more deputy chairmen (depending upon the size of the organization), and as needed authorizes other committee members to supervise party correspondence and paperwork, to take care of economic or other matters, or gives them permanent assignments.

The chairman of the basic organization bears generally responsibility for the committee's work. He organizes and directs the collective work of the committee toward the responsible fulfillment of tasks. Together with other officials he bears the overall responsibility for the standard of work with cadres, supervision of subsidiary organizations and party groups, correct keeping of records and statistics on membership, party administrative work, safe filing of party documents, and economical use of the organizations' funds. He signs letters and other written materials sent out by the basic organization. He represents the organization in its contact with party and nonparty organs.

The deputy chairman substitutes for the organization's chairman during the latter's absence and is in charge of a certain area of party work at the same time. The committee in larger basic organizations usually elects two deputy chairmen, one of whom supervises subsidiary organizations and party groups, while the other is responsible for ideological and mass political work.

The committee member in charge of party paperwork (recorder [zapisovatel]) keeps the minutes of committee and membership meetings, records and statistics on membership and candidate members, prepares the reports to the party organs, registers correspondence and other written documents of the basic organization.

The committee member in charge of economic matters (economic administrator [hospodar]) organizes the payments of membership dues in the amount specified by the CPCZ Central Committee and records them. He procures membership stamps and provides for their timely placing in the membership cards and candidate members' certificates. He takes care of financing the organization's activity and sees to it that the funds are spent according to the principles approved by the party Central Committee.

In accordance with the local conditions and needs, the other committee members can be assigned additional long-term and short-term tasks, such as assuming the responsibility for working out the party organization's tasks in the economic area and checks on their implementation, collection and processing of intraparty information, organization of party education, personal and visual propaganda, handling of comments, party press and so on.

According to the party statutes, the committee of the basic organization authorizes two to three members to supervise the management of financial and other funds of the basic organization and to check on the observation of the Central Committee's guidelines on keeping membership records and handling party paperwork.

## Changes in Committee Between Membership Meetings

The committee of the basic organization constitutes a stabilized collective which directs the work of the organization during the entire term of office. Experiences have confirmed that the committee can work even if some of its members are incapacitated temporarily or even over a longer period. In justified and urgent cases, after consultation with the okres committee, the committee can be rendered complete or its structure revised at any membership meeting. For these reasons, the committee of the basic organization lacks the right of cooption which, according to the party statutes, belongs to the higher party organs alone.

## Trustee and His Deputy

According to the party statutes, the basic organization with a small membership (up to 10 members) can elect, with the approval of the okres committee, a trustee and his deputy instead of a committee. The duties, functions and tasks of these organizations do not change. In contrast to the organizations directed by a committee, however, some different methods and procedures are applied because it is practically possible for all members and candidate members to discuss all the more important questions, take positions on them, decide on the manner of their solution and implementation of adopted resolutions. Every member and candidate member enjoys the same conditions of actively and directly participating both in their formulation and implementation.

The trustee and his deputy perform essentially the same tasks as the committee in other basic organizations. In accordance with the party statutes, they direct the work of the basic organization between membership meetings, organize the implementation of their resolutions as well as of the resolutions of higher party organs. They propose the solution of tasks and problems which everyday life brings up or which arise from the local conditions in which the organization works. They report to the membership meeting on their activities and situation in the organization.

The trustee discharges the same function as the chairman of the basic organization. He is the chief organizer of the organization's activities, sees to it that the organization performs its task and mission both in intraparty life and its influence on the workers. He is in contact with the okres party committee. Together with his deputy, he is responsible for the timely and proper preparation and proceedings at the membership meetings. He discusses the affairs of the basic organization with the management personnel at the workplace or in the locality, and with the officials of mass organizations, and follows up the activity of communists who work in these sectors. He is responsible for keeping proper membership records, for party correspondence and other paperwork, for safe filing of party documents and economical use of the organization's funds.

The deputy trustee takes care of other sectors of party activity--ideological, mass political and educational work, party indoctrination, personal and



visual propaganda, party press and so on. He takes care of party correspondence and other paperwork, keeps the minutes of party meetings, keeps records on members and candidate members, prepares reports for the party organs, registers correspondence and other written documentation. He collects the membership dues in the amount set by the CPCZ Central Committee and records them. He procures members' ip stamps and provides for their timely placing in the membership cards and candidate members' certificates. He takes care of economic matters of the basic organization.

This division of labor can be organized in a different way with regard to minor questions. In accordance with the local conditions and needs of party work, it is necessary to assign concrete tasks also to other members of the basic organization, make them participate in the preparation of membership meetings, political-organizational, ideological-educational and mass political work in the implementation of party resolutions.

10501

CSO: 2400/72



DECREE ON REUNITING FAMILIES, ALIEN MARRIAGES

Text of Decree

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German Part I No 26, 27 Sep 83 pp 254-255

/"Decree of 15 September 1983 Regulating Questions of Family Reunions and Marriages between GDR Citizens and Foreigners," signed by W. Stoph, Chairman, GDR Council of Ministers and F. Dickel, minister of interior and chief of GDR People's Police, in East Berlin on 15 September 1983/

/Text/ To settle issues of reuniting families and marriages between citizens of the German Democratic Republic and foreigners, the following is decreed:

Article 1

Scope

(1) This decree applies to foreigners who wish to take up residence in the German Democratic Republic for the purpose of family reunion, and to GDR citizens who wish to take up residence abroad for the purpose of family reunion. It also applies to GDR citizens wishing to marry a foreigner.

(2) This decree regulates the procedures and prerequisites for approving domiciliary residence in the GDR and a change of domicile to a foreign country for the purpose of family reunion as well as the approval of marriages between GDR citizens and foreigners.

Subjection to Licence and Application Procedure for Domiciliary Residence in the GDR

Article 2

Domiciliary residence of aliens in the GDR requires the approval of the competent GDR state organs.

Article 3

(1) Applications for domiciliary residence in the GDR must be submitted in writing to the embassies or consular representations of the GDR abroad or the competent state organs in the GDR.

(2) Entitled to submit applications are foreigners who have completed their 18th year and have family members domiciled in the GDR. Parents are entitled to submit applications on behalf of their minor children.

#### Article 4

Approval of domiciliary residence in the GDR may be granted if such residence does not run counter to the interests of the GDR, in particular the protection of public order and security.

#### Subjection to Licence and Application Procedure for Change of Domicile to Another Country

#### Article 5

A GDR citizen's change of domicile to another country requires the approval of the competent GDR state organs.

#### Article 6

(1) Applications for change of domicile to another country must be submitted in writing to the competent state organs in the GDR.

(2) Entitled to apply are GDR citizens who have met the conditions of Article 7 and have completed their 18th year. Parents are entitled to apply on behalf of their minor children. If parents apply on behalf of children who have completed their 14th year, the agreement of these children is required.

#### Conditions for the Approval of Domiciliary Change to Another Country

#### Article 7

(1) Approval for domiciliary change to another country may be granted by the competent state organ to reunite parents with their minor children whose custody they have been awarded, provided that the parents or their minor children are foreigners and domiciled abroad.

(2) Article 1 also applies to single major children or parents who, due to their physical or mental state, wish to move to the domicile of the parents or children for the purpose of nursing care.

(3) The competent state organ may grant permission for a change in domicile to another country to reunite a married couple if the marriage had the approval of the competent state organs as per Article 18 of the Dispensation of Justice Law of 5 December 1975 (GB1 I No 46 p 748), or one of the spouses took up domicile abroad with the approval of the competent GDR state organs.

#### Article 8

(1) Approval may be withheld if the rights of GDR citizens and other social interests of the GDR might be adversely affected by the change of domicile to another country. That applies in particular if

- Minors who have completed their 14th year refuse their agreement as per Article 6, Paragraph 2;
- Custody or visiting rights of GDR citizens are affected with regard to minors;
- The applicants would leave behind in the GDR children, parents, grandparents or siblings in need of care and assistance;
- Adverse effects might be incurred for the care or welfare of citizens due to the profession exercised by the applicant;
- The applicant has failed to meet liabilities in the GDR;
- No orderly administration of real property, buildings and other property of the applicant is guaranteed;
- The information in the documents accompanying the application is incorrect.

(2) Approval for a change of domicile to another country must be denied if

- Such approval would be contrary to GDR interests, especially with regard to the protection of public order and security;
- The applicant is or has been in the military or an equivalent service, and the subsequent period stipulated by the competent state organs has not elapsed;
- The applicant is involved in a criminal prosecution or needs to serve a jail sentence pronounced by the courts.

(3) The competent GDR state organs may make the issue of approval dependent on the presentation of certificates or confirmations by the competent organ of the state to which the domicile is to be changed, with regard to admission and social guarantees for the applicant (such as job, housing, school and professional education of the children).

#### Conditions and Application Procedure for the Issue of Approval of Marriage Between GDR Citizens and Foreigners

#### Article 9

Approval of a marriage as per Article 18 of the Dispensation of Justice Law may be given if

- Conditions allow the future spouses after marriage to take up joint residence in the GDR or abroad,
- and
- The legal marriage requirements of the GDR and the foreigner's country of origin have been met.

#### Article 10

(1) The application for approval of marriage must be submitted in writing to the kreis, city kreis or city district council, interior department, competent for the domicile of the GDR citizen. If the GDR citizen is permanently domiciled abroad, the respective embassy or consulate of the GDR is competent to receive the application.

(2) Entitled to submit the application are citizens of the GDR.

#### Article 11

(1) Approval of marriage is to be denied if the provisions of Article 9 fail to be met, or the information in the documents accompanying the application is not correct.

(2) Approval of marriage may be revoked up to the time it is concluded if it is noticed that incorrect information supplied with the application had resulted in the approval.

#### Article 12

##### Delays

(1) As a rule the competent state organs must decide on applications as per Article 3 Paragraph 1, Article 6 Paragraph 1 and Article 10 Paragraph 1 within 6 months of submission.

(2) The validity of an approval issued by one of the competent GDR state organs may carry a time limit. As a rule this time limit may not exceed 6 months. If extraordinary circumstances are involved, the time limit may be extended by the competent state organs upon application of the parties concerned.

(3) The approval of marriage lapses if the marriage has not taken place within 6 months. In justified exceptional instances the above mentioned time limit may be extended by the state organs competent for issuing approval of the marriage.

#### Article 13

(1) Applications as per Article 3 Paragraph 1 and Article 10 Paragraph 1 may be re-submitted if the reasons for denial of the applications have ceased to exist. The processing of such applications proceeds according to the provisions of this decree.

(2) The competent GDR state organs may refuse to receive renewed applications if the reasons for the denial of the original application still exist.

#### Article 14

##### Appeals

(1) The decisions issued as per this decree may be appealed. The person affected by the decision must be so instructed.

(2) Appeals must be submitted in writing and within 2 weeks from the issue of the decision to the manager of the competent kreis state organ. If he is unable to deal with the appeal, he must forward it to the manager of the superordinated state organ within 4 weeks from receipt. The latter must issue a final decision within 6 weeks. If this time limit cannot be observed, an interim decision must be issued.

#### Article 15

##### Concluding Provisions

(1) The Minister of Interior and Head of the German People's Police will issue implementing regulations to this decree.

(2) This decree takes effect on 15 October 1983.

##### Implementing Decree

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German Part I No 26, 27 Sep 83 pp 255-256

/First Implementing Regulation to the Decree on Regulating Questions of Reuniting Families and Marriages Between Citizens of the German Democratic Republic and Foreigners, 15 September 1983, signed by Dickel, minister of the interior and chief, German People's Police/

/Text/ The following is ordered on the basis of Article 15 Paragraph 1 of the Decree of 15 September 1983 on Regulating Questions of Reuniting Families and Marriages Between Citizens of the German Democratic Republic and Foreigners (GBI No 26 p 254):

To Article 3 of the Decree:

#### Article 1

(1) The application procedure includes:

- a) A formal application to take up domiciliary residence in the German Democratic Republic;
- b) An official certificate showing that the applicant is the guardian of the minor children included in the application;
- c) A police certificate of good behavior or equivalent official document;
- d) Other documents required by the competent state organs.

(2) Acceptance of the application must be denied if the applicant is not entitled to apply or the documents as per Paragraph 1 are not complete.



To Article 6 of the Decree:

#### Article 2

- (1) The application procedure includes:
  - a) A formal application for change of domicile to another country;
  - b) The written consent of children as per Article 6 Paragraph 2 of the Decree;
  - c) Other documents required by the competent organs.
- (2) Article 1 Paragraph 2 applies with regard to the acceptance of the application.

#### Article 3

- (1) In accordance with the request of the state organs competent for the approval of applications for a change of domicile to another country, the applicant must--following acceptance of the application--submit the required statements and certificates on the settlement with regard to real property and buildings owned and used by him as well as on his debt-free status.
- (2) If the statements and certificates listed in Paragraph 1 are not submitted to the state organ competent for the approval of the change of domicile to another country within 2 months from request as per Paragraph 1, the application is deemed to have been withdrawn. The competent state organ decides on justifiable exceptions.

To Article 10 of the Decree:

#### Article 4

- (1) The application procedure includes
  - a) A joint written statement by the future spouses on the intended joint domicile following marriage;
  - b) An application
    - As per Article 1 Paragraph 1 if the domicile after marriage is to be in the GDR, or
    - As per Article 2, Paragraph 2 if the domicile after marriage is to be in another country.
- (2) Article 1 Paragraph 2 applies to acceptance of the application.

#### Article 5

- (1) Consonant with the request of the competent GDR state organs, the applicant must submit the following supplementary documents with regard to the application:

- a) As per Article 10 Paragraph 4 of the Family Status Law, the foreigner involved must submit a certificate from his (her) country to the effect that there are no legal obstacles to the marriage;
  - b) Required data, certificates or other documents must be made available for inspection to verify that the legal requirements for marriage have been met.
- (2) The documents and other data to be submitted by foreigners need notarization for use in the GDR unless otherwise provided in international agreements.

To Article 12 of the Decree:

#### Article 6

- (1) The processing period for applications begins on the day of receipt of the complete application documents as per Article 1 Paragraph 1, Article 2 Paragraph 1 or Article 4 Paragraph 1 by the competent state organs in the GDR.
- (2) The processing period is interrupted for the time needed to bring forward the application documents as per Article 3 Paragraph 1 and Article 5 Paragraph 1.

#### Concluding Provisions

#### Article 7

This implementing regulation takes effect on 15 October 1983.

11698  
CSO: 2300/112

## KUBIAK REPORT INQUIRES INTO CAUSES OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish [special issue no date available]

[Text] Report of the PZPR Central Committee Commission Established To Inquire Into the Causes and Course of Social Conflicts in People's Poland (NOWE DROGI)

[Part I, pp 1-45]

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31 May 1983 on the Findings of the PZPR Central Committee Commission Estab-  
lished To Inquire Into the Causes and Course of Social Conflicts in People's  
Poland

The PZPR Central Committee has examined and discussed the report of the com-  
mission established by the Third Plenum of the Central Committee to inquire  
into the causes and course of social conflicts in people's Poland.

The Central Committee declares that the commission has carried out its work  
in accordance with the programmatic resolution of the Ninth Extraordinary Con-  
gress of the PZPR and the decisions of the Third Central Committee Plenum.  
The Central Committee hereby approves the commission's report and endorses  
the recommendations contained in it.

The Central Committee instructs the commission to prepare its report for publication in a special issue of NOWE DROGI, taking into account the remarks made during the discussion.

The Central Committee expresses its appreciation and thanks to the commission, together with all institutions and individuals who cooperated with it, for conscientiously performing the tasks assigned to it by the Ninth Congress and the Third Central Committee Plenum.

The Central Committee expresses the conviction that the commission's report and the recommendations contained in it will aid the ideological development and practical work of the party in carrying out the process of socialist renewal.

Report of the PZPR Central Committee Commission Established To Inquire Into the Causes and Course of Social Conflicts in People's Poland

"The political party's attitude to its own mistakes is one of the most important and most reliable tests of its own earnestness and of whether it is genuinely fulfilling its obligations to its own class and to all working people."

Vladimir Lenin

## I. Introduction

The Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), in a resolution passed on 20 July 1981, declared, "One of the important prerequisites of the credibility of the party and its program of socialist renewal is a thorough and honest assessment of all dramatic turns in Poland's post-war history and especially the painful Poznan tragedy of 1956 and the December 1970 tragedy in the Baltic coast region. To fulfill this objective, the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress obliges the Central Committee to appoint a commission to investigate all the circumstances and facts involved, including personal responsibility for the decisions which led to these tragedies. The commission should start its work immediately and present to the public within 12 months, both the facts and the conclusions ensuing therefrom for the party and state, so that this kind of tragedy can never occur again."

In implementing the decision of the Ninth Congress, the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee appointed, on 2 September 1981, a commission to investigate the circumstances, facts and causes of social conflicts in the history of people's Poland.

The plenum declared that the tasks of the commission would be the following:

--to examine and specify the social, economic and political background and the course of the crises, social tensions and conflicts, particularly those which took an especially dramatic course and led to tragic consequences;

--to submit proposals regarding the methods of examining and analyzing the state of sociopolitical life as an important instrument facilitating the earliest possible detection of the signs of rising social tensions; and

--to formulate the principles and methods of solving disputes, as required by the program of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress.

The commission was composed of Kazimierz Barcikowski, Jozef Baryla, Andrzej Burda, Eugeniusz Duraczynski, Tadeusz Fiszbach, Jan Glowszyk, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Stanislaw Kalkus, Czeslaw Kiszczak, Zbigniew Kowalski, Hieronim Kubiak, Ryszard Kucharski, Jan Labecki, Jaroslaw Ladosz, Marian Marek, Wladyslaw Markiewicz, Zbigniew Messner, Norbert Michta, Jan Mikulski, Miroslaw Milewski, Stanislaw Miskiewicz, Jozef Mitak, Jadwiga Nowakowska, Marian Orzechowski, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Jerzy Romanik, Wieslaw Skrzydlo, Edward Skrzypczak, Maria Stadnicka, Bronislaw Syzdek, Romuald Szwengler, Jerzy Topolski, Jerzy Wiatr and Sylwester Zawadzki.

At the commission's first meeting, held on 7 October 1981, Hieronim Kubiak was made chairman, and Eugeniusz Duraczynski was made secretary. The commission also appointed four working teams to study the periods 1948-56, 1968-70, and 1976-80, respectively, and to draft the final synthesis and conclusions.

After discussion, it was decided that in its studies of the causes, course and results of the crises, the commission should not leave aside an analysis of the directions of development of the Polish People's Republic and its positive results. It was also decided that regarding personal accountability, the commission would not engage in matters which fell within the responsibility of the Central Control Commission or within the jurisdiction of prosecuting bodies or courts of law.

The commission started its work by formulating research assignments, specifying the subjects and deadlines of expert reports and assigning individual authors or research institutions the task of preparing the said reports. Altogether, 69 such reports were prepared. The commission also established cooperation with the PZPR Voivodship committees in Gdansk, Szczecin, Poznan, Radom and Lodz and obtained materials which had been prepared for these local committees.

The studies included source material from the Central PZPR Archives, the Chancellery of the Central Committee Secretariat, records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense, as well as other generally accessible archives. The archives of voivodship party committees in those voivodships where conflicts were especially acute were also very useful. The commission took advantage of earlier works and scientific publications pertaining to the research topics, as well. Materials and information sent by individual persons and institutions were also taken into consideration.

At plenary sessions, commission members analyzed at length individual papers in the presence of their authors. There were also meetings involving experts in specific areas and some or all members of the working teams to discuss



detailed problems as they emerged during the preparation of the final report. After the working teams prepared synthetic appraisals relating to individual crises, these were discussed by the commission and then offered for consultation with representatives of selected groups. Such consultations included representatives of the party organization at the FSO car factory in Warsaw, party activists from the tri-city area [Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot], party activists from Szczecin, party activists and scientists from Lodz and representatives of the party branch organization at Silesia University.

At the inspiration of the commission, party branches at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan and the Jagiellonian University in Cracow organized scientific sessions. A session was also organized by the [PZPR Central Committee's] Higher School of Social Sciences, at the school's own initiative. Materials from all these sessions were used by the commission's working groups.

The commission encountered serious difficulties in its work. These were connected with the multitude and complexity of problems it examined, gaps in source materials, some of which resulted from occasionally shoddy documentation of the work of the organs of authority, and the unsatisfactory quality of part of the appraisals.

In order to meet the deadline set by the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, the commission prepared an initial draft of its final document and submitted it to the Politburo in August 1982. However, being aware of its shortcomings, the commission suggested to the Central Committee that it be given more time to carry out additional research projects and to consult with selected party branches on its findings.

The fact that the commission was working while the party was implementing the resolutions of the Ninth Extraordinary Congress had a positive impact on its efforts. The congress provided a political analysis of the contradictions, tensions and mounting social conflicts of the 1970's, which in mid-1980 led to an eruption of the worst crisis of all; it also specified a program of action to overcome that crisis. It was not the aim of the commission to develop or specify the guidelines of the ninth congress in this respect.

It should be recalled though that the resolutions of the ninth congress were aimed at devising the following coherent program:

- building an efficient economic system which would correspond to the possibilities and needs of the present period of building socialism in Poland;
- strengthening the state through the development of socialist democracy and institutions pertaining to it;
- consolidating the rule of law, making it identical for all state institutions and all citizens;
- implementing the principles of social justice;
- effectively diagnosing, revealing and overcoming the contradictions of social development and properly steering this development.

The systematic solutions corresponding to these aims should favor an early detection of negative phenomena, while providing guarantees of an effective influence on settling various contradictions in the interest of the working

class and other classes and strata dedicated to socialism; also, they should guarantee the rectification of political and economic policy moves in order to prevent the evolution of contradictions into social conflicts and crises. The practical activity of the party during the preparation for the ninth congress, as well as after that congress, matched these assumptions.

This is especially true of the martial law period, which not only saved the socialist state from a counterrevolutionary threat and a total collapse of the economy, which was torn apart by anarchy and strike madness, but also secured internal peace, consolidated the process of stabilization of social life and introduced necessary reforms to the state and legal system as required by the ninth congress resolution.

On the initiative of the party, the political alliances that cooperate with it and Sejm deputies, as well as taking advantage of numerous government initiatives, the Sejm, as the supreme organ of state power, launched unprecedentedly broad legislative and control activity; this applied to plenary meetings as well as the work of all parliamentary commissions.

With a view to insuring better coordination of the process of preparation of draft laws and resolutions and taking into account the opinions and experience of the public, the Sejm appointed a socioeconomic council, made up of workers, peasants and outstanding specialists. By October 1980, the Sejm brought the Supreme Board of Inspection back under its direct control. The legislative initiative of the party and political alliances and organizations, channeled to the parliamentary agenda by party caucuses, and deputies' parliamentary activity have been providing a solid framework for a system of transformations perpetuating the process of socialist renewal guaranteed by institutions and laws. During the 3 years that have passed since the autumn of 1980, and especially after the introduction of martial law, the Sejm passed several dozen laws that were of great significance to the system, the functioning of public life, the national economy and culture.

An economic reform, i.e., a set of new economic assumptions and mechanisms, has been put into effect. The Sejm passed a 3-year socioeconomic plan for the years 1983-85, complete with anti-inflation and savings programs, which, when combined, create conditions for a consistent and gradual overcoming of the economic crisis. The authorities adopted a program to develop agriculture and food production and distribution, as well as a uniform policy for all sectors of farming and new principles of land use. A new taxation system, based on the principles of social justice and an economic rationale, has been introduced.

In line with the provisions of the ninth congress resolutions the gap between the lowest and the highest pay was radically narrowed. At the end of 1982, minimum pay was 5,400 zlotys a month, or 59.2 percent of the mean pay.

At the same time, those earning more than 3.5 times the national average accounted for a mere 0.4 percent of the total number of people employed in the national economy; of this 0.4 percent, a huge majority were the highest

paid coal miners working overtime on Saturdays. In fact, concern for the lowest-paid workers and the social sensitivity of the socialist state actually led to an excessive leveling of pay, unjustified by the real input of labor and the requirements of the economy in many instances. The social principles of the socialist system were also a reason for introducing new concepts to the state welfare system, notably with regard to old age pensions and family benefits, by raising allowances and introducing the principle of superannuation. There have also been new forms of protection and assistance to families, including single mothers and young married couples, and protection of the interests of persons and families in a difficult financial situation. Also, new decisions regarding the system of social insurance for private farmers, the principles of distribution of apartments and health protection have been made.

The recently established Cultural Development Fund creates durable foundations for the development of national culture. The situation of teachers and university lecturers has improved as a result of recent decisions.

A series of new institutional guarantees of the rule of law in the functioning of the state system have been introduced. This applies in particular to the Constitutional Tribunal (passing judgment on the compatibility of regulations issued by the supreme state bodies with the constitution) and the Tribunal of State (passing verdicts on the constitutional accountability of people holding top state posts), as well as to increasing the powers of common courts of law and the Supreme Administrative Court along with the growth in prestige of legal services and legal protection bodies.

New legislation on censorship has been passed and the press law has been drafted. The law on the status of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the terms of reference of the bodies subordinated to it has settled the duty of defending the socialist rule of law, its scope and determinants. It also specified the powers of the minister with regard to the protection of public security and order; it defined the forms and methods of executing these powers and at the same time the limits of interference in the domain of human rights by specifying the organizational structure and principles of operation of the internal affairs office, the security service and the Civil Militia, as well as the mode by which militiamen discharge their duties. Presenting to the public at Sejm plenary meetings the reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, prosecuting bodies and judicial authorities has been introduced.

The struggle against crime has been intensified. The most difficult moral and civic issues, such as the social plagues afflicting the economy and social life, have been tackled on a much larger scale than ever before. New legal rules have been enacted which facilitate a more efficient war on profiteering, bribery and social parasitism; also, a system of official and social struggle against manifestations of these plagues has been activated. A new law introduces a comprehensive system of educating society in a spirit of sobriety and preventing alcohol abuse, creating conditions for the participation of all patriotic forces and communities in an effort to overcome phenomena which threaten public health and social morality.

The institutions and legal principles of operation of various instruments of socialist democracy have been defined by law and have been shaped in practice; this concerns in particular social self-government in all its multiple forms, incorporating workers' self-management and peasants' self-government, cooperative or university self-government.

The law on people's councils and local self-governments is of immense importance from the point of view of the system. Its aim is to broaden and insure active participation by residents of towns and the countryside in cogoverning and assuming coresponsibility for the problems of their area and the whole country.

The law on trade unions created a legal framework for their development and effective work. At the same time, it initiated the process of a trade union revival movement, which is quite advanced by now, and its development based on the principles of autonomy and independence from state and economic administration, combined with the observance of constitutional norms.

Many essential changes have taken place in the functioning of the Government of the Polish People's Republic and its subordinate bodies. Of the 448 people currently holding the posts of ministers, undersecretaries of state and directors-general in ministries, heads and deputy heads of central offices, voivodes and deputy voivodes, as many as 323, or 72 percent, were appointed to these posts after August 1980; at the government level alone, this number is even higher. The coalitional nature of the government is now more fully expressed in the composition of the state and government authorities. Next to PZPR activists, United Peasants Alliance (ZSL) and Democratic Alliance (SD) politicians as well as activists with no party affiliation, notably representatives of lay Catholics' organizations, have been appointed to many positions of responsibility.

This new approach, which incorporates respect for the distinctness of the partners, has enriched and strengthened the alliance of the parties and the close cooperation between the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD. The government has been working "with a raised curtain," presenting its programs and plans for activities to the public in various forms and systematically informing society about the implementation of these. The Council of Ministers and its chairman have been taking advantage of vigorous activity of social consultative bodies, made up of scientists and other outstanding experts, as well as social and economic activists, workers and farmers, which has had a significant impact on the preparation of government decisions. These bodies include the Consultative Economic Council, the National Cultural Council, the Food Council, the Consumer Market Council, the Council for Family Life and the Council for Youth. The Commission for Economic Reform has also been playing an important role.

Various forms of social discussions and consultations have been introduced. A general outline of a law on social consultations that will govern this important area has been drafted. Under this law, trade unions, social organizations and other groups must be consulted on the drafts of basic state decisions (new legislation, the fundamental elements of socioeconomic plans, etc.).



The Council of Ministers has set up the Opinion Research Center which co-operates with other public opinion research institutions that were established earlier; it is probing the opinion of various groups, especially the working class, by using various types of research methods and tools. The results of this research have been helpful in gauging public moods and in taking into consideration citizens' opinions in the decision-making process and subsequently studying the social effects of the decisions in question.

The government has embarked on a process of improving the work of the civil service by expecting more of civil service workers, by introducing the practice of formally taking an oath and the duty of submitting a personal property declaration. Staff reviews have been continued and a system of staff training is being developed.

A civil servant's code of ethics has also been prepared. Better relations between the administration and citizens has also been emphasized, especially with regard to responding to letters, complaints and suggestions. A complex system of control, including control of the work of the administration, is being introduced.

The party, the political alliances and social associations of Christians and lay Catholics are the signatories of a declaration of a new movement which has appeared in the Polish political system and has had a chance to play an important role in the process of national conciliation and revival. This movement is the Patriotic Movement of National Revival, which has been encouraging understanding and building the unity of society on the basis of recognition of the supreme national and socialist aims, while taking advantage of the social diversity of motivations and choices dictated by world outlooks and the methods for attaining these goals.

The processes taking place within the party itself since its ninth congress are especially significant. Guided by its integrally-understood resolutions and the statutes adopted at that congress, the party has been strengthening its Marxist-Leninist identity, its unity and capacity for action, as well as its ties with the working class. It has retained its leading role within the state and is striving to fully regain its leading role in society. With 2.3 million people on its membership rolls now, the party is concerned about maintaining its character as a party of the working class.

The main brunt of party work has been gradually shifting toward its [factory-level] branches. Carrying out the decisions of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of February 1982, the party has been overcoming and rejecting the symptoms of divisions inherited from the pre-August and especially the post-August period, ridding itself of ideologically alien influences that used to weaken it. These branches have been increasingly active in shaping and expressing working-class opinions and initiatives in factories and institutions, as well as the initiatives of rural communities. Their ideological life has gradually become richer and discipline has been improving.

The flow of information within the party and the availability of materials useful in ideological work and in shaping the awareness of the laws and mechanisms governing the economy has been improving.

Through its political and ideological activity in various communities, the party is seeking to undo the damage and the superficiality that ideological and educational work has acquired over the years and, more importantly to overcome the damage to social consciousness that was done by antisocialist activities and subversive propaganda, specifically the negation of the achievements of real socialism, the nihilistic attitude toward the state, putting society at loggerheads with the authorities, the nationalist trends and lack of understanding of and arbitrary approach to economic laws and mechanisms.

The position of elective bodies, of committees at all levels, has been consolidated. The executive levels reports to these bodies on their activity. The composition and the style of work of the Central Committee has undergone a fundamental change. Its members, a large majority of whom are workers and peasants, are active not only at plenary meetings but also in the work of the Central Committee's 16 commissions dealing with specific problems, in periodical seminars and consultative meetings, and in the preparation and appraisal of materials for plenary meetings; they have been voicing their opinion on the development of the situation within the party and society. They are taking an active part in meetings in factories and institutions and in various communities. Both the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat have been working collectively, systematically and intensively, informing the party and society about their work, initiatives and decisions.

The principle of openness of party life has been observed in practice. By publishing not only the resolutions of its authorities but also schedules for implementation, and subsequent reports on this implementation, the party submits itself to public appraisal and control.

Members of the party authorities maintain ties and cooperate with specific enterprises, party members and social groups, they take part in conferences of party and working class activists, pass information about the party's plans and activities, offer its initiatives for public consultation and get a reliable picture of public opinion. A majority of party apparat employees are members of party branches in industrial enterprises.

As recommended by the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee, the system of examining and reacting to suggestions from within the party as well as to letters and complaints from citizens has been elevated to a higher rank in the practical activity of party branches and authorities at various levels.

A fundamental change in the party's cadre selection policy and the state's personnel policy, as promised by the ninth congress, has begun.

The ninth congress decided that severe punishment should be applied to PZPR members who held posts in its highest executive bodies in the 1970's and thus were responsible for the errors that led to the emergence of the crisis and its exceptional dimensions.

Either on the strength of the resolution of the ninth congress or the Central Committee Commission, and taking into account the findings and

conclusions of a commission (established by the 10th plenum on 28 April 1981) to appraise the course of proceedings to date and to speed up work on the personal accountability of PZPR members holding the highest posts, the severest party sanction, i.e., expulsion from party ranks, was applied to the following persons who had earlier been removed from the Central Committee and asked to resign their parliamentary seats as well as their membership on the Council of State: Edward Gierek, first secretary of the Central Committee from December 1970 to September 1980; Piotr Jaroszewicz, member of the Politburo and prime minister of the Polish government from December 1970 to February 1980; and Edward Babiuch, Zdzislaw Grudzien, Jerzy Lukaszewicz, Tadeusz Pyka, Jan Szydlak, Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, and Zdzislaw Zandarowski, who all used to occupy senior positions in the party and government.

At the same time, the ninth congress obliged the Central Committee and the PZPR Sejm caucus to consider a motion to establish a constitutional tribunal and to launch appropriate legislative initiatives. In a law of 26 March 1982, the Sejm amended the Constitution and established the Constitutional Tribunal and the Tribunal of State. In another law passed on the same day, the Sejm settled the issue of principles, form and procedures of constitutional accountability. Under a provision of the law on the Tribunal of State, the Sejm appointed a Commission for Constitutional Accountability, elected a Tribunal of State and adopted regulations governing its proceedings.

Bowing to public criticism of those responsible for the crisis, a group of 125 Sejm deputies submitted a preliminary motion to bring former Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz and former deputy premiers Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, Jan Szydlak and Tadeusz Pyka before the Tribunal of State. In the same motion, the deputies suggested that should be ascertained whether or not there was any legal groundwork for calling to account Edward Gierek and Edward Babiuch. The deputies' motion was submitted to the Sejm Constitutional Accountability Commission for an appropriate investigation, the conclusions from which would be passed on to the Sejm. The Constitutional Accountability Commission compiled indispensable materials and documents, took testimony from the persons listed in the preliminary motion, specified charges against individual persons, interrogated the defendants and, in July 1983, finalized its conclusions, which it submitted to the Sejm. In a resolution dealing with Piotr Jaroszewicz and Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, the commission charged them with violation of the Constitution by adopting important socioeconomic decisions which significantly altered socioeconomic plans, infringing on the principles of a proper investment policy, concealing information about the true state of indebtedness of the country and the impact this debt would have on the entire economic situation, and distorting statistical data. If the Sejm decided that specified persons should be brought to constitutional accountability, it would send the case to the Tribunal of State.

For the first month after August 1980, and especially after the ninth congress, the PZPR Central Control Commission and control commissions at lower levels launched proceedings against leading party and state activists in central-level and local branches and raised charges against certain authorities of an ethical and ideological nature, accusing them of infringing on binding party principles and statutes. Between October 1980 and the end of

1982, the Central Control Commission and control commissions at all other levels examined 14,200 cases of this kind. After careful investigation, the charges raised against 11,500 comrades proved to be unfounded. In those cases in which offenses were found to have occurred, 894 persons were expelled from the party and 1,813 were subject to other types of party disciplinary measures.

The examination of charges against 181 PZPR members holding senior positions in the state and economic administration and the party apparatus was especially significant.

The charges concerned the abuse of authority for financial gains. There were also charges of inefficient management, which included mainly participation in the making of decisions on investment projects which led to evident economic losses. Out of these 181 people, 65 were expelled from the party and 68 faced other party sanctions. All those who were disciplined were also recalled from the posts they occupied. Thorough investigations proved that the charges against 48 comrades could not be substantiated.

The process of purging the party was followed not only with great interest by society, but also with a great deal of emotion that was not always related to facts. There were frequent libelous accusations, irresponsible generalizations, and premature sensational reports. Even some state institutions and party authorities displayed such an attitude, actually helping to intensify the anti-VIP psychosis. Beyond a doubt, the political enemy was also trying to exploit the process of party purification. By resorting to slander and taking advantage of the abuses which were, after all, of a limited scope if viewed from a nationwide angle, this enemy was trying to discredit the whole party and popular authorities and blemish the good name of ideologically committed and active cadres. One feature of the self-purification process was the observance of all the legal requirements both in making accusations and in conducting the defense of the accused. The process of purging the party and its apparatus consolidated the principle of rule of law and awareness of law in society that had earlier been undermined both by impunity and by libelous charges and gossip or even the tendency to take justice into one's own hands and seek revenge.

In 1982, when party proceedings relating to cases of the 1970's were in principle completed, party control commissions at all levels actively joined in the implementation of the resolutions of the fourth and the seventh plenums of the Central Committee, especially with regard to the ideological and political self-determination of PZPR members, and they proceeded to counteract endeavors to weaken the unity of the party.

An almost complete turnover of top cadre positions took place within the party as a result of the election campaign preceding the ninth congress. This turnover included 80 percent of the membership of voivodship committees and over 65 percent of the membership of town, gmina and factory branches.



Since August 1980, well in excess of 50 percent of the apparatus has been replaced. As much as 65.7 percent of elective posts (Central Committee secretaries, voivodship committee secretaries, chairmen of control commissions) are now filled by different comrades. Out of the 49 voivodship committees, first secretaries have been replaced in 48, and in some instances twice.

The resolutions of the ninth congress and the PZPR statutes then adopted consolidate the foundations of intraparty democracy based on the Leninist principles of party life. The partial restrictions on the functioning of democratic mechanisms imposed by the Politburo in connection with requirements of martial law and later endorsed by the seventh plenum, were gradually lifted and then completely removed on 26 July 1983. The process of salutary changes inside the party, its political, ideological and moral consolidation on the ground of full restoration of the statutory principles and mechanisms of democratic centralism, taken up by the ninth congress, is the basic condition for effectively discharging the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party.

The scope of regulations and changes pertaining to the party and the state, resulting from the resolutions of the ninth congress and reflecting the line of socialist renewal discussed above, does not mean that satisfactory progress has already been made in all the areas in question. However, the decisions that were made and their consistent implementation have initiated a historic process and furnished conditions indispensable for its continuation. The conclusions that the party is drawing from the crises should strengthen the conviction to staunchly defend this policy line.

The commission is of the opinion that a consistent and uncompromising quest for truth and its honest presentation are indispensable for drawing constructive conclusions from past experience and introducing guarantees which will prevent a recurrence of the ills leading to crises in the life of the party and the socialist state.

The commission decided to present its findings in the following way: Chapter II of this report contains a chronological survey of the social crises of 1956, 1970 and 1980-81. This chapter focuses on the evolution of the situation and is specific about the developments mentioned in the resolutions of the ninth congress and the third plenum of the Central Committee.

It also provides an analysis of various spheres of party and state activity, with special emphasis of the phenomena that engendered the crises.

Chapter III of this report contains the authors' conclusions. While critically appraising past experience, the commission attempted, on the one hand, to formulate the general principles of correct activity, and on the other, to show what must be done, what must be avoided and rejected in party and state activity, in the contents and structure of collective life. The commission also formulated a number of postulates which, in its opinion, may contribute to Poland's faster emergence from the crisis and prevent the eruption of tensions, conflicts and crises in the future.

In presenting its report, the commission makes a number of additional remarks.

The commission attempted to find instructions regarding the method of analyzing contradictions and social conflicts and crises that have occurred in the history of building socialism in Poland in the records and guidelines of the ninth congress. But the terms "social conflict" and "social crisis" are understood in a number of ways, and the same developments have even been alternately referred to as conflicts or crises. Therefore, the commission feels that it is under an obligation to explain the difference between the two terms.

As a rule, the root of social conflicts lies in clash of interests of social groups or strata. The social conflicts examined in this report had socio-economic determinants for the most part, particularly the contradiction between the level of productive forces and the state of social aspirations, the economic, social and political structures and the methods of exercising power; they stemmed from errors made in defining, and especially in implementing socialist goals.

External determinants resulting from imperialist cold-war aggression, the arms race and the growth of tension in the international arena also exerted a great impact on the emergence and aggravation of contradictions and the mounting of social crises.

An accumulation of contradictions as a rule sparks a social conflict. Yet not all conflicts lead to destructive processes. It is a well-known fact that contradictions are the driving force of historical processes and that social progress is attained by overcoming contradictions. However, in a situation when numerous conflicts have a cumulative effect and when they are not resolved quickly or in a proper manner, they become social crises. Such a crisis is usually characterized by a sudden outburst of social discontent, a disruption of development and, at least, considerably upsetting the operation of the control mechanisms of political, social and economic life.

A "social crisis" is, therefore, a process of pathological changes in the contents and forms of public life; it can apply to the whole society or to individual areas of it. Every social crisis is at the same time a social conflict--or set of conflicts--but not every conflict and not even every set of conflicts becomes a social crisis.

In people's Poland, crises which resulted from an accumulation of contradictions and conflicts erupted in the years 1956, 1970 and 1980-81. It should be noted that unlike the former two, the third crisis could be divided in two stages.

The first stage, the symptoms of which were evident as early as the mid-1970's, manifested itself in the form of outbursts of workers' discontent and culminated in the signing of the August-September accords, after which the wave of strikes and tension subsided. Indications of an emergence from the crisis

appeared, while the motto "socialism--yes, distortions--no" was to specify the direction of the changes that followed.

However, the second stage of the crisis soon began to develop. Then, the counterrevolutionary threat to the socialist system, national security, the functioning of the economy and Poland's statehood itself came to the fore. These phenomena were arrested by the 13 December 1981 imposition of martial law, which initiated a prolonged process of overcoming diverse manifestations of the crisis.

This report also deals with the developments of 1968 and 1976, which were not treated by the commission as crises but as signs that a crisis was in the offing.

The commission's aim was to examine the causes, course and effects of these crises; naturally, the emphasis was on negative phenomena. However, the truth about the history of the party and people's Poland is that although highly negative phenomena occasionally appeared--with the results that the achievements of socialism were not as great as they could have been--generally speaking, a historic breakthrough and progress occurred in Poland and development proceeded along an ascending curve in the direction of socialism. For only as a socialist country could Poland overcome the centuries of development backlog and war damage within such a short period of time, becoming a land where the working class and all working people could advance, a land recording enormous gains in civilization, education and culture.

At the same time, the commission voices the hope that the results of its labors will have a preventive effect, contributing to an even more determined elimination of negative phenomena from Polish life, and serving the cause of development and consolidation of the socialist renewal, a successful building of socialism.

## II. Characteristic Features of Social Conflicts and Crises in the History of People's Poland

The emergence of people's Poland, its present system, territorial shape and alliances with other states have proved the historical maturity and accuracy of the political thought of Polish communists and the Polish revolutionary left. Their main ideas have been realized by the working class in close alliance with peasants and the working intelligentsia. The correctness of choosing the socialist road has been confirmed as the nation gradually multiplied its lasting achievements, despite the failures and mistakes made along the way and the accompanying social tensions and conflicts.

Difficult experiences during the decades of struggle for class and national liberation prepared the working class for performing the hegemonic role in the struggle for an independent and socialist Poland. The Polish working class's organized revolutionary movement began over 100 years ago. Thirty-five years have passed since the historic merger of workers' parties which gave birth to the Polish United Workers' Party.

Immediate conditions for socialist transformations of a social and political nature developed during the war and the Nazi occupation. The development of these conditions was possible due to the bankruptcy of the bourgeois camp's political conception, the working class's gradual ripening for the role of the fundamental political force in society, and the support granted to it by the most progressive strata of peasants and the intelligentsia.

The Polish Workers' Party (PPR) played the main role in the process of a deliberate shaping of these conditions. The PPR manifesto "What Are We Fighting For?," issued in November 1943, and the Manifesto of the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) proclaimed on 22 July 1944, were historic programs determining Poland's future.

The liberation of Poland by the Soviet Army and the Polish Army, which fought at its side, created objective conditions for the working class and its class allies to take over and defend power in the state. A fundamental breakthrough in Poland's history was effected by a social revolution. As a consequence of profound social reforms, of abolishing the economic and political power of the classes of owners, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, the old class-and-stratum structure of society underwent an essential change.

A fundamental revolution in agrarian relations was effected as a result of the agrarian reform, eliminating the effects of German colonization, settling the regained Western and Northern Territories, and dividing the so-called mortmain land among peasants. As a consequence of these agrarian transformations and the nationalization of forest land and a considerable portion of the agricultural industry's facilities, socialist agriculture could develop.

The socialist sector was established in the economy as a result of nationalizing large and medium-sized enterprises and banks. Workers played the most important role in starting up factories and reconstructing them, becoming their actual masters. Worker activists took part in implementing the agrarian reform. Workers also made a great contribution in defending and strengthening people's authorities. It was the workers who made the greatest sacrifices and carried the heaviest burdens of the revolutionary transformations.

Peasants also made an important contribution to the process of revolution and reconstruction. They also took part in defending people's rule and made the greatest contribution to feeding the cities and supplying money to the state budget.

Initially, only a part of the old intelligentsia consciously identified itself with the revolution. However, during the process of reconstructing the country, of developing its economy, education and culture, an increasing number and then even the majority of those in the old intelligentsia circles found themselves a place in the new reality and availed themselves of the opportunity to realize in an active way their patriotic and professional aspirations. Meanwhile, children of worker and peasant families who grew up under the new conditions joined the ranks of the intelligentsia.



The reconstruction and revolutionary transformations extended to cover a very vast area of culture and education. Historical hallmarks of these processes included the elimination of illiteracy as a social phenomenon, by introducing free and general education on all levels, effective actions promoting leadership, etc. Real opportunities were created for vast numbers of the working masses to enjoy a civilizational and cultural promotion and to actively participate in the sociopolitical and economic life of the country.

The reconstruction of Poland from unprecedented war-time destruction, the rebuilding of the economy, the taking over, settlement and development of the regained territories, and the process of transforming the country's socioeconomic structure and propagating education and culture among the masses released the energy of millions of Poles. During the first years following the war, the Polish society made exceptional sacrifices and displayed exceptional creative enthusiasm, a firm will to reconstruct work places, to strengthen the country and its position in the international arena. As the patriotic activity of the nation grew, people's--worker-and-peasant--democracy was actualized; its essential feature was the extensive participation of masses of the people in solving problems of varying social significance.

The base from which the state and economic leadership apparatus recruited its members underwent a major change, assuming worker-peasant class character. A similar change took place in officers' corps and the public order and security apparatus. The old, democratically-oriented intelligentsia--specialists in various fields--also joined in managing the country.

The democratic camp achieved indisputable successes in basic issues. However, the successes were neither easy nor painless. A fierce class struggle was under way--the reactionary enemies of people's authorities set up underground antistate organizations and used terror tactics in relation to the local institutions of people's power. Thousands of members and activists of the PPR and other parties of the democratic bloc, activists of the Youth Struggle Union (ZWM) and other left youth organizations, militiamen, security officers and soldiers of the people's army lost their lives.

Supported by the actions of the armed underground, the political oppositions, represented primarily by the Polish Peasants Alliance (PSL), tried to arrest revolutionary transformations.

Despite attempts on the part of the counterrevolutionary underground, it has been possible to prevent a civil war on a national scale and gradually win social support for the policy of the new, people's authorities. Diverse weapons and forms of political activity were used to overcome the oppositions and obstacles, to defend and strengthen people's rule. Former soldiers of the Home Army (AK) and other organizations, who proved their patriotism and democratic beliefs, were attracted to the idea of active work for people's Poland. At the same time, a fierce struggle was waged against the leaders and activists of the London camp, who were opposed to people's rule and the Soviet Union. Following several years of struggle against political clericalism allied with the political opposition, and after the completion of the difficult process of separating the church from the state, a government-

episcopate agreement was signed in April 1950. Political divisions dating back to the war and the occupation receded. Society, its basic classes and strata, gradually became integrated around supreme shared goals. These goals were represented by people's authorities and the political parties and alliances constituting the democratic camp. The pivotal point of this strategy was the PPR's political thought, which the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the bloc of democratic alliances agreed with on vital issues.

Following the 1947 elections to the Legislative Sejm, the political situation in the country clearly grew more stable. The implementation of the 3-year 1947-49 plan--the first multiyear socioeconomic plan--began. Apart from being a major step toward overcoming the country's serious backwardness and reconstructing its economy, the plan envisaged raising the working people's living standards above the prewar level. Its targets were achieved in time. The plan consolidated changes in the country's economic and social structure, greatly strengthening the socialist sector in the national economy.

The difficult tasks of reconstruction, development and revolutionary transformations were fulfilled at a time when the international situation was deteriorating owing to the imperialist circles. The so-called Cold War intensified, the world grew increasingly divided into two opposing political blocs. Although the influence and size of the internal political opposition diminished greatly, it increasingly became an instrument of global anticommunism.

Because of the international situation, the fierceness of class conflicts and the harsh lessons experienced in the course of the struggle imposed on the authorities by the counterrevolutionary underground, certain incorrect views and moves in the political and economic spheres were unavoidable. They were an outcome of a shortage of properly trained managerial cadres, of a lack of experience in the exercise of power, and of the fact that a concept for the development of socialism in Poland which specified the roads and methods of implementing it, was only beginning to develop. Debates and controversies on those matters occurred between the PPR and PPS and within both parties. Although a full program did not emerge, important elements were worked out, especially at the first PPR congress in December 1945. These elements have been rather imprecisely termed the Polish road to socialism, which was understood as a method of building socialism by realizing its universal properties under actual Polish conditions.

The shortcomings and weaknesses of 1944-48, especially the mistakes committed in the later period, should be viewed against this backdrop. Apart from the abovedescribed personnel situation, the sources of these errors included an underestimation of the role of allied political forces and the experiences gained from patriotic agreements reached during the struggle for Poland's liberation by a number of leading PPR activists, a rapid growth in party ranks which outstripped the membership's ideological development, etc. Models arising from the area of influence of Hilary Minc gradually started to dominate the sphere of organization of economic life, planning and the cooperative movement. Studies, research and discussions with authors of diverging proposals were abandoned.

## The 1948 Political Breakthrough and the 1956 Crisis

An abrupt change with far-reaching consequences occurred in the PPR's political line in mid-1948. This change, whose manner surprised even the party and which was preceded by a crisis in the party leadership, was dogmatic and sectarian in nature. It manifested itself in a renunciation of the previous concept and forms of the gradual socialist transformation of political and socioeconomic structures, and by an arbitrarily imposed acceleration of the pace of these transformations by means of noneconomic forms of coercion. Serious differences developed between members of the PPR leadership primarily around these issues.

External circumstances and a change in the European communist and working class movement were also of great importance. This change took place in the face of a growing threat of war posed by imperialism, an intensification of cold war and anticommunist psychoses, and a conflict between the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This conflict was watched with close attention in these circumstances and seriously influenced the parties affiliated with the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) founded in 1947. The PPR Politburo majority, led by Boleslaw Bierut (who in August 1948 was summoned for active work in the party), Jakub Berman, Roman Zambrowski and Hilary Minc, took advantage of these circumstances to remove Wladyslaw Gomulka from the party leadership and to introduce the abovementioned changes to the PPR's political line. Bierut became the party leader. He enjoyed a reputation as an activist of the cooperative and working class movements, and particularly as the leader of the National People's Council (KRN) at the time of the underground struggle against the occupying force. In people's Poland he became the KRN president and, from February 1947, he held the greatly prestigious title of president of the Polish republic. He had won public support by representing Poland and its frontiers in the international forum, by an active involvement in rebuilding and developing the country, by his ability to talk with various communities and by his concern for national culture.

Gomulka was charged with rightist-nationalist deviations, with far-reaching consequences, dating back to the time of the war. In this way, the new leadership justified the need to make changes and endeavored to win the support of the PPR rank-and-file and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) which would soon merge with the PPR. The followers of the new line found another excuse for their actions in the thesis that class struggle was aggravated as the construction of socialism progressed. This belief was later used to justify the limitation of democracy's range and, in early 1957, became one of the main justifications for violating the rule of law. Charges against Gomulka were extended to include his closest PPR associates from the time of the Nazi occupation and became more serious at the Third PZPR Central Committee Plenum in November 1949. The defendants' positions were assessed as being favorable toward antisocialist forces. This assessment, in turn, was quoted as a reason for their arrest and for preparations for political trials of the party's leading activists.

Poland's rapid development, its transformation from a country in which agriculture was more important than industry into one in which industry took the lead, and the construction of the foundations of socialism were all carried out as a process of industrialization in which the construction of the capital goods industry was given preferential treatment. Collectivization of private farms, which began at the same time, was expected to greatly increase farm output. Plans for 1949-55 envisaged a 50 percent increase in agricultural production (the corresponding figure for industry was 158 percent). Economic growth should be accompanied by radical transformations in the system of education, in culture and science. The PZPR guidelines adopted at the merger congress in December 1948 were included in the 6-year plan and, in 1950, the targets were increased further.

The plan was very ambitious and particularly appealed to the imagination of the youth. It outlined very promising prospects (including a 40 percent increase in the population's standards of living).

Many promises, however, did not correspond to existing possibilities which were further limited by very difficult international conditions. The West resorted to economic discrimination. It was also necessary to increase military expenditures after NATO, the aggressive military pact of the United States and its Western European allies, was founded in 1949, after a West Germany was created which pursued a revanchist policy and demanded a revision of frontiers, and after the threat of war increased following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950.

The planned targets were the result of a subjective approach and an over-estimation of economic reality. The major mistake lay in planning a simultaneous leap in all areas, i.e., in industry, agriculture, the population's standards of living, etc. Plans to restructure agriculture did not resolve the problem of supplying the means of production to farmers and lacked psychological incentives likely to appeal to the peasantry.

All these factors produced many disproportions and tensions. They led to a growing discontent, undermined the faith in the promises and in the correctness of the party's policy.

There were attempts to overcome a severe economic imbalance in 1953 by means of considerable price increases and modifications of the economic and social policy during the last 2 years of the 6-year period. Investment outlays were greatly reduced at that time, and the policy of farm collectivization, which had been very severe and resorted to the use of coercion, was abandoned. Greater respect was shown for economic and production principles in agriculture.

The reality, i.e., the fact that a rapid increase in agricultural output was impossible, was acknowledged. At the same time, a large increase in food production and an improvement in living standards became doubtful. The abovementioned corrections only reduced the imbalance. Nevertheless, as far as overall industrial output was concerned, the 6-year plan was generally implemented. During those 6 years, Poland was transformed into a country



where industry was dominant over agriculture. In 1955, industry contributed 44 percent to the national income, and agriculture 27 percent (the corresponding figures for 1947 were 34 and 47 percent). In comparison with 1938, national income increased 2.7 times, and the value of fixed assets rose by 27 percent. However, the promises of a tremendous increase in national income, agricultural output, real wages and consumption were not fulfilled.

The 6-year plan restructured industry. The motor and shipbuilding industries were created and other industrial branches such as the steel and iron and the chemical industries developed remarkably. Over 500 major industrial projects were constructed. They and other projects completed in the following years were the foundation for further industrialization. The projects were constructed with the friendly assistance of the Soviet Union which supplied Poland with equipment and sent experts to advise the Polish designers and builders of major industrial projects.

Poland's industrial map changed. Underdeveloped regions became economically active. Many towns developed and considerable progress was recorded in town planning. Warsaw and other towns which were destroyed in the war were rebuilt. Profound changes took place in the population's social and occupational structure. Migration processes which had begun after the war came to an end. The excess workforce in farming went into industry. During the 6-year period, the working class increased by 2.5 million people, most of whom were young.

Overwhelming results were recorded in education, culture and science. Illiteracy was eliminated and the price of books enabled more people to read. Cultural facilities became accessible to the general public, a network of cinemas, and cultural centers was constructed, electric lines were run to villages and radio services were developed. Cultural activities and folk art receives state support. The system of education of all levels expanded remarkably, and many boarding schools and student hostels were constructed. In all, 348,000 people who mainly came from worker and peasant families, graduated from secondary and higher schools during the 6-year period.

These achievements won a permanent place in social consciousness. They broadened and strengthened social advancement of workers and peasants and consolidated the postwar enthusiasm about work which assumed the form of rivalry. They also provided challenging prospects for the younger generation, whose activeness and social prestige was promoted by the Polish Youth Union (ZMP).

These were social processes of historical significance. Their visibility and meaning were detracted from, however, by mistakes and deformations in the exercise of power, which led to a stiff and bureaucratic style of government that frequently resorted, without any cause, to the use of coercion. Processes developed which separated the authorities from citizens. This was particularly true of social security, working conditions, wages, etc., where such processes aroused discontent and gave the impression that the declarations of the party and the socialist authorities contradicted reality.

This impression was intensified when ties were broken between the state and party authorities and the PZPR apparat on the one hand, and the working class and society on the other. Certain legal categories such as offenses against the state and system and sabotage were expanded and followed by corresponding changes in people's accountability to laws and penal measures. The treatment of many former Home Army (AK) soldiers and members of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, who took up jobs and participated in activities serving people's Poland, worsened.

Repressions did not spare either members of left-wing organizations active during the occupation or working class activists. Presented as unavoidable in a situation where class struggle was becoming worse, an increasingly frequent use of coercion facilitated abuse of the law at security offices, military information agencies, law and order agencies and courts.

The activities of the forces of law and order, which are proper and necessary with regard to real political crimes, such as antistate activities, spying, and subversion, also surpassed the constitutional framework. An informal pattern of these forces' rights and methods developed. They were also allowed to enter the party. A PZPR Central Committee Politburo commission headed by First Secretary Boleslaw Bierut supervised the prosecution system on behalf of the party. Apart from the public security chief, Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Jakub Berman also belonged to the commission and, as a Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, he was in fact the direct supervisor of the prosecution system.

Without diminishing the party officials' responsibility for these matters, including violations of the rule of law (for which they were disciplined in the years 1956-57), it should be stated that the scale and consequences of these abuses in Poland were limited. It should also be emphasized that the majority of people employed in law and order forces worked honestly and, fighting against the real enemy, selflessly guarded the young socialist state.

Lack of confidence, suspicions and formal, mechanically applied political and class criteria--which frequently disregarded real ideological commitment, conscientiousness and professional qualifications--prevailed in the personnel policy. At the same time, a system developed of informal personal connections, founded on group interests and on a common past or national background. In this way, the natural inflow of new, valuable personnel to managerial groups, and a replacement of the old staff with new, better educated and professionally qualified people, were blocked.

The ideological and political aggression campaign launched by cold-war Western centers and the relentless class struggle in broad segments of Poland's spiritual life made stepping up ideological actions imperative. However, the effects of these actions were largely wasted because of inherent simplifications and their superficiality, and because of propaganda bias and deformations.

From the very beginning of people's Poland, Marxism-Leninism effectively paved its own way as a value system and a research method. Theory in Poland benefited greatly from this. Marxist cadres acquired knowledge and grew in numbers. Ideological training was intensively conducted on a broad scale, supplying party members, above all party functionaries, with fundamental Marxist-Leninist knowledge.

Parallel with this, though, a considerable and increasing number of scholars were administratively barred from research activity, while Polish scholars, even those working in the area of applied research, were denied access to many genuine achievements of world science. Often enough, in social science and in education, Marxism was presented in a grossly simplified version, while an insufficient knowledge on the part of some researchers at the time was compounded by artificially promoting the careers of some people. This explains why in later, painful periods a significant number of those people easily allowed their ideological and political integrity to be eroded, up to the point of betrayal.

The period discussed here saw a flourishing of culture, its rapid spread and genuine democratization, including the overcoming barriers between culture and its makers and social groups, especially workers and peasants. However, this accomplishment was hampered by restricting the search for creative styles and forms of expression, imposing socialist realism as the only creative method, and by mechanically sealing off Polish culture from current worldwide cultural achievements.

This not only curbed versatility in artistic creation but also fostered conformist and careerist attitudes, which in later difficult situations of ideological and political choice resulted in politically astounding and morally dispicable renunciations.

Another adverse phenomenon noted during the analyzed period was the simplification of national traditions, of interpretations of patriotism. This resulted in ripping open and reinforcing old divisions, opening new platforms of mistrust for the party and the people's authority. This also adversely affected the social climate of Polish-Soviet relations and internationalist attitudes within the Polish working class and society. Poland's alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union as well as versatile Soviet aid were of decisive significance for Poland's regaining independence, for its statehood and national security, for the integrity of national territory and inviolability of its new, just borders. The Soviet Union met Poland halfway with its comprehensive brotherly help at the most difficult time of raising the country from ruins and subsequently embarking on the great industrialization program. However, the cult of Stalin and its consequences helped reinforce historical resentments and complexes in Polish society. Things changed significantly only under the new CPSU leadership and after the 1956 changes in the PZPR leadership. Of very great importance was the 30 October 1956 declaration of the Soviet government on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation ties between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

During the period analyzed here--that is, from the [December 1948] historic Unification Congress onwards--the PZPR was established, building its platform on Marxist-Leninist tenets, consolidating its internal life, structures and forms of carrying out its leading role.

These forms were not straightforward continuations of the PPR or the left-wing PPS parties [the Polish Workers Party and the Polish Socialist Party united in 1948]. Along with constructive facts there were also adverse developments.

Above all, the mode and scope of fulfilling its leading role was becoming increasingly institutionalized and less and less innovative. Developing the party apparatus was closely adapted to the state system of management and administration. This favored practices of direct intervention and substitution of state agencies by the party apparatus and bodies in resolving detailed problems.

The party apparatus was recruited primarily from among workers and peasants, which was its greatest asset. These people acquired their party-work and organizational skills primarily on the job and supplemented them in numerous training courses at party-sponsored schools and in the extensive autodidactic system, compensating for their theoretical insufficiency by their great dedication. Yet the party apparatus increasingly tended to supersede statutory collective party bodies in their work. Centralism inside the party was expanding, while democracy was dwindling, especially with regard to collective decision-making, open and candid internal discussions or unhampered election procedures. Internal criticism was becoming increasingly formalistic and superficial, being as a rule launched "downwards" and more and more rarely "upwards." Pomposity and ceremonious rituals began to expand. In party activity as a whole, the first secretary predominated more than allowed by statutory provisions, and a specific cult and charisma was being built up around him. The Central Committee's role, like that of lower-level party bodies, was curtailed, and the autonomy of voivodship, poviats and base-level party organizations was curbed.

At the top level in the Politburo and government, the practice of uniting party and government posts was ubiquitous. This was final confirmation of the party's detailed and indivisible responsibility for everything that happened in the state, of its authority bearing responsibility for all the deficiencies of life. At voivodship and poviats levels the situation was the same. Such a particular form of exercising the party's leading role called forth a sense of discrimination against allied forces and nonaffiliated people.

Until 1954, party membership was lower than at the time of unification. The number of members who were workers and peasants were falling. While that of white-collar employees was rising.

In 1956, the party had 1,137,000 members and candidates. From 1957 onwards, a downward trend ensued again, this time due to the new situation in the party and in the state. Preserving a numerical majority of workers and peasants in the party was a hard job.



The party's strong position in state structures and social organizations was not tantamount to its real position in society, especially not among the working class, or to the development of mutual information and inspiration, to mutual development of confidence and understanding. The natural but gradually dwindling enthusiasm of the first years of implementing the 6-year plan was to be upheld by formal methods, or by simplified propaganda rather than genuine discussion with the working class or even bitter truths. As a result, a gap began to emerge between the party and its bodies, and the working class and other groups of working people; disbelief in otherwise correct programmatic tenets began to spread.

Trade unions, youth organizations and other social organizations which were to serve as conveyor belts between the party and the masses were fulfilling this function less and less effectively. In particular, a reverse flow was lacking in this transmission process. Trade unions buttressed production endeavors, conducted active social and cultural-educational activities, recording great achievements in these areas. However, they ceased to fulfill their defensive function which was their natural obligation. Union participation in shaping labor and wage conditions became purely formalistic, which in the context of not always justified or understandable administrative decisions, often generated resentment among worker communities and occupational groups.

The abovediscussed body of sociopolitical practices furnished the ground for emergence and cumulation of tensions, which would burst in an outward manifestation if circumstances permitted.

At that time, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began, after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, a process of significant changes in the USSR. By launching a relentless struggle against so-called Beriovschina, the Soviet authorities put an end to law violation, modified economic policies and restored Leninist rules in internal party life.

This undoubtedly had great influence on a reinvigoration of criticism in other communist parties, including the PZPR, and subsequently helped ignite political changes.

The PZPR leadership made its first changes in economic policy and upheld this in the March 1954, second congress resolutions. This found a formal reflection at the January 1955, third Central Committee plenum. The critical presentation of cases violating the law and insufficient control over security agencies, the dissolution of the Public Security Ministry and the creation of its Committee for Public Security were then events of overriding significance.

However, the excessively circumspect decisions that followed, especially with regard to personnel changes, were met with increasing criticism from party activists and followed by a diversification [sic] of attitudes and actions by a number of persons anxious to shed responsibility for their contributions to the erroneous line and its consequences. The Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat can be said not to have displayed enough political imagination in envisaging the consequences of this in the party,

in particular, failing to anticipate the consequences of a possible chain reaction following the cumulation of contradictions and tensions in all domains. As it presumably had a sense of responsibility for the previous political line, the Central Committee both feared the consequences and failed to do away with the non-Leninist approach to building socialism.

Eventually, then, implementation of the third Central Committee plenum's basically correct decisions was hampered. Removing the effects of law violations, acquitting people of unjustified charges and repealing unjust verdicts proceeded sluggishly and not without resistance--at least until October-November 1956. The most blatant such case was that of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was arrested in 1951, but although he was released in December 1954, it was only in July 1956 that the old charges against him were dropped and October 1956 that he resumed his place in the party leadership.

The same must be said of the Politburo which, after Boleslaw Bierut's death in March 1956 was headed by Edward Ochab as first secretary, took a similar stand toward all other urgent problems. Changes occurred in many areas, but in scanty doses and inconsistently; fundamental personnel changes, including governmental posts, rarely happened, and those that did were not credible enough.

The March 1956 ideological and moral shock brought about the materials of the CPSU 20th Congress came as a political crisis in Poland was gaining impetus. It embraced nearly all platforms of political life by that time, including culture, research and economic management. Within the party, especially among its chief activists, divisions began appearing over tactics and ways of overcoming the crisis. However, those divisions were less acute than they were presented and interpreted at the time. Moreover, vested group interests, specifically the desire to shirk responsibility for mistakes and deformations, had their influence, too. Certain intellectual and journalist groups with ties to revisionist circles inside the Warsaw party apparatus were trying to take the initiative. Such attitudes and views, apart from an understandable commitment to overcome deformations, were spreading, for instance, among the editors of the PO PROSTU and NOWA KULTURA weeklies.

The party leadership was unable to orient itself to the working class and party organizations; it proved unable to seek from them backing or inspiration in order to work out efficient ways of leading Poland out of the political crisis, of strengthening the party's ties with the masses. The working class was increasingly dissatisfied, most sharply over its material situation, but also over the accumulated consequences of violations of the law and infringement of socialist principles.

On 28 June 1956, against a background of a prolonged norm and wage regulation action as well as earlier wage irregularities, a strike broke out at the Cegielski factory in Poznan.

The direct cause of this was the fact that on 27 June, machine industry Minister Roman Fidelski questioned the possibilities of implementing some promises he had made one day before in Warsaw to a delegation of workers from the Cegielski factory.

His promises included invalidating an unjustly levied tax [retroactive for the 3 preceding years], changes in the piece-work system, abolishing the consequences of idleness caused by subcontractor delivery delays and talks on other changes in keeping with the crew's interests. The Cegielski strike started a chain reaction in the form of demonstrations at other Poznan factories during which workers voiced their own as well as general demands, chiefly of an economic character.

In the morning hours of 28 June, the strikers took to the streets. At about 9 am, tens of thousands of people gathered in Zamkowy Square and around it. The massive demonstration started out quiet. However, it soon got out of any control and became a dangerous, destructive force. This was clearly incompatible with the purpose of the workers' protest, as the huge crowd with its pent-up emotions was manipulated by hooligan and criminal elements as well as by people hostile to the socialist system. They instigated aggression against destruction and theft of public property. They inspired and organized an action to seize weapons and to storm public buildings, the local prison. At about 10 am, a group of rowdies seized a van equipped with a loudspeaker which they subsequently used to spread the false news that worker representatives from the Cegielski factory had been arrested. This news, which bore all characteristics of a provocation, helped fuel the crowd's aggressiveness. A charge of the prison in Mlynska Street was launched, prison guards were disarmed, 257 prisoners were freed and an arms depot was seized. Next, the crowd stormed court and prosecution buildings as well as the premises of the Voivodship Public Security Office. This latter was defended by its staff and a platoon of Internal Security Corps troops. The building was attacked, Molotov cocktails were hurled at it, and an attempt was made to get inside. Shots were exchanged and the first casualties were noted. Armed groups attacked Civil Militia outposts in the city and stormed the arms depots of military training centers in Poznan's higher schools. In all, 245 weapons were seized. Public buildings and shops were plundered. In an avalanche of events, the situation in the city was becoming increasingly dangerous, causing casualties and material losses and threatening further, simply incalculable risks. So, the authorities faced the necessity of immediate and determined action.

The local authorities were not prepared to tackle this dangerous situation even in its preliminary phase. They did not command enough order-keeping forces to compel the demonstrators to discipline themselves or to disperse them before extreme dangers set in. The appearance of small groups of militiamen, who were not even properly equipped, only infuriated participants in the disorders. In this situation, at about 11:30 am, small detachments of cadets from Poznan's officer schools were used, which failed to yield desirable results. Since the soldiers were under orders not to use weapons, the aggressive crowd attacked them with impunity and even tried to disarm them.

Faced with the necessity of putting an end to the events, which by then had taken very alarming forms, the Central Committee Politburo decided to use major military forces. Command of these forces was entrusted to the deputy defense minister, General Stanislaw Poplawski, who arrived--accompanied by

Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, who was put in charge of the entire operation--at Poznan at about 1 pm General Poplawski launched into action detachments from two nearby military training camps, which enabled him to bring the situation under control. On 28 June at about 5 pm, peace was finally restored in the area of the Voivodship Security Office premises. During the evening hours of 30 June and through the ensuing night, military units were pulled out of the city, and only temporary guards were left behind to protect some public buildings.

It was only at about 1 pm that the army was given permission to use firearms, provided it did so in self-defense, to destroy identified fire positions held by armed groups, or to foil attempted larceny or devastation of public buildings. Although they were attacked with various objects, exposed to attempts to disarm them or, in some cases, were fired at with weapons seized earlier, soldiers and militiamen reacted with great continence. This helped prevent the tragedy from expanding too much, but casualties, including accidental ones, could not be avoided.

During the Poznan events, 55 people were killed, and 19 more people died of wounds later. Of the deceased, 66 were civilians, 3 were security office functionaries, 1 a militiaman, and 4 were soldiers. Wounds and injuries were suffered by 575 persons, including 15 security office functionaries, 5 militiamen, and 37 soldiers.

The Poznan events were an extreme manifestation of long-standing tensions and the conflict-laden situation. The authorities were not active enough in trying to forestall the outburst. They failed to make appropriate socioeconomic and political decisions in due time; they especially wasted opportunities to reach an agreement with the working class and to win workers' support. The leadership at the time proved unable to correctly analyze the causes and character of the situation. It believed the events were merely an attempted act of subversion and provocation organized and controlled by hostile centers. This was an erroneous view, which, of course, does not mean that absolutely no antisocialist forces participated in the Poznan events, or that the most extreme confrontative clashes were not inspired or organized by such forces. Nonetheless, these forces could not engineer to massive an outburst of workers' frustration.

In connection with the Poznan events, prosecution offices filed indictments against 54 persons, of whom 27 were found guilty. Only three persons served prison terms for killing orderkeeping force members. By a later decision, the prosecutor general terminated all further investigations, and persons serving sentences were freed.

It was only at the Eighth PZPR Central Committee Plenum in October 1956, that a fuller account of the June events was given. In his introductory report, the new Central Committee first secretary said that the road followed by the party leadership had been wrong and that workers had forced it to abandon this road. Teaching the party and government leadership a "bitter lesson," the workers had protested the evil practices and deformations



of the basic tents of socialism. The earlier assessment of events was also said to have exhibited a "great political naivete." However, neither the authors nor the sponsors of that assessment were named.

Except for Fidelski, who was appointed for another post in the central administration, no members of the leadership had to bear career or administrative consequences for what had happened.

The June 1956 events in Poznan were a warning against attempts to stall the changes underway. Yet they also significantly exacerbated the crisis. The progressing paralysis of leading political centers, which could not establish contacts with the working class or effect indispensable changes, manifested itself in virtually all domains.

This was most conspicuous in the sphere of law observance and democracy, in the planning and management system, in the party's relations with political groups and in the youth movement. It also manifested itself in the slow pace of restoring Leninist norms to internal party life. All this only further exacerbated the crisis within the party. Due to this paralysis of the management system, decisions made at the July 1956, Seventh PZPR Central Plenum, even though they were correct and contained many innovative ideas and proposals, could not be put into effect. It was only the cumulative effect of tensions and conflicts as well as their expansion into other domains in subsequent months that made the Central Committee Politburo venture any major decisions, in particular making the persons responsible for these critical developments bear the political consequences.

A definitive overcoming of the crisis became possible owing to the working class which, like most working people, believed that solutions must be sought only within the framework of socialism and marking the party's decisive contribution. The party found in itself forces which enabled it to reestablish its ties with the working class, with society.

One great asset was the legendary personality of Gomulka. His indomitable stand during the period of unjustified charges and imprisonment won him respect and esteem both in the party and in society. Forgetting his personal resentment over the wrong done to him and withdrawing his demand for an explanation of the 1948 affair, he agreed to take over the party leadership. The eighth Central Committee plenum, which met on 19-21 October 1956, elected him first secretary, and Gomulka accepted the post.

The eighth plenum is remembered by Poles as a breakthrough. In its first ever secret ballot, participants elected a Politburo and a Secretariat. The party line adopted at that plenum testified to the party's determination and realistic concepts for overcoming the crisis, eliminating its causes, and embarking on a road of observing the principles of socialist democracy. This line also involved the problem of relations with the Soviet Union, which were based on Leninist principles earlier restored by the CPSU 20th Congress. These relations were discussed during talks with a Soviet delegation, led by Nikita Khrushchev, which arrived at Warsaw on the opening day of the eighth plenum.

The Polish delegation included Gomulka. The Polish-Soviet talks ended with the signing of pertinent declarations and agreements during a November 1956 visit by a Polish party and state delegation to Moscow, headed by Gomulka. Among others, the agreements included one on a Soviet loan for Poland, one on nullifying Poland's debt as compensation for earlier Polish coal supplies to the Soviet Union, one on terms for stationing Soviet troops in Poland, and one on repatriating Poles; this latter agreement enabled many thousands of Poles to return to their native country.

Changes in the party following the eighth Central Committee plenum were very extensive indeed. Voivodship and poviats party leadership positions were reshuffled. In most cases, this took place in a tense, often agitated atmosphere of pressure from party activists and masses, and even partly from people outside the party. The party apparatus was also largely superseded. After the reorganization finally ended in 1958, the party apparatus staff was reduced by 44.4 percent. Its structure and functioning were thereafter based not on sectoral-administrative management patterns but on political principles. Statutory party bodies were given a decisive voice. The cadre structure of the state administration and of social organizations was rebuilt, too. In all, 33 previous Central Committee and Central Party Control Commission members, 51 voivodship party secretaries, 35 ministers and deputy ministers, and 23 chairmen and deputy chairmen of people's councils were dismissed.

The ninth plenum, which was held in May 1957, revoked the Central Committee membership of two former Politburo members, Jakub Berman and Stanislaw Radkiewicz, and ousted them from the party (Radkiewicz was dropped from the Politburo at the fourth plenum in July 1954, and Berman at the seventh plenum in July 1956). These two bore the responsibility for political control and supervision of security agencies. The plenum also ousted from the party Mieczyslaw Mietkowski, a former Central Committee member and public security deputy minister.

Public security Deputy Minister (and former CC member) Roman Romkowski and Public Security Ministry department directors Anatol Fejgin and Jozef Rozanski were sentenced to long prison terms following court trials. Prison sentences were also given after court trials to security officials responsible for illegal investigation methods.

Late in October 1956, the Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, was released from his compulsory confinement in a monastery, which began in September 1954. After his return to active life, he played a positive role in seeking accord between the state and the church on the ground of the church's recognition of Poland's socialist foundation of existence as a state.

The process of restoring unity and the efficiency of operation in party ranks lasted longer. It was completed by the Third PZPR Congress which, after several deferments, finally did convene in March 1959. This process included, among others, a verification of party ranks in 1958, and a struggle against revisionism and dogmatism and their advocates.

The new political line indicated by the eighth plenum was theoretically unfolded and supplemented in the review report submitted to the ninth plenum in May 1957. In that report, Gomulka gave a more comprehensive formula of building socialism in Poland's specific situation than any earlier one. That platform and line were upheld by the Third PZPR Congress in March 1959, even though by that time there were already signs that some of the post-October changes would be dropped. In particular, this involved the idea of creating worker councils at enterprises, which had been spontaneously hailed by workers in 1956, as well as certain economic reforms.

The line worked out at the eighth and ninth plenums embraced many new issues, including the party's ideological-political struggle on two fronts simultaneously--namely against revisionism and opportunism on the one hand, and against dogmatism and conservatism on the other; changes in agricultural policy worked out in collaboration with the ZSL; recognizing worker councils as the basic, direct form of self-government in enterprises, and expanding farmer self-government in enterprises, and expanding farmer self-government; consolidating the rule of law in state agencies; enhancing the role of the Sejm and competences of people's councils; establishing relations of coexistence with the church; invigorating cultural policy; renewing and enriching Polish-Soviet relations, which furnished new impulses for authentic understanding and efficient implementation of the ideas of patriotism and internationalism; restoring Leninist norms in the party's internal life; significant changes in the party system by establishing a partnerlike cooperation among the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD, and augmenting the role of these allied groups in the exercise of authority.

A new formula for a national front, then called the Front of National Unity, considerably extended the scope of its participants and activities. Changes were also introduced in the election law, under which the January 1957 Sejm general election was held. This new law provided for choice of candidates on a ticket. The Sejm's composition was also changed significantly, with representatives of workers and peasants as well as nonparty persons--including Catholic groups--holding more seats than before.

The trade union movement also underwent significant changes. Apart from changing its structure and staff, the union movement also adopted new forms and a new scope of activity. Trade unions resumed their defensive function, which was treated as the equivalent of fulfilling welfare functions and output increases.

The road of the youth movement was a difficult one, as it was deeply immersed in an ideological-political as well as organizational crisis. The Polish Youth Union (ZMP), which was deprived of political backing, could not resist calls for liquidation, especially as they came from its own board. This resulted in the union being dissolved, which had detrimental effects. An independent Polish Scouts Union (ZHP) was brought to life again. New political-ideological youth organizations were created. On the initiative of the party and its allied political groups, these new organizations could be partly integrated, and two general unions were founded--a Socialist Youth Union (ZMS) and a Rural Youth Union (ZMW). A long period of development

began; these unions never achieved the membership figures or scope of activity, and especially not an ideological fervor, comparable to those of the dissolved ZMP.

However, the all-decisive factor was that the new party line was implemented immediately--despite the fact that many innovative solutions were not established in legislative form--by the new party activists along with some old ones who committed themselves constructively to the new conditions. The party's post-October policy line, as well as Gomulka's personal prestige, were supported by a considerable majority of people from all social sectors. This found its most eloquent expression in the January 1957 general election, and in particular society's positive response to the party's call to make, as a token show of acceptance of this line, no cancellations on ballot cards. This social backing sprang from various motivations. Apart from active acceptance of the party's line and platform, there were also expectations by opposition circles for the next stage of changes which would result in so-called full liberalization which the opposition hoped would fully erode socialism's political foundations. This was reinforced by internal ideological differences within the party, especially over interpreting the general line. These differences clashed in the form of inconsistent struggle against revisionism, which had not yet been destroyed, but while reviving, it also weakened the party; also, these internal differences manifested themselves in the abandonment of the struggle against dogmatism, which then was believed to be less of a danger because it had little ground for expansion.

Declared enemies of socialism, including the remnants of reactionary opposition from the latter half of the 1940's, failed to gain any visible social support. Hopes for a so-called second period following the eighth plenum--which were evident against the backdrop of the events in Hungary, where they took the form of counterrevolution--did not materialize. In its entirety, the Polish nation displayed prudence and backed the party's stand. This is not to say the struggle against the enemy was consistent enough. In some cases, concessions were made toward antisocialist pressure groups, ideological confusion continued for a long time, various forms of ideological-political indecision persisted, while ideological struggle in the educational system and in the domains of science and culture as well as against slanderous antisocialist campaigns launched by subversive centers was not active enough.

Altogether, though, the new PZPR leadership's line, which was ubiquitously regarded as correct, insured a generally harmonious development of Poland for many years.

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In the 1960's, Poland's economy still lagged far behind the economies of the rich countries, which had developed earlier, had not suffered such great destruction during the war and were continuing to develop thanks to the scientific and technological revolution. However, new opportunities for developing the economy and satisfying society's new needs presented themselves in Poland at that time. These were based on increasing efficiency and profitability and manufacturing more modern products of higher quality, which was to be achieved by reforming the system of organizing the national economy and methods of planning and management, and by introducing a more effective incentive system. This opportunity was outlined in a general project for economic reform drafted by the Economic Council, which had been set up in 1956. The principal idea of this reform was to combine greater independence of enterprises with a modified system of central planning. However, this concept did not win the attention it deserved and no significant attempts were made to examine or implement it.

This inconsistency and weakness affected future developments. Nevertheless, an 80 percent total growth in national income was recorded for the 1960's, which was high compared to other countries. Major achievements were made in developing the coal and power industries, which proved particularly beneficial during the acute--yet unpredicted--energy crisis of the 1970's. Unfortunately, these achievements were not accompanied by a development of research and investment in technologies involving economical consumption of coal and energy (and other raw materials) per unit of production.

The mining and processing of copper ores was begun and developed considerably. Rapid growth was recorded in the output of sulfur, which is an important export to this day. As the nitrogen and sulphuric acid industries expanded, the production of fertilizers grew from 480,00 tons to 1.63 million tons. Efforts were made to develop and modernize the production of tractors, the automotive industry and shipbuilding.

However, the increased production of basic materials (as well as steel and rolled steel products, aluminum, cement and petroleum products) was clearly not utilized sufficiently to diversify and accelerate the modernization of mass production of high-quality finished goods. Investment policy failed to make adequate provision for the needs of the consumer industries, agriculture and the food industry.

There was a general trend toward onesided growth preferences, which lessened the positive effects of growth and had an adverse effect on the functioning

of the economy in general. Since there were limited possibilities of mobilizing reserves toward technological progress, it was not possible to expand the export potential of the manufacturing industry and there was only slight improvement in the structure of exports to the highly developed countries, which remained dominated by raw materials and agricultural products. Although a balance of payments deficit was avoided and no doubts were incurred (which was an indisputable achievement), opportunities for developing trade and international specialization were not used to the full, which would have boosted export production, stimulated modernization and alleviated tensions on the domestic market.

Thus, the policy of intensive growth, although declared essential, was not actually implemented. Growth was not based on reducing material and energy consumption, improving productivity and raising the efficiency of international trade. Only a small part of the economic surplus could be allocated to increasing consumption.

Starting from a low level, the growth rate in agricultural production was slightly higher than the world average, although it was subject to great fluctuations. Average food consumption levels improved (the annual consumption of meat, for instance, grew from 50 to 61 kg per capita). The increase in meat exports was more than enough to offset a slight increase in grain and fodder imports. However, strong fluctuations in the pig population caused serious problems with meat supplies. Low investment efficiency was a characteristic feature of the development of agriculture in this period. This was partly due to the predominance of small farms in Polish agriculture; no long-range program for the modernization and integration of agriculture was developed.

The growth in employment during the 1960's amounted to 250,000-500,000 persons annually due to the demographic high and the increasing employment of women. As a result, consumption growth was based on increased employment in the public sector (39 percent) rather than increases in real wages (19.5 percent). The increase in average real wages, especially at the end of the decade, fell below 2 percent and displayed a tendency to fall even further.

Individual wages were changed exclusively by central regulations in different branches of the economy. Generally speaking, the changes were not related to the performance of these branches or enterprises, and sometimes were an outcome of pressure exerted by diverse branch groups on the headquarters. This led to distorted pay proportions and produced a sense of injustice. As the proportion between wages and the labor input was disrupted, there arose negative, pessimistic feelings about economic growth and consumption increases, which were slight anyway.

Consumption grew slowly; at times and in some areas, it even dropped. There was no variety on the market and prospects for acquiring apartments, furniture, cars and modern consumer durables were poor. The gap between social expectations in the area of consumption and the degree of fulfilling them not only grew wider, but the consequences became more serious, laying a heavy burden on the mood of those years.

The working class underwent immense transformations in the 1960's. The worker class grew by over 2 million (to a total of 6.8 million in 1970), making it the largest social class in Poland; employment was concentrated in large factories (more than one-third of all industrial employees worked at factories employing over 2,000 people); workers' education and vocational qualifications improved (the percentage of workers with a primary school education increased from 43.4 to 56.3 percent in the 1960's, and of workers with junior vocational school diplomas--from 9.7 to 18.1 percent); besides, the workers' sociopolitical aspirations obviously grew.

A generation gap emerged in the working class. In the late 1960's, over a half of workers had worked for less than 5 years. Young workers with junior and, increasingly also senior, vocational education were concentrated particularly in Silesia, on the coast, in Warsaw, Lodz and Wroclaw. Unlike their fathers, these workers did not regard work in industry as a promotion, as young people's aspirations developed under the cultural influence of higher-income segments of society and sometimes also under the influence of unilaterally interpreted foreign models (the latter was particularly strong on the coast). The development of the group of nearly 2-million worker peasants, who combined farm work with factory work, was another characteristic feature of this decade.

An important and consistently implemented slogan of that period was: Poland is a country of people who learn. The expansion and modernization of primary and secondary facilities (primary schooling was extended to last 8 years) was financed from the state budgets and local contributions; citizens also did volunteer work. The campaign to build 1,000 schools to commemorate Poland's millenium was launched by the National Unity Front (FJN) at the party's initiative presented by Wladyslaw Gomulka.

The development of culture and art and a general cultural and intellectual boom after October 1956 was not accompanied by an appropriate development of cultural facilities, organized support for mass cultural and artistic activities, or any major improvement in research and university facilities. As the decade advanced, especially at its close, the standard of cultural and scientific facilities in Poland was one of the lowest in the socialist countries, posing a serious threat to the democratic principle of universal access to culture.

The trend particularly affected book publishing, which declined in stark contrast to how it had been in the first years after the war. Detrimental ideological phenomena were also recorded in artistic and intellectual communities, which succumbed to the pressures of the bourgeois value system.

There were also manifestations of revisionism, which were not consistently fought. Besides, the intellectuals were painfully affected by a lack of clear ideological and political criteria in evaluating their work and the growing arbitrariness of decisions in the area of publishing and propagating it.

The general improvement in society's level of education entailed growing demands and aspirations not only in the spheres of culture and living standards, but also regarding the effective functioning of the economy, the state as an institution and the organization of public and political life. As a result, the prestige of economic managers and local authorities diminished or even dissolved whenever they proved unable to cope with growing problems in organizing production and constructing the social and cultural infrastructure.

The number and quality of transformations of society's class structure, which had far-reaching consequences, were an unquestionably beneficial result of the socioeconomic growth in the 1960's. These transformations also determined the working class's and other social groups' drive to improve economic efficiency and distribute the income more justly, i.e., to live better and to exert greater influence on decisions regarding small and large communities.

As the state and its institutions failed to respond to the working people's growing aspirations, opposition and tension grew.

As the importance and level of development of the working class grew (despite the many manifestations of its weakness and immaturity) and was additionally intensified by a verbal recognition of and emphasis on its social role, workers' aspirations to exert a greater influence on the activities of the party, trade unions, enterprises and local authorities were underestimated or even ignored. This gap was the greatest source of conflict.

Throughout the decade, workers accounted for about 40 percent of the party membership (all white-collar groups accounted for about 42 percent, and peasants for about 11 percent, of the membership), remaining in the shadow, as it were, of the party and administrative apparatus employees and white-collar workers. This was also evident in the composition of party authorities.

As the number of party members and candidates grew rapidly, and local party branches and authorities even competed for higher membership, admission criteria became lax and the quality of party ranks deteriorated; the party's avantgarde role in the ideological and political sphere and in social activities diminished. Its ideological leadership and its class and worker character were no longer so obvious.

The role of basic organizations gradually diminished as the role of party authorities and their apparatus increased. The mechanisms of internal party democracy (democratic centralism) became weak or even deformed. Executive bodies (i.e., according to the statutes, the first secretary, Secretariat and executive) practically dominated decision-making bodies (committees). Too many representatives of administrative authorities and other officials became executive members of voivodship and poviat [former territorial unit smaller than the voivodship] committees, often by way of co-opting. This greatly limited the room for rank-and-file activists representing major party groups.



Over 60 percent of the Central Committee members elected at the third, fourth and fifth congresses were top state, economic and party apparatus officials. The Central Committee of the 1960's did not make full use of its statutory rights. Genuine exchanges of views and real work on resolutions became increasingly rare occurrences at Central Committee meetings.

Wladyslaw Gomulka's personality greatly influenced party activity and state policy during the entire 1956-70 period. His views were of decisive importance for party and state policy and all new political, ideological and economic concepts were usually connected with Gomulka's initiatives.

He had the personality of a leader as well as enormous and diversified political experience. Gomulka was very sensitive to class values and interests and combined the sense of patriotic responsibility for the nation, for its dignity and for the state with great internationalist responsibility. He was a man with a strong will and character, a man of integrity and ascetic behavior, and a very hard worker. He also had excellent memory.

Gomulka did not care for popularity although, with the passage of years, he became unable to overcome the eulogizing inclination. His peremptoriness gradually became transformed into autocracy. Cooperating with Gomulka was becoming increasingly difficult and his public popularity diminished and eventually faded away. Underestimating modern socioeconomic mechanisms, he feared the development of economic units' independence and initiative and an increase in the importance and activeness of socialist democracy.

Such an attitude derived from Gomulka's great sensitivity to the importance of a stable state which, as he learned from Poland's history and his own life, is the most essential condition for the existence and successful development of a nation. An understanding of history and of contemporary needs enabled him to pursue a principled and flawless foreign and defense policy, and to secure for Poland a dignified position within the socialist community, in Europe and in the world.

Gomulka had personal historical merits in [the negotiations] leading to the acknowledgement of Poland's western and northern frontiers by West Germany. He was principled as far as class struggle was concerned.

At the same time, the experience of the communist movement and his own painful political biography made him avoid violence and show patience, if not magnanimity, in dealing with political opponents. He understood traditional, strong ties between the masses and religion and made sure that the denominations policy corresponded to Polish *raison d'etat*. He followed the principle of limiting the growth rate of current consumption to enable its growth in the future and to insure that Poland was not dependent on foreign credits.

The story of this great leader shows that even the greatest mind and the strongest character are incapable of replacing the collective wisdom and strength of the party and, even further, that the development of democracy in the party and state is an absolute necessity.

Politburo meetings were held rarely (approximately 14 times a year in the 1961-70 decade) and irregularly (from 22 meetings in 1961 to 9 in 1969 and 10 in 1970). Discussions at these meetings were limited. The Central Committee's Secretariat hardly met at all, and made decisions by means of circulating documents. This work style further increased the independence of PZPR secretaries, who managed certain sections not only of the party's, but also of the state's, activity. Among them, Zenon Kliszko, who managed the personnel policy and ideological and parliamentary work and Boleslaw Jaszczuk, who was in charge of the economy, were the most powerful.

The Politburo was practically beyond the control of the Central Committee. Frequently, its decisions were applied mechanically to all authorities. In this situation, the government, which operated according to detailed Politburo instructions, felt absolved of constitutional accountability to the Sejm. What followed was a gradual limitation of the rank and competence of the Sejm and, subsequently, of people's councils.

An attempt to reorganize cooperation between the PZPR and the ZSL and SD after October 1956 was only partly successful because it concerned formal matters rather than a real partnership. This prevented a utilization of all opportunities for cooperation and stopped the ZSL and SD rank and file from becoming actively involved.

The Third PZPR Congress adopted the position that trade unions should take an active part in making decisions concerning state affairs and, particularly, about the distribution of national income, and about wages and prices. It also suggested that representatives of trade union executive committees take part in the work of ministries and industry boards. These proposals were carried out to a limited degree.

In the 1960's in general, and particularly during the second half of this decade, an inflexible overcentralized system of state and economic government developed which was incompatible with the Leninist principles and the needs of socialist development. At the same time, an excessive involvement of the party authorities and apparatus in administration diminished their roles of promoter and controller. In addition, it took the party's attention away from ideological and political issues, from taking care of society's interests, from observing social justice and from showing initiative to introduce systemic transformations aimed at a more intensive socioeconomic development. Preoccupation with administrative work also lessened the party's vigor and involvement in shaping the ideological consciousness of the working class and in encouraging the working class to participate in the state and economic management.

A lack of an innovative approach and of a vision of the future was evident, as was the absence of concepts of necessary changes in the structure and methods of the state and economic functioning which ought to have been better adjusted to a growing level of production, personnel, various social communities and their ambitions. Eventually, no effective measures were introduced to counteract the exhaustion of the possibilities of extensive development, based on increases in capital expenditures and employment, although the party central authorities realized such a need.

Only ineffective and uncoordinated reforms were introduced to the systems of planning, management and material incentives.

The party at that time also suffered from too little concern for ideology, from the supreme authorities' inability to realize the acuteness of differences and from an avoidance of ideological disputes. Out of 32 Central Committee plenums held between 1960 and 1970, only one [in 1963] was devoted to ideology.

An underestimation of ideology and of the development of social theory, accompanied by an ignorance of the dangers of dogmatism and stagnation, produced conservative political trends and greatly hampered the struggle against the real danger of revisionism. A lack of a creative Marxist-Leninist approach to development contradictions, which emerged at that time, facilitated revisionist penetration as an attempt to introduce into socialist society instruments and measures characteristic of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. Different forms of antisocialist ideologies--from overtly hostile ones to those which hid behind demagogical claptrap, propagated by oppositionist forces in Poland and subversive agencies abroad, had a certain influence was particularly great in communities which had lost all hope for a tangible improvement in living standards and for broader socialist democracy.

Relations with the church were also aggravated. Particularly in 1966, the year of Poland's millenium, the church became involved in political activity which violated the principles of the church-state agreement and harmed state interests. This activity manifested itself most strongly in the letter from the Polish Episcopate to West German bishops, which contained the memorable phrase: "We forgive and ask for forgiveness."

The first obvious symptoms of a growing social crisis were recorded during the so-called March events of 1968, which were strongly connected and revisionist trends and milieux. Revisionist views had appeared since 1956 among journalists, writers and sociologists. They were propagated mainly by people who had previously been active dogmatics and sectarians, to mention Leszek Kolakowski, Zygmunt Bauman and Bronislaw Baczko, party philosophers and sociologists employed at Warsaw University.

From the early 1960's, they patronized an increasingly active group of Warsaw secondary school and university students who frequently came from families of party and political activists influential prior to 1956. After October 1956, these activists turned to revisionism and, although they pretended to be the leaders of renewal, they were gradually deprived of influence. Jacek Kuron, Karol Modzelewski and Adam Michnik were the leading young oppositionists whose views were seriously affected by a Trotskyist and social-democratic influence. The activeness and aggressiveness of such groups has been growing since 1964. They first attempted to influence party organizations at Warsaw's higher schools in general, and particularly at Warsaw University, in order to organize students' political opposition and provoke increasingly serious political incidents.

In the conditions of the deteriorating material, personnel and ideological situation at higher schools, and under the influence of the mood and developments of the Czechoslovak events in March 1968, they managed to provoke--taking advantage of misinformation and the majority of students' conviction that they were fighting for an improvement of the conditions of social life and university work--riots at higher schools in Warsaw and several other towns, as well as street clashes. Party organizations in large work establishments reacted with contempt to this and lent their support actions designed to restore order. At the same time, worker communities and their party organizations sharply criticized the party authorities, and particularly the central leadership, quoting a dissatisfaction with the economic situation, the blurring of ideological conflicts and conservatism in the personnel policy as reasons for this criticism. In the shadow of the struggle against the revisionist and cosmopolitan trends, unofficial divisions took place among the party's leading activists, which led to the fact that certain people gained publicity and false popularity. No proper lesson was drawn from the sign in 1968 of an upcoming crisis in relations between the working class and the party or, to be more exact, its leadership. Temporary ideological enlivenment, partial criticism of the economic system and administration and of improper relationship between the party and state structures, as well as changes in the composition of the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat introduced by the fifth congress, all these were not profound enough to prevent a growing conflict.

So, the last 3 years of the 1960's saw an accretion of economic, social and ideological-political contradictions. Because the fifth PZPR Congress failed to resolve them, these contradictions continued to grow. Gomulka's prestige was dwindling, while his inability to tackle the emerging tensions and disintegrative moves within the top party and state leadership was becoming increasingly patent.

A violent outburst of public dissatisfaction came after the 12 December 1970 changes in price regulation, which provided for higher food prices. Meat and meat products prices (including those for fats) were raised 17.6 percent. Price increases for other, more heavily subsidized goods were even higher. Also, prices for a number of previously subsidized durable goods were raised. To partly compensate for these increases, price tags for many industrial consumer goods with high rates of return were reduced. Also, modest cost-of-living compensation allowances were ordered. Simultaneously, livestock procurement prices paid to farmers were raised.

In purely economic terms, especially against the backdrop of that year's very poor harvest, this price regulation was a sound measure. What particularly infuriated the public was the total surprise and the unfortunate date of introducing it (shortly before Christmas, at a time when intensive buying deepens the sense of financial insufficiency). However, the outburst was primarily an expression of years of frustration felt by the working class and all society over Poland's economic and political situation.

The decision was made and implemented in the following way: after endorsing a pertinent government draft, the Politburo circulated a letter to base-level



party organizations which was read to members on Saturday, 12 December. On that day, too, the news about the price regulation was announced on radio and television, and on the following day a detailed communique was published in the press.

In the morning hours of Monday, 14 December, the Central Committee gathered for its sixth plenum (it should be observed that this happened just a few days after a significant event--the signing of an agreement on normalizing mutual relations between the FRG and the Polish People's Republic).

The agenda did not provide for discussion on the price regulation, nor were any reports made to the plenum on grassroots party reactions to the Politburo letter (those meetings were held in an atmosphere of ubiquitous opposition all over Poland; party masses kept a depressing silence about the decision, and hardly any declaration of support for it came from party ranks). None of the speakers at the plenum mentioned this subject. Central Committee members were not informed about the outbreak of riots in the coastal area before the plenum ended.

While the Central Committee plenum was conducting the debates, at about 10 am, Gdansk PZPR Voivodship Committee first secretary Alojzy Karkoszka, and later Deputy Premier Stanislaw Kociolek were informed that workers in several departments of the Gdansk shipyard had stopped work and that a crowd of several thousand workers had gathered to demand talks with Voivodship Committee representatives. Kociolek and Karkoszka proposed that they go to Gdansk immediately in the company of Franciszek Kaim, then deputy premier responsible for shipyards, Wlodzimierz Stazewski, a Gdansk PZPR Voivodship committee secretary, and Jerzy Pienkowski, first secretary of the Gdansk Shipyard PZPR organization, all of whom were attending the plenum. After a telephone conversation with the shipyard director, Kociolek outlined the situation for Gomulka and suggested that the above-named comrades be sent to the scene of events. In consultation with Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Gomulka accepted this proposal.

This group of comrades, who were supplied with no extra instructions or special prerogatives, arrived at Gdansk at 1 pm and reinforced the group of local party activists already there. This happened some two hours after a thousand-strong group of workers had left the shipyard in a march to the PZPR Voivodship Committee building. However, neither the first secretary of the voivodship committee nor his deputy for economic matters were present in the building at the time. Nor were the conditions suitable for holding talks with the delegation appointed by the workers, especially since hooligans and criminal elements had joined the gathering, which began to behave in a manner typical of rioting crowds.

The crowd, which occasionally grew to several thousand, entered the Stocznia Polnocna shipyard premises, the Technical University and the radio station, calling for bystanders to join the demonstration; another rally, to take place in front of the voivodship committee building, was planned for the afternoon hours and a strike and demonstration at 7 am the following day was also organized.

At 2:50 pm, internal affairs Deputy Minister Henryk Slabczyk arrived to take command of the ministry's orderkeeping forces. An initial attempt to disperse the demonstrators was made by these forces at 3:55 pm. Orders to disperse went unheeded, while the militia cordon was too weak to hold back the crowd, which began using rocks to smash windows in public buildings and pressing forward, marching toward the voivodship committee building. Next, the crowd began demolishing and plundering shops, destroying vehicles, and setting fire to newsstands and buses, attempting to burn the voivodship committee building, and finally demolishing the railway station and blocking railway transports. It was only at about 10 pm that this destructive rioting subsided and the crowd dispersed.

During the first day of rioting, several persons suffered minor injuries. Sixteen persons caught plundering public property, shops and committing acts of larceny were detained.

From the early morning hours of 14 December, party and administration officials of the Gdansk shipyard repeatedly tried to defuse the tension among the workforce and to persuade workers not to strike or to join the demonstration. In the evening hours, the chairman of the Gdansk People's Council presidium, Tadeusz Bejm, appeared on local television calling for calm and prudence and for protecting the property which was rebuilt by those who raised Gdansk from ruins with such a great effort. Late in the night, voivodship and city-district party activists met with enterprise party organization secretaries to discuss the situation.

At 10:25 pm, with Gomulka's endorsement, Politburo members Zenon Kliszko and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski arrived at Gdansk; Gomulka also recommended that Deputy Defense Minister General Grzegorz Korczynski make the trip as well.

However, the fact that three Politburo members, one deputy premier, an internal affairs deputy minister and a deputy defense minister were in Gdansk simultaneously, hampered activities rather than facilitated coordination of state and party actions. There was no clarity as to the exact competences of each person, nor was there any official state leadership which would bear legal-constitutional responsibility for decisions. Gomulka's closest aide, Zenon Kilszko, whose opinion Gomulka highly valued, was treated--and behaved--in Gdansk as a plenipotentiary of the party and state leadership, though formally he had no such competences and was not heading the local crisis management body.

A crucial decision in the events in the coastal area was made the following day, on Tuesday, 15 December in the morning hours. At 9 am, a group of persons holding what in the given situation were the most important party and state posts were summoned to the Politburo hall of debates in the Central Committee building. The session was attended by PZPR Central Committee first secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka, Council of State chairman Marian Spychalski, Council of Ministers chairman Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and PZPR Central Committee secretaries Boleslaw Jaszczuk (responsible for economic matters, Mieczyslaw Strzelecki (internal party matters); moreover the following were summoned--Stanislaw Kania as head of the Central Committee administrative department,

Wojciech Jaruzelski as national defense ministers, Kazimierz Switala as internal affairs minister and Tadeusz Pietrzak as civil militia commander.

At the same time the session opened, those present had information on the dangerous destructive events of the previous day, in particular the plundering of shops and theft of public property, the destruction of vehicles, attempts to burn the voivodship committee building, and the devastating of the railway station. They were also aware that events of the early morning of 15 December would snowball. The strike spilled over to the Gdansk harbor, to the other shipyards of Gdansk and Gdynia, as well as to some other enterprises.

Large numbers of demonstrators marched toward the voivodship committee seat, the Gdansk Voivodship People's Council, and the voivodship militia headquarters. Information was being received about attempts to storm the militia's road traffic control headquarters and a prison, and later the voivodship committee building. Near the main railway station, five militia and military vehicles were burned, as well as several vehicles of a nearby dispatch center. Thick smoke hovered over the city. Also, news was conveyed to the participants that shots were fired from the crowd, wounding three militiamen. One militiaman was massacred.

In this situation, in the face of information from the coastal region that the destructive events were expanding violently and dangerously, Gomulka decided that orderkeeping forces and troops should use firearms. Firearms were to be used in cases of direct assaults against militiamen and soldiers, setting fire to or otherwise damaging buildings, or creating dangers to human life. Gomulka gave the following definition of the conditions for using firearms: after shouts of warning, first shots should be fired in the air; the next shots, after 5-10 seconds, if aggressive crowds should keep pressing militiamen and soldiers, should be fired in salvos at legs. The decision was to take effect at noon on 15 December.

Gomulka's decision, which he made in the presence of the Council of State chairman and the Council of Ministers chairman, thereby acquired the rank of an official state decision. Gomulka told Cyrankiewicz to convey these decisions to General Korczynski in the coastal region, which the Council of Ministers chairman did immediately.

At 1:50 pm, a second meeting that day of leading party and state officials was held in Gomulka's study. Except for Kania, all those who had attended the morning session participated, as well as Central Committee secretaries Stefan Olszowski and Arthur Starewicz, and the head of the Polish Army's General Staff, General Boleslaw Chocha.

The participants in this meeting knew already that the Gdansk National Engineering Society (NOT) building, which stood next to the voivodship committee, had been burned, and that the voivodship committee building itself had been set on fire; militiamen and soldiers had risked their lives--although they did not use arms--to evacuate employees from the voivodship committee building.

Gomulka, who was in a condition of extreme nervous strain, charged the coastal region's orderkeeping forces and local authorities with inefficiency and lack of energy. During the same meeting, Gomulka ordered the establishment in Gdansk of a local operations staff headed by General Korczynski. In keeping with this decision, the operations staff was to include Kociolek, Karkoszka, Slabczyk, and the voivodship militia commander, Colonel Roman Kolczynski. Moreover, General Chocha was ordered to go to Gdansk to help in staff operations planning.

However, the two Politburo members then in Gdansk, Kliszko and Loga-Sowinski, were not included in the new local operations staff. It did not operate systematically or collectively. Kliszko played the role of a person having the greatest, if informal, powers and actually did give a number of orders to the local staff.

On the same day, at 2 pm, internal affairs Deputy Minister Franciszek Szlachcic went to the coastal region in order to establish the post of commander of Internal Affairs Ministry forces. Yet in reality, no such post was established.

On 15 December, the situation in Gdansk became extremely dangerous. By 7:30 am, the first shots had been events fired from the crowd, wounding three militiamen. The crowd was trying to burn public buildings. Militiamen opposing the crowds were attacked with stones, bricks, screws, pieces of wood, etc. One firebrigade vehicle was burned while enroute to rescue people caught in burning houses.

During the street riots that day, 6 people were killed and some 300 were injured. Fifty-four shops were plundered, and 19 vehicles were destroyed.

At about 10 pm that day, the voivodship committee executive body assembled for a meeting. Also present were Kociolek, Kaim, Kliszko, Loga-Sowinski, as well as a Trade Union Federation Board secretary Ryszard Pospieszynski. Fearing that demonstrations might again occur on 16 December, with dangerous consequences, Kliszko ordered that the Gdansk shipyard be sealed off. This blockade was mounted by sealing off exits from the shipyard in order to prevent a mass exit of workers into the streets. The decision provided for the use of arms in case such attempts were made.

On 16 December, workers of the Lenin, Repair and Polnocna shipyards called a sit-down strike. At about 8 am, a large group of predominantly young people armed with crowbars, metal bars and similar implements, ignoring warnings, decided to attack the forces blocking exit No 2. Despite calls to halt and warning salvos the group continued its advance. A salvo aimed at the ground killed 2 persons and 11 were wounded by ricocheting bullets.

The wave of strikes, demonstrations and street riots continued. Only late in the evening did the authorities reach agreement with representatives of the Gdansk shipyards, providing for the strikers to leave the factories. Extra transportation means were furnished to drive people home.



On 17 December, the situation in Gdansk improved, yet most factories did not function. At different places throughout the city there were clashes between orderkeeping forces and groups of predominantly young people who behaved aggressively or committed acts of vandalism against public property.

Particularly dramatic were events in Gdynia. On 14 December, order reigned in Gdynia. On 15 December, some employees of the Paris Commune and the repair shipyards as well as of Dalmor left their workplaces to march to the PZPR city committee building and later to the city People's Council Presidium, where a delegation of demonstrators talked with Presidium chairman Jan Marianski. After a telephone conversation and consultation with Bejm, Marianski said he would convey the delegation's petition calling for a revocation of price increases to Kociolek, but only under the condition that those gathered in front of the building disperse and go home or return to their factories, which they did.

It should be pointed out that although the abovementioned factories called a sympathy strike for Gdansk shipyard workers on 15 December, no cases of demolition, plundering, etc., were noted in Gdynia that day.

However, at midnight, all 31 delegates representing the Gdynia factories, who had formed something like a strike committee and had held talks at their own premises with Marianski from 7:30-10 pm, were arrested. The decision to arrest the Gdynia strike committee was made by the local staff. These arrests had a very detrimental effect on the course of events. The atmosphere became even more tense, especially at the Paris Commune shipyard, and it was announced that unless the detained were released a demonstration will be staged.

On 16 December in the afternoon, Kilszko made two decisions concerning the Paris Commune shipyard. One decision was to fire all the employees and to carry out a verification of the workforce; the other was that all entrances to the shipyard would be blocked. Blocking entrances to the shipyard was designed to allow orderkeeping forces to bar employees from getting onto the shipyard premises. On the basis of these decisions, in the evening hours employees were informed that work in the shipyard would be suspended while militia units and troops took positions at entrances to the shipyard. After these decisions had been put into effect, Kociolek, who had not been informed about them, appeared on television at 8 pm to call upon workers of the coastal region to return to work. When it was realized that Kociolek's radio and television appeal for resumption of work was incompatible with the decision to block entrances, attempts were made both in the city and along major traffic routes to let people know that the shipyard had been closed and to appeal to people to stay at home. This action turned out to be ineffective.

In the early morning hours of 17 December, despite calls for dispersal and warnings that firearms might be used, the aggressive crowd attempted to force its way onto the shipyard premises. In a direct assault against the forces blocking the gates, stones were hurled.

After unheeded calls and warnings, after soldiers were already injured and wounded, warning shots were fired into the air and later onto the ground in front of the attackers. Four people were killed by ricocheting bullets and several more were wounded.

During the next few hours, large street riots occurred in different parts of the city, with direct assaults against soldiers and militiamen, attempts to disarm them and to seize military equipment. In some cases orderkeeping forces had to use arms. The tragic death toll of all these clashes was 18 killed and several dozen wounded.

Szczecin too was the scene of a serious social conflict. Violent protests and demonstrations were staged there, especially by workers of the Warski and Gryfia Repair shipyards.

On 17 December, workers of these shipyards halted work, gathered in spontaneous meetings, and some of them took to the streets. The shipyard workers were then joined by hundreds of adolescents, especially by hooligans and criminals, as well as individuals staunchly hostile to people's Poland, who changed antistate slogans. The crowd became aggressive toward the orderkeeping forces and threw Molotov cocktails, rocks and wielded crowbars. The PZPR Voivodship Committee was stormed and set fire to while aggressive groups began demolishing rooms inside.

Fire brigades were barred from discharging their duties. Despite this, the soldiers and militiamen defending the building did not use arms.

Later the crowd stormed and burned buildings of the militia voivodship headquarters and the voivodship Trade Union Council. Military vehicles stationed nearby were the target of Molotov cocktails.

Doors were forced open in the militia headquarters main building while some tried to climb drainpipes to enter windows on the first floor. In this situation, after warnings, arms were used, and the first persons were killed and wounded.

Prison and prosecution office buildings were charged, too, and inflammable materials were used. Several dozen recidivists, whose possible release could have serious consequences, were held in prisons. The orderkeeping forces had to use arms. Again, there were fatalities. It also proved necessary to disperse large groups of hooligans and thieves who smashed and plundered shops and storage places (77 shops were damaged, of which 40 were plundered entirely or partly).

As a result of the Szczecin riots, 16 persons were killed and well over a hundred were wounded. Material losses were also considerable.

In Elblag, demonstrations and street riots occurred on 15 and 16 December. Buildings were burned, shops and kiosks were demolished and plundered. On 18 December, after renewed attempts to start fires, orderkeeping forces

protecting the bank, the post office and the communications center were charged with crowbars, bricks and rocks. Military equipment was set on fire.

After calls for abandoning aggressive action and after warning shots, further shots were fired at the ground in front of the attackers. As a result, one person was killed and several persons were injured.

The events in the coastal region resulted in numerous casualties as well as material damages. In all, throughout those events 44 persons were killed or died of injuries, including two militiamen and one soldier, and 1,164 people were injured, of whom 600 were members of orderkeeping forces.

Nineteen public buildings were burned and totally or partly demolished, and 220 shops were plundered and damaged. Scores of civilian vehicles and a considerable number of militia and military vehicles and equipment, including tanks and armored vehicles, were destroyed or damaged. Losses due to the events in the Gdansk region amounted to 105 million zlotys at the prices of the time; those in Szczecin totaled 300 million zlotys.

The course of events was adversely affected by the presence of many top officials from central bodies, who unfortunately had no clear competences or responsibilities, which occasionally resulted in nervous, chaotic and mutually contradictory decisions. During the 5 days of dramatic and tragic events in the coastal region, which were visibly beginning to threaten many other cities, no session of the Central Committee Politburo was convened, while the Council of Ministers waited until 17 December to pass a resolution concerning the events in Gdansk and in the whole coastal region, obliging prosecution bodies to use all legal means of law enforcement, including arms, against persons committing violent assaults against citizens' lives or health, acts of robbery or devastating property and public buildings. The resolution was published on 18 December.

The absence of uniform and effective actions, as well as the failure of authorities to supply early public information, helped demonstrations spread quickly and made participants in them yield to the influence of adventurers and criminal elements. On the other hand, strike organization was becoming increasingly efficient while workers were growing increasingly mistrustful of possible talks with enterprise directors and representatives of local authorities.

After a detailed analysis of the relevant materials, including reports made by an investigative team that operated in 1971 and which concerned the involvement of the armed forces among other things, the commission established that, in the extremely complex situation, the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense had made a number of moves and issued many recommendations aimed at keeping the results of the use of force to a minimum. A strict ban was imposed on the use of artillery and machineguns installed in armored vehicles, despite the fact that these vehicles were frequently assaulted, damaged and set on fire. The use of blanks was recommended for firing warning shots so as to eliminate the possibility of accidental hits. It was ordered that the warning shots be followed not by aiming at the legs, but

only aiming at the ground some 5 meters in front of the attackers. It was also extremely important that the soldiers showed proper discipline, controlled their emotions and did their utmost to limit the tragic consequences.

Extremely critical situations sometimes occurred during the protection of buildings that were either set on fire or were the target of arson attempts, and during efforts to stop the looting and destruction of property. There were also many attempts to damage military equipment, including heavy equipment, or to seize arms from soldiers, and there were active assaults on representatives of the orderkeeping forces.

Although decisive actions in self-defense would have been formally justifiable, soldiers and militiamen exhibited a great deal of restraint, making use of their firearms only in the last resort. Had it not been for the "checks" ordered from above, and especially for the prudence of commanders in charge of combat groups, as well as of soldiers and militiamen themselves, the casualty toll would have been much higher.

Ultimately, the conflict's solution lay in a turn in the party policy, which began with a meeting of the Central Committee Politburo on 19 December. Depressed and seriously ill, Wladyslaw Gomulka was unable to attend. The meeting was presided over by Jozef Cyrankiewicz. After 7 hours of debate, the meeting adopted decisions concerning the need to make significant changes in the Politburo's composition. They consisted, in particular, in Gomulka resigning as first secretary. (During a talk with Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Zenon Kliszko who, at the Politburo's request, visited him in the hospital, Gomulka submitted his resignation.)

It was also decided that it was indispensable for Boleslaw Jaszczuk, Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spychalski, and R. Strzelecki to step down from the Politburo. The second vital element of the change was the formation of the core of a new leading team. The Politburo proposed Edward Gierek for the position of first secretary.

Both in the party and nationwide, Gierek enjoyed a reputation of an able administrator which he earned during his many years as first secretary of the voivodship party committee in Silesia. He was a working class activist well acquainted with the work of miners, the needs and living conditions of workers. His understanding of the significance of the modernity of production and its scientific and technical determinants, as well as of the functioning of huge urban organisms, positively contrasted with the inhibitions of socioeconomic growth in the second half of the 1960's. This made Gierek popular and was a source of hope among party activists and the society at large.

Piotr Jaroszewicz, designated for the post of premier, and Edward Babiuch, who was to take charge of internal party matters as new Central Committee secretary, were proposed for the posts of new Politburo members. Other new Politburo members were to be Mieczyslaw Moczar, Stefan Olszowski and Jan Szydlak.



Edward Gierek, Piotr Jaroszewicz and also Edward Babiuch, whose influence was steadily rising, were to exercise the real leadership in the party and state over the next decade.

A report on the situation in the country and the ensuing conclusions, presented by Stanislaw Kociolek on behalf of the Politburo, was heard at the Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on 20 December. It also endorsed all the Politburo proposals regarding changes in the composition of the authorities and assessed the developments as a conflict caused by the outgoing leadership's incorrect policy, especially regarding the working class, which required a fundamental change.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and chairman of the Council of State Marian Spychalski, submitted their resignations at the 23 December 1970 Sejm meeting.

The decisions adopted at the eighth [sic--evidently a typographical error, the sentence clearly refers to the seventh plenum] plenum put an end to the strikes and demonstrations in Gdansk and Gdynia. These had actually ended by 19 December. However, strikes kept recurring in Szczecin. In this situation, First Secretary Gierek and Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, accompanied by Central Committee secretary Kazimierz Barcikowski, Defense Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski and Deputy Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic, made the bold but correct decision of going to the strikebound A. Warski shipyard. After many hours of difficult talks, the Szczecin strike ended. The following day, on 25 January 1971, when Gierek met with delegates of the shipyards and ancillary industries in Gdansk, the famous words "We shall help" were uttered.

The tide of strikes, which rose again in February, especially in Lodz, finally ended when the decision on the price increases was reversed as of 1 March 1971.

The decision of the eighth plenum (6-7 February 1971) to suspend Wladyslaw Gomulka in his capacity as a member of the Central Committee, and on removing Zenon Kliszko and Boleslaw Jaszczuk from the Central Committee, settled the problem of their party accountability.

Politburo members Stanislaw Kociolek and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski resigned from the Politburo at the eighth plenum. Kociolek also resigned as Central Committee secretary, a position he had held since the seventh plenum (20 December 1970); Loga-Sowinski resigned as chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions.

The attitude of the new leadership of the party and government to the lessons and conclusions of the crisis at the turn of 1970-71, when social conflicts erupted with such great force, became a most important matter for the future.

On 3 January 1971, the sum of 8.6 billion zlotys was assigned for improving the situation of families with the lowest income or with many children and for raising the lowest pensions. The prices of staple foods were frozen for

2 years. This was an important decision from a political and psychological point of view, but the price freeze, whose effects would accumulate in the following years, was an obstacle in the pursuit of a policy of effective and balanced economic growth.

As a result of the prolonged strike of the Lodz textile mill workers, with whom Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions Wladyslaw Kruczek and Central Committee secretaries Jan Szydlak and Jozef Tejchma held difficult and protracted negotiations, the price increases introduced the previous December were retracted. It appears that it would have been more correct from an economic point of view, and as effective from a political angle, if workers in the textile industry had received a well-deserved pay raise, whereas the reversal of the food price hikes only strengthened society's conviction that prices depended on the authorities' will, and, at the same time, led to a total separation of prices from production costs. This became a permanent factor disintegrating the system and mechanisms of the economy.

In response to the manifest expectations of the working class and the widely-voiced opinions of party members, an analysis of the December developments and the ensuing conclusions were presented at the 8th plenum (6-7 February 1971), both in Gierek's speech and in material prepared by a special commission headed by Jan Szydlak.

These reports contained the most profound analysis yet of the contradictions and conflicts in development which occurred in the previous period, both in the economy and in sociopolitical and cultural life.

The December conflict was regarded as an outcome of a crisis of confidence between the party leadership and the working class and other social strata which had been growing more serious for a rather long period of time, especially as a result of insufficient concern for better satisfying society's needs. As members of party branches and crews in enterprises signaled their dissatisfaction with available information and appraisals regarding the course of events in the coastal regions and the actions and responsibility of individual top officials of the party and state, the Politburo was obligated to set up a commission that would, as Gierek put it, "be entrusted with the task of explaining everything that has not yet been explained." The commission that was to examine some detailed questions relating to the December 1970 events was headed by Wladyslaw Kruczek. It studied documents and other evidence, and interviewed many activists engaged in the December developments on the Baltic coast and many participants in these developments. The work of the commission ended in November 1971 and, during the sixth party congress (6-11 December 1971) its findings were made available to those delegates to the congress who had been members of the outgoing Central Committee.

Then, on 11 February 1972, Wladyslaw Kruczek and Edward Babiuch presented information on the commission's findings to a small group of party activists from Gdansk. Then the 1970 developments on the coast were no longer referred to, either in documents or party propaganda activity, while the activity of the censors limited or completely barred any historical and scientific reflection on that subject.

It was also announced at the eighth plenum that a team of outstanding experts would be appointed to prepare a proper conception of a system of functioning of the economy, matching the assumptions of the new strategy of socioeconomic development. Called the Party-Government Commission for the Modernization of the Functioning of the Economy and State, the team began active analytical and programming work that was to produce substantial systemic changes in the economy and the method of exercising power.

However, before long, the activity of the commission was limited and then virtually stopped, first with regard to problems pertaining to the party and its role in the state and society, and, in the mid-1970's, it was suspended altogether.

All that was left of the proposals relating to systemic changes was the rather ambiguous motto: "The party shows the way, the government governs," but even that lacked a theoretical buildup. It reflected not so much an intention to carry out democratic systemic changes and to insure a proper interpretation of the party statutes and state constitutional norms, as the consolidation of Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz's position in leading the economy and administration.

In the mid-1970's, an attempt was also made to reform the economic and financial system of economic organizations (the so-called WOG system), that was to rely on the use of economic instruments and net indices. However, the new methods of operation of enterprises were not coordinated with the methods of central planning and management, and these methods were revised before long and then completely abandoned.

Shortly after the December changes, brakes began to be applied to the discussion of the causes of the crisis, while the slogans of democracy propagated at that time were mere empty phrases, especially with regard to intraparty, state and legal instruments of control, the control of the so-called inner leadership. This kind of informal institution was to remain in existence. The practice of combining top party and state positions actually got worse; this applied in particular to the number of Politburo members who also held top posts in the government. The widely publicized meetings and consultations between the leaders and factory crews, villagers and people of other milieus, which were relatively authentic at first, gradually degenerated into stage-directed spectacles, while reports showing Gierek's forthrightness and measure of paternalism were replaced by eulogies of the leader. The undeniable successes of the first years of the decade led to a growth in self-assurance and even to conceit.

This was reflected in various initiatives in the realm of socioeconomic policy, launched without a sufficient analysis of their costs, and especially without projections of their long-term socioeconomic consequences, and also in an unprecedented propaganda activity, which was later referred to as the "propaganda of success."

At the eighth plenum of the Central Committee, and then again at the sixth party congress, it was recognized that the 1970's would be a decisive

decade for Poland's economic development, and that, with the help of a scientific and technical revolution, it would be possible to make use of the opportunities offered by the younger generation, the huge numbers of people coming of age for employment and to insure a high position for Poland in the international division of labor among highly developed countries.

The results achieved in the first years of this policy's implementation had a lasting impact on the socioeconomic development of the country. The stagnation of the preceding years was done away with and a vast modernization of industry and the entire economy was carried out. The most advanced technology available was introduced in many areas. This was accompanied by an intensification in research and development activity, by a dynamic growth in Polish scientific research and by broader international exchanges. The most difficult problems connected with the fact that about 3 million young Poles came of age and started professional work during that decade were successfully solved. In particular, they were given a chance to obtain good qualifications and employment primarily in modern enterprises. That period also witnessed the first breakthrough in the overdue development of the infrastructure of big cities, and especially housing, with a large number of new apartments being handed over to users. Social welfare services and benefits were vastly expanded, both in towns and in the countryside. The affluence and modernity of most households increased and the production of motor vehicles grew as well. Cultural and scientific contacts with foreign countries were activated, although not always wisely. The international position of Polish culture and artists grew stronger and domestic as well as foreign travel developed. All of this resulted in an improvement of the public mood and society's attitude toward the authorities, but also in a rapid growth of additional hopes and aspirations.

However, an increasingly adverse influence was being exerted on the socioeconomic situation of the 1970's by the symptoms of arbitrariness in the decisionmaking process, and in planning and management, as well as by the clear signs of the inconsistency and inefficiency of the decisions. In particular, the so-called strategy of intensive growth, which was implemented from the beginning of the 1970's, was based on a vast and, frequently, incorrectly chosen investment program and a clearly reckless use of foreign credits. At the same time, the significant increase in employment, which was not matched by a sufficient increase in productivity, was a sign that emphasis was placed on extensive, rather than intensive, methods of attaining an increase in output.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in the period in question, just as in the entire history of people's Poland, there were also areas in which the policy was absolutely correct and passed the test of life. This concerns, in the first place, the foreign and defense policies--both vital for national existence. The popularity and prestige of Poland, and of Edward Gierek himself, increased as a result of Poland's activity on the international arena, especially in connection with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.



### C. The 1976 Events and the 1980 Crisis

During the first 5-year period following the December breakthrough, especially in 1971-73, high growth rates were recorded in industrial output and national income, as well as in real wages and consumption rates--the highest growth rates ever in socialist Poland's history were achieved in 1971-75. This good performance was easier to achieve owing to good atmospheric conditions for farming in 1971-73, the fairly good Western markets for Polish products, low fuel and raw material prices, and easy-to-get credits.

However, from 1973 on, external conditions for development began to deteriorate. Imported raw materials, especially oil and derivatives, became more expensive, and the boom in Western countries ended. To preserve economic balance, the authorities should have curbed growth rates for investment, private incomes and Poland's foreign debt.

Yet despite this, in 1974, the authorities increased investment spending over and above original plan targets and put through a wage-increase program which had been scheduled for implementation in the next 5-year plan period. These decisions were based on overoptimistic and arbitrary assessments of future economic developments, and partly under pressure from various ministries and regional authorities, who were anxious to record "succession."

The enormous resources received in the form of foreign credits were often put to use in a very ineffective manner--mainly under pressure from vested-interest groups in the heavy industry and engineering industry sectors--which further deteriorated the industrial structure and failed to boost exports. Excessive economic orientation to the West, paralleled by under-rating possibilities for stable long-term cooperation with socialist countries, often led to grossly mistaken decisions, such as buying a license for the French bus Berliet instead of the Hungarian Ikarus, or certain other licenses which were wrongly appraised by Polish specialists and technology experts but often promoted by various vested-interest groups.

At the same time, by way of administrative controls, the authorities constrained, and partly even liquidated, small-scale socialized businesses, especially those supervised by local authorities, despite the fact that such businesses recorded, as a rule, higher efficiency rates.

Perpetuation of the inadequate industrial structure resulted in a stagnation of producer goods for farmers. Pesticide and land amelioration rates even fell. Delaying decisions to raise produce procurement prices undermined farmers' belief in adequate rates of return. The decline of village self-government accelerated the bureaucratization of a large segment of the agricultural service sector, which only perpetuated the adverse phenomena. Too-low return rates in agricultural production clouded farming's development prospects and deteriorated the sociocultural conditions of life in the countryside, which resulted in an excessive flight of young people to towns; this in turn added to the difficulties in the housing and municipal service sectors.

Attempts to increase agricultural output, especially in animal breeding, by way of costly capital imports or by pumping money into so-called large specialized farms, failed to produce expected effects--also because these investment resources were not always put to use effectively. As private incomes kept rising and specifically as the Polish demand for meat products continued to increase, the stagnating agricultural production was bolstered by rising food imports, especially of grain and animal feeds, which, next to investment policies, was to become the chief source of Poland's heavy indebtedness to capitalist countries.

This debt, which was incurred by crediting the investment effort and by steadily increasing--in particular after 1975--imports of consumer products and raw materials and producer goods, put such a great burden on Poland's payments balance that credit servicing alone--principal repayments and interest--claimed more than half of Poland's aggregate revenue from exports in 1976-78, and even practically all of it in 1979-80.

At the turn of 1975 to 1976, economic tensions acquired a critical dimension. This made the authorities attempt what was called an "economic maneuver" which was expected to help slow down the too rapid growth, alter investment and production structures in favor of consumer goods, increase exports, and halt the progressing indebtedness. Yet pressure from industries which had embarked on huge investment ventures effectively hampered this endeavor. Above all, however, the party and state leadership committed itself to a policy of deferring a solution to the impending crisis by contracting new loans, a practice which could only add new difficulties and make them more dangerous still in the future.

An analysis of this decade's economic contradictions, which could not be resolved by the economic policies pursued at the time, was given in a June 1981 government report on the condition of the national economy, submitted to the Sejm and later published. This report was also included in the official materials of the ninth PZPR congress. This commission regards itself freed from the necessity of repeating the report's detailed arguments and conclusions.

During the 1970's, price and wage policies--or private income growth rates--were at odds with each other, so that in both, the former and the latter, many developments occurred which gave birth to social frustration. Nor were those policies justifiable on the basis of economic efficiency.

The price policy failed to provide adequate relations between product price and production cost. It was generally inconsistent and regarded arbitrarily as one element of economic leverage. Although staple food prices were frozen, an overall price increase process was underway and gaining momentum. This generated undesirable changes in the price structure, among others in connection with the aforementioned food price freeze, thus boosting demand for foodstuffs which was reinforced by rising private income rates. Nor did the situation improve by further price hikes--among others, by introducing so-called commercial prices--which were introduced without fundamental, publicly consulted reform and were not officially admitted. In this situation,

expanding the commercial-sales system in July 1980 may have perhaps been the proverbial spark that started the explosion of social discontent.

Also inconsistent were wage and private income policies. In general, these policies failed to insure any link to the national economy's overall performance. This found its ultimate expression in the quicker rise in national income distributed than in national income produced. The latter's mean yearly growth rate in 1976-80 was some 2 percent, while that of national income distributed was 5 percent--analogous indices for 1971-75 were 10 and 12 percent, respectively. This meant that consumption was largely on credit. As in the mid-seventies, the national economy's growth indices declined and the disproportion between output and wage increase rates was becoming evident and blatant.

Unequal growth rates for income and wages were also noted between individual occupational groups as well as between social classes and strata. In particular, the disparity between minimum and maximum wages widened--2.5-fold during the 1970's--while a system of privileges--secret ones, as a rule--was expanded to provide, especially for managerial personnel in enterprises and in the administration, socially-resented, extra income possibilities.

Against this background, society was particularly resentful of negligences in the areas of health service and culture. Among others, in the latter 1970's, the per-capita number of books published began to plummet.

In the housing sector, despite the big, actually unprecedented increase in number of dwellings commissioned for use, the actual situation led to frustrating, pent-up hopes for an early solution to the housing problem. The number of persons per room fell from 1.37 in 1970 to 1.16 by 1981, but the rapidly rising nuptiality index resulted in a preservation of the proportion of dwellings occupied by more than one family at its previous level--nearly 30 percent of all dwellings were occupied by more than one family in 1978. Housing cost and effect levels were greatly affected by the one-sided commitment to the energy and capital-intensive "prefabricated house factory" building technique while disparaging traditional building materials and liquidating small-scale businesses producing homes and building materials.

Very harmful for the whole body of sociopolitical life were internal party life deformations in violation of Leninist norms. Internal criticism mechanisms were blocked, as were mechanisms for party and state cadre selection both at the central and the local levels. The lack of appropriate procedures for personnel replacement in the power structure--both in the party and in the state apparatus--fostered haughty attitudes among dignitaries, their isolation from new ideas and authentic information.

Along with this, collective leadership was becoming increasingly formal. Decisionmaking was actually concentrated only in small informal groups--which also controlled more and more functions--with particularly great powers being held by the first secretary himself. Party authority electronics became tantamount to accepting a list of names drawn up earlier. The party leadership was unheeding of criticism; in most cases criticism was ignored, but sometimes critical party officials were removed.

The role of the Council of Ministers was gradually curtailed in favor of its Presidium, but especially in favor of the prime minister and several of his closest aides. Lack of clarity and irregularities persisted in legislative regulations, especially in practical relations between the government and the Sejm. The latter's role continued to be disparaged, as the 1976 subordination of the Supreme Board of Inspection (NIK) to the prime minister excellently shows.

In the mid-1970's, the system of people's council and local administration was reformed, while the country's territorial division was submitted to a radical restructuring (49 instead of the previous 17 voivodships were created, poviats and gromadas were abolished as administrative-territorial units, and communes were established instead). These changes, which had not been preceded by public discussion and were inefficiently prepared, had many detrimental consequences. In particular, at a time when a crisis was already imminent, these changes destroyed the long-established structure of social activity organization.

Deformations and deficiencies in the system of government affected the rank of social organizations, which, under the Constitution, were to be first-rate instruments of socialist democracy. The preponderance of bureaucratically interpreted centralism hampered any genuine social enterprise or activity, which would give society a sense of authentic participation in public life and in the decisionmaking process. The curtailed role of people's councils was regarded as particularly painful. Some statutory competences of trade unions were bureaucratized and gradually disappeared. Institutions such as the Worker Self-Government Conference (KSR), designed as a platform for workers' activities, were actually not autonomous at all and lost their viability.

A number of new provisions were instituted in the social service sphere. Leave periods were equalized for all employees, private farmers were granted health service rights, a 60-day leave for mothers taking care of sick children was introduced, and an alimony fund was created.

However, this extension of social service benefits without a parallel increase in social productivity rates could not, under conditions of rising economic shortages and the debt burden, have but an adverse impact on the national economy. In practice, work discipline was also weakened by some new provisions of the Labor Code.

Extremely adverse effects ensued in social consciousness after wages and social benefits were disassociated from productivity rates, because this encouraged people to treat the state as an institution of which demands should be made. This particular attitude was a direct consequence of arbitrary decisionmaking, which gave people the impression that everything depended on the authorities' will alone rather than on objective processes and possibilities. Steadily growing demands were being made on the state. Observations of actual practice taught people that the group, industry, region, etc. that could better "fight" for its interests, or who had stronger backing at the top, gained more than others. This tendency was further reinforced by



the propaganda of consumerism as an attitude, without proper links to labor productivity and personal labor inputs.

Against the background of the spread of socialist ideas among the working people (in particular the recognition of social ownership of production means, and of equality and social justice), any deviation in practice from these ideas was particularly resented. Resentment became greater as the disparity between actual practice and invariably declared and socially accepted slogans became wider. Resulting political and ideological-political detriments were becoming increasingly drastic. The young, in particular, felt this was a deprivation of their prospects. They found no answer to their ideological-political queries or their sociocultural needs in youth organizations, which often undertook spurious actions, apart from going through a difficult period of reorganization.

Particularly harmful was the insufficiency and considerable negligence in party and social work, including superficial analyses and purely formal actions, a fear of divulging existing social and ideological differences, keeping to shallow optimism, which found its expression among others in purporting the achievement of alleged moral-political unity of the nation, and evading any staunch ideological struggle against the enemies of socialism.

All the abovediscussed objective and subjective processes accrued in the latter half of the 1970's.

Against this background, working people were increasingly desirous of some change in the situation. This was compounded by a generally low level of knowledge of economic laws and mechanisms among the populace, and also by actions launched by external and internal centers and individuals hostile to socialism. A particularly profound conflict was becoming imminent.

The sharp conflict which occurred in 1980 had been preceded by strong warning signals, in particular in 1976 and the ensuing years.

The most critical maladies of the system had already manifested themselves at the turn of 1975 to 1976. In 1976, the economic balance was strongly distorted and food shortages especially became acute. The steady income rise, accompanied by year-in-year-out deferments of indispensable food price increases, boosted demand for staple foods, especially for meat, and was virtually uncontrollable (all this happened after a series of bad harvests). Price increases for other goods and services, which began to be introduced from 1973 onwards, further deepened the already irrational price disproportions.

After a long series of discussions within the party leadership, in which voivodship officials were included in the final phase, a decision was made to increase food prices. Mainly under pressure from Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, this was to be done by way of a single, considerable price increase, which was expected to restore proper return rates for all or nearly all foodstuffs, with meat and meat product prices alone to go up by 69 per cent.

The population, which was reinforced by actual economic practice at the time in its firm belief that prices and wages had no relation to objective economic factors but depended on the authorities' will alone, was taken aback by the scale and scope of the price hikes. On top of this, the system of compensations proposed was such that, although they declined in percentage terms with rising wage levels, in absolute terms provided those earning less with smaller sums than those earning more. This was incompatible with the sense of social justice.

This is why Jaroszewicz's proposal submitted to the Sejm at its 24 June 1976 sitting, which was backed by Edward Babiuch speaking on behalf of all Sejm caucuses, that prices should be increased on 26-27 June--that is, after barely one day of essentially only formal "consultations with representatives of enterprises, institutions and communes"--called forth opposition among the people.

On 25 June, enterprises teemed with excitement and spontaneous manifestations of disbelief in any form of consultation; workers turned an eager ear to claims that the authorities would take notice only of massive pressure. In 10 voivodships, strikes and demonstrations were staged in enterprises. Street disturbances occurred in Radom and Ursus, and, to a smaller scale, in Plock.

In Radom, the workforce of the General Walter Mechanical Works went on strike before 8 am, at which time 1,000 workers took to the streets, calling upon workers from other plants to stop working and join the demonstrators. At 10 am, a crowd of 2,000 gathered in front of the PZPR Voivodship Committee building, while minor incidents in the city and in other enterprises added to an atmosphere of general agitation. When at 12:30 pm voivodship committee first secretary Janusz Prokopiak went out to speak to the crowd gathered in front of the voivodship committee building, the demonstrators demanded that he convey to the central authorities their demand that the price increases be repealed. Prokopiak informed Central Committee secretary Jan Szydlak about this by telephone and promised the demonstrators an answer by 2 pm. In the crowd, and elsewhere in the streets, agitation began to predominate, hooligans and adventurers joined the demonstrators, and shops were plundered and demolished. Attempts were made to storm the voivodship office, the voivodship militia headquarters and the prison. At 2:30, militia detachments armed with teargas grenades, truncheons and water cannon began dispersing the crowd. In line with a decision made by the central authorities, militiamen, sprayed sidewalks with inflammable fluids, started fires, built barricades, and set fire to the voivodship committee building. Two persons from the crowd, who were under the effect of alcohol, tried to start a lorry with concrete plates in order to drive it into the orderkeeping forces formation, were overrun by the car and died of injuries.

On the same day, nearly 90 percent of the workforce at the Ursus factory near Warsaw stopped working and demanded that the price increases be repealed; 400 persons went out in the streets. At 9:30 am, some 2,000 people gathered at the railroad which runs by the factory. The crowd stopped city commuter as well as long-distance trains, and cases of looting and demolishing wagons

were noted. At 5 pm the demonstrators started unscrewing the rails, cutting them with acetylene torches, and building a barricade around a derailed locomotive. At 9:20 pm, militia forces undertook actions to disperse the crowd, using gear gas and concussion grenades. Order was restored at 11 pm, and the railway company's technical squads began repairing the damage. During the riots, 15 militiamen and 1 civilian were injured.

In Plock, a demonstration of some 300 persons was held inside the local oil refinery at 10 am. At 4:20 pm, some demonstrators (about 200 persons went out into the town and marched toward the PZPR Voivodship Committee. At 5:10 pm the crowd, which meanwhile had grown to some 400 persons, arrived at the voivodship committee building, where the local voivodship committee first secretary talked with the demonstrators. Some of them unsuccessfully tried to force entry into the harvesting machine factory in order to stop work there. At 8:40 pm, groups from among the demonstrators hurled stones at the voivodship committee buildings, smashing its windows. At 9:10 pm, militia forces undertook dispersing actions and, within less than an hour, restored peace in front of the voivodship committee building as well as throughout the town. No injuries were recorded.

Determined to avoid the use of force and to appease pent-up emotions as well as to forestall further strikes and riots, the party leadership decided on the same day to rescind the price increases. At 8 pm, the Council of Ministers chairman appeared on television to inform viewers that the government had withdrawn its draft bill on price increases from the Sejm and that retail prices would be kept at the previous levels. No strikes or demonstrations occurred in Poland in the following days.

Simultaneously, it was decided to stage a great propaganda campaign which, as Edward Babiuch put it, was designed "to forge yesterday's events into support for the first secretary, for the party, for the Central Committee, for the government and for the Council of Ministers chairman."

In all voivodships, a campaign of large meetings was held under a slogan of "We are with you, Comrade Gierek," during which the Radom and Ursus events were denounced as the work of troublemakers. The media also unleashed a great propaganda campaign.

Participants in the events were tried at civil courts and misdemeanor courts and disciplinary measures were taken against them. In Radom, 939 persons were summarily fired from their jobs and 180 persons were fired in Ursus. This decision was soon revoked for 162 persons (mainly in Radom).

Neither the Central Committee, the Politburo nor the government submitted the June events to sociopolitical analysis. Instead, steps were taken to hush up the affair as soon as possible. This, among other things, was the meaning of early revocations of repressive measures. As soon as the end of July, the Council of State issued a recommendation by which sentenced persons who had held a steady job before 25 June, who had a good reputation and had not been sentenced before should be given mild treatment. In February 1977, the Council of State conditionally lifted the remaining

prison terms for participants in the June 1976 riots, and a 19 July 1977 Council of State decree on clemency and an amnesty decision of the same day definitively closed the juridical aspect of the riot participants' cases. Those sacked found jobs in other enterprises or, after some time, resumed work at their previous job sites.

Since it was not clear how long government planned to suspend the price hikes, a panic ensued on the market, and all nonperishable goods were bought out in a frenzy. This forced the government to introduce sugar rationing. The July 1976 procurement price increases with a concomitant price hike for producer goods for farmers, a move which had been designed as part fulfillment of the whole price regulation action, only reinforced the disproportions between retail food prices and produce procurement prices. Farmers no longer found it profitable to produce food for their own needs, which made many of them, especially small holders, abandon animal breeding on their own fodder.

Yet another revocation of indispensable price increases and public consultation of the problem of prices and compensations, as well as the subsequent obvious fear on the part of the authorities to take up this problem, further reinforced the common demoralizing belief, especially among the working class, that wages and prices bore no relation to the productivity of both individuals and factories. This particular attitude also strengthened the inclination to force concessions from the authorities.

The failure to draw proper conclusions from the June events--both in the economic sphere (as the misfired economic maneuver showed) and in the party's internal life--together with the subsequent adoption of a drive for survival at all costs, proved to have been the final decisive step which led to an acute, profound crisis.

The weakness displayed by the authorities, their lack of contact with the working class and their disposition to rely on the worst conceivable manner of talking to the masses, namely in rosy, oversimplified propaganda terms, created very favorable conditions for unfolding antisocialist opposition activities. The reactionary, confrontative political line adopted by the United States and its allies was another factor facilitating such activities.

The open conflict in 1976 between worker communities and the authorities provided an opportunity for small, cosmopolitan groups within the intelligentsia--which had been active for several years and received growing external support--to organize action in "defense of the working class."

In September 1976, the so-called Workers Defense Committee (KOR), which was transformed in September 1977 into the Committee for Social Self-Defense/Workers Defense Committee (KSS KOR), was founded. Long-known revisionist activists, including those active during the March 1968 events, and some of whom at first even occasionally used socialist phraseology, played the major role in this organization.



KOR's main ideological target was to undermine confidence among workers and the intelligentsia, and particularly among young people, in the Polish system's ability to meet the needs of the working people, and to develop in them a conviction that this system could not be reformed. Another aim of the oppositionist attack was to undermine the chief role of the party as well as the party's ability to lead society. Finally, the opposition attempted to question Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union and the international socialist system by resorting to historical pretexts and presenting a false picture of the present. They also endeavored to create pro-Western sentiments, particularly among the easily penetrated intelligentsia communities.

The worsening crisis, a dislike for the authorities, an unwillingness to admit that there was an increase in social contradictions, and a lack of energy in the struggle against antisocialist activities, fostered the activeness of some illegal groups and increased their sense of impunity.

Their sense of being untouchable was also based on a belief in the efficiency of blackmail by the Western countries which threatened to cut off credits for Poland should the Polish authorities apply administrative measures.

The increasing efficiency of organization and propaganda of some of these groups, which received instructions and support from the West in the form of propaganda and materials, developed educational work among young people, published and disseminated illegal materials and sent emissaries to potential hotbeds of unrest, became particularly dangerous when the workers' protest exploded in mid-1980.

Apart from the KSSR KOR, illegal organizations included the Confederation for an Independent Poland founded on 1 September 1979, whose ambition was to become a political party and which propagated extremely nationalist, antisocialist and anti-Soviet slogans, as well as the Founding Committee of Independent Trade Unions of the Baltic Region and the Young Poland Movement.

Anarcho-syndicalist concepts, which awkwardly contrasted the idea of self-management with the idea of socialist statehood, and personal and group interests of workers with the working class' interests, prevailed in the oppositionist ideologies. Lenin and Marx had proven, however, that anarcho-syndicalism could only be a stage because, being a petty bourgeois and reactionary trend, it would unavoidably lead to counterrevolution.

The ideas and activities of the oppositionist groupings, as well as their penetration of Solidarity (founded in the second half of 1980), had a decisive influence on the deformation of this union's working-class character and on its dangerous political evolution.

Development of church-state relations had a great impact on the shaping of the public mood in the late 1970's. The election of Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as Pope in October 1973, and his visit to Poland in June 1979, also significantly influenced the state of social consciousness.

John Paul II's visit demonstrated that the church in Poland is capable of taking the initiative in propagating among the nation slogans which, despite being characteristic of socialist humanism, were underestimated in ideological work particularly in the 1970's. Among other things, this applies to moral values manifested by man's relation to individuals and the community as well as to the dignity of labor and the working people. The fact that no proper conclusions were drawn from this experience, particularly with regard to the younger generation, was another serious mistake on the part of the political leadership.

However, Edward Gierek, during his meetings with Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, during a visit with Pope Paul VI and in the Mielec address, did make attempts to develop constructively the policy of the normalization of church-state relations which should be based on an acknowledgement of socialist transformations, respect for international alliances involving Poland, and observance of legal order, and to transform this policy into that of cooperation on moral and educational planes.

The inability of the party leadership to draw a lesson from multiplying symptoms of an upcoming crisis was particularly striking during and after the report and election campaign preceding the Eighth PZPR Congress in February 1980.

During the pre-Congress debates in general, and particularly at the meetings of basic party organizations, the working class activists as well as some active party members among the intelligentsia and peasants, sharply criticized the obviously deteriorating situation in the market, declining living standards and a basic lack of correspondence between official reports and the truth about the economic situation and public mood. They also raised the problem of unjustified disproportions between the incomes of different groups and individuals and of demoralization of some groups and persons among managerial personnel. Above all, however, activists from many basic party organizations demanded profound changes in the system of government and economic management. Sharp criticism of the managerial personnel developed against this background.

Critical remarks also concerned a bad intraparty situation, the game of pretenses, the propaganda of success, a pursuit of the largest possible party membership and a formal approach to planning in this sphere (on the day of the eighth congress the party had some 3.1 million members and candidates), as well as violations of intraparty democracy, a disregard of critical opinions and promotion of opportunist loyalty and career-oriented attitudes.

This wave of criticism by the party rank and file was accompanied by instances of a desire to repair the situation and participate in discharging the tasks which, because of growing public discontent, were especially difficult, as well as by the hope that the eighth congress would conduct an honest analysis of the situation, reveal the truth and find a remedy.

The eighth congress did not take advantage of this opportunity to seize the initiative in drafting and implementing a program of repair. The leadership

did not realize how serious the situation was and showed no desire to reveal the true picture. PZPR activists were particularly disappointed by a lack of analysis of catastrophically-intensifying economic threats during the period after the seventh party congress, by hiding behind the average data for the whole decade, as well as by an obvious manipulation of the congress' discussion and preparations for electing the Central Committee. Edward Gierek and his associates attempted to ease the situation by preparing for a change in prime minister, but avoided criticizing Piotr Jaroszewicz and his cabinet.

Several months later, an outbreak of workers' protest occurred, the scale of which had no precedent in socialist Poland's history. It was these events which eventually forced the party leadership to reevaluate and make changes. At its fifth plenum (30 August 1980), the Central Committee approved the reports by government commission appointed to conduct negotiations with worker representatives about the demands put forward in Gdansk and Szczecin. On 30 August, an agreement was signed in Szczecin and, on 31 August, in Gdansk.

At the Fourth PZPR Central Committee Plenum (24 August 1980) and at the first session of the sixth plenum (the night of 5 September), changes were introduced to the composition of the party leadership and government, and Edward Gierek and his closest associates were removed from office.

The second session of the sixth plenum (4-6 October 1980), marked the beginning of a period of deep political breakthrough and moral revaluations, known as the period of socialist renewal, which took place in an extremely difficult socioeconomic situation and in conditions of acute class struggle.

Experiencing a profound crisis and internal transformations, the party at the same time drafted and proceeded to implement a program which obtained its full shape at the historic Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress held on 14-20 July 1981.

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The 1980 crisis had unprecedented dimensions, as a phenomenon which can be called an "accumulation of crises" took place that year. The previous crises were arrested (in 1956, mainly thanks to Gomulka's popularity and, in 1970, because of confidence in the program of economic growth as well as in transformations and reforms promised in Gierek). But in 1980, when the symptoms of a deep economic crisis had accumulated for many years and negative political, ideological and moral phenomena intensified, the party, lacking a program for overcoming the difficulties and repairing the situation, was incapable of halting the crisis.

In 1971-80, thanks to industrial and economic modernization, and development of education and an active cultural policy, Polish society quickly modernized its structure and changed its sociopolitical consciousness, although the shortcomings of ideological and educational work frequently prevented these changes from developing in a proper direction. Various processes took place in the social consciousness, particularly among the working class: together

with the strengthening in people's minds of the main ideals of socialism (concerning the rights of the working people rather than their duties) came a natural desire to participate in the decisionmaking process and to protest against contradictions existing between the authorities' actions and slogans on the one hand, and their implementation on the other, and between real achievements and exaggerated opinions about them, particularly hurt the prospects of young people.

All this intensified the subjective sense of disappointment and criticism, which became deeply rooted in the social consciousness, and the contradiction between the strivings of the working class and the authorities' actions became yet another crisis-generating factor.

In this situation, a need to introduce changes into the previous economic and political practice became obvious. At the same time, drawing a lesson from the manner in which the previous crises had been overcome, the working class demanded institutional guarantees of these changes. This was one of the reasons for the support given to the idea of trade union revival and for Solidarity, particularly during the first stage of its development. Accumulating difficulties also increased the range and aggressiveness of antisocialist forces receiving support from their imperialist, subversive sponsors.

### III. Conclusions Regarding the Causes and Prevention of Crises

#### A. Experiences From the History of the Polish People's Republic

By analyzing social crises which occurred throughout the history of the Polish People's Republic, we were able to identify the general mechanism breeding tensions, conflicts and crises and to indicate their main causes in the sphere of objective circumstances and subjective activities by individuals, groups, classes and institutions.

The threat of a social crisis does not come into existence automatically, but only when violations of Marxist-Leninist principles of socialism and departures from the goals of socialist construction accepted by society (and the working class in particular) become so obvious that a powerful desire for change develops in social consciousness. Apart from objective and subjective factors, an immediate reason is necessary to spark off a social crisis. These reasons have usually included inadequately-prepared decisions concerning prices and wages under conditions of society's insufficient knowledge of economic laws and mechanisms.

In order to explain the causes of crises, one needs to examine processes occurring in social consciousness. An essential characteristic of these processes is the general recognition of the goals of socialist construction. They include raising the working people's living standards under conditions of social ownership of the means of production, social justice, observance of the principle "to each according to his work," broadening access to culture, and, in the political sphere, the rule of the people; these principles are constantly compared with their realization in practice.



These comparisons may be based on a genuine knowledge of the reality and be determined by the joint political responsibility of the masses, who are objectively informed and consciously take part in the decisionmaking process. However, in real life, such comparisons are most often deformed by insufficient public knowledge about the development process; the problem is additionally compounded by deliberate actions on the part of enemies of socialism, who increase their activities whenever a major gap emerges between the professed goals and the social perception of the reality.

As a result, shortcomings in the functioning of socialist democracy deprive the party and state bodies leading the socialist construction of a warning system against social discontent. Moreover, the gap between the expectations and aspirations of the developing society and the reality grows deeper.

Another fundamental sphere of comparisons between the expectations and aspirations of the developing society and the reality grows deeper.

Another fundamental sphere of comparisons between the goals and the results are the material conditions of life, which are directly related to the economy and social policy.

The role of these spheres varied from crisis to crisis, although both have clearly played a part in all of them. In 1956, matters related to violations of the rule of law came to the fore; in 1970, economic problems received the greatest emphasis; and in 1980, it was a profound socioeconomic crisis. As the economic conflict worsened, political accents became increasingly clear. During all crises, the bond between leading party units and membership masses, and between the party and state and the working class and society in general, has been weakened. The weakening of this bond was the gravest consequence and manifestation of departures from the Leninist principles and style of management.

Social crises in the Polish People's Republic have been the result of interacting objective and subjective factors. Subjective factors dominated: deformations in the exercise of power, economic management errors, neglect of ideological education, and inconsistency in struggle against the enemy. All this determined the working class' and society's attitude toward the party and state authorities.

1. The basic objective factors which should be taken into consideration when explaining the origin of Poland's social crises after 1945, include:

--the historical heritage, i.e., objective civilizational and material conditions, and the personality and behavior patterns of the people, which are inherited from the past;

--the population growth trends, changes in social and generational structure and the resulting consequences regarding social needs, views and behavior;

--the ideological, political and economic divisions and conflicts of the contemporary world;

--the necessity of a fundamental growth in the role of the consciousness, knowledge and the democracy factor in shaping the processes of socialist construction.

The economic and social backwardness, an effect of Poland's difficult past, comes to the force among the historical heritage factors. Looking at it from a greater historical perspective, this was a result of class egoism and a lack of economic imagination on the part of the magnates and gentry, the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the social and economic deprivation of the peasants, as well as other internal and external causes which led to the loss of independence for Poland. The partitions and the more than 120 years of foreign rule slowed down and distorted the country's social and economic development. The effects of the socioeconomic backwardness were compounded by the Nazi occupation of Poland, in which the Polish people were faced with the threat of biological extermination while, at the same time, some 40 percent of the national wealth was destroyed. With that heritage, the construction of socialism began at a time when the nation's standard of living was very low indeed.

The objective heritage also comprises the nation's historical awareness, with its specific positive and negative features which were shaped in the age of the noblemen's anarchy and later influenced by the partitions and the struggle for independent statehood. The negative characteristics include insufficient respect for the state authorities and the rule of law, a lack of experience with democracy and of the habit of well-organized and disciplined, hence efficient, work.

Together with general progress, the consciousness of needs grew steadily and fairly quickly in Poland. Part of the population became fascinated with the deceptive standards of living in the richest countries, failing to notice the past and present determinants of that situation, which was an outcome of technological advancement, a conscientious attitude toward work, and high productivity. In this situation, it was necessary not only to stimulate and maintain a proper rate of the country's economic and social growth, but also to make up for past delays, to reduce the gap between achievements and expectations, or at least to prevent it from growing.

Polish society is young, both in the sense of its age structure and the still-high natural increase, and in the sense that the economic and socio-political structures of the system are still new. Elements of tradition and processes of change are particularly strongly intertwined. A critical evaluation of history, a modern approach to work, and participation in public life are necessary.

The international situation and world economic and social trends are objective external factors influencing the progress of socialist construction in Poland. The world is politically divided; between capitalist and socialist systems, there is constant competition and ideological and political struggle, the intensity of which varies over time. Despite this division, international ties and dependencies are gradually growing stronger. This painfully affects those countries which develop their economies and raise their standards of living starting from a relatively low level, which is the case with most socialist countries.

Beginning with the Cold War in the second half of the 1940's and the Korean War, all recurrences of aggressiveness in the military policy, economic relations and the ideological and political struggle waged by the United States and Western states, have jeopardized and harmed plans to raise material and cultural standards. Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to claim that the international situation and its detrimental changes resulting from aggressive imperialist policies were the main factors producing crises in the history of people's Poland. Incidentally, it should be stressed that Poland received the fastest and most effective economic aid preventing the most dangerous consequences of social crises from the Soviet Union (in the years 1956, 1971 and 1980-83).

A growing role of consciousness and deliberate choice in shaping development processes is an objective trait of socialist construction. Directing social processes is a historical necessity. Marx analyzed this process and Lenin complemented his analysis.

Gaps between the goals of activity as understood by the people and results of these activities may only be bridged by directing social development.

In order to direct all social processes effectively and, in particular, to formulate and concretize goals properly (i.e., depending on the objective situation), one needs constant improvement (by reliable consultations and expert advice, for instance) in one's knowledge and skills which provide for a proper selection of strategy and corrections during its implementation. The party and state leaders, and all those occupying posts which involve making decisions, need such knowledge and skills. However, this knowledge should also be propagated in society to enrich its historical, economic and legal consciousness. This allows the people to participate in public life, in the decisionmaking process and in the implementation of those decisions with a greater sense of responsibility, and to reduce the negative consequences of uncontrolled phenomena.

Building socialism is, as a process of controlling social developments under extraordinarily difficult conditions, a very complicated task. In fact, it amounts only to more or less correct choices of strategy. Yet, throughout the history of people's Poland, the party and the most responsible people in the power structure as a rule made correct choices in matters vital to the nation, particularly concerning problems of security and peaceful development, state sovereignty and integrity, and international alliances which are most advantageous to Poland and its socialism-building society.

One objective regularity, on an indispensable prerequisite of socialist construction, is that socialist democracy should be developed steadily. Socialist democracy, which has its foundation in the economic system based on the principle of social ownership of the means of production, insures participation in government by the working people, above all by working class as the nation's leading force. The chief leverage for this participation is the party, which most fully articulates workers' class interests.

If socialism's historical development fails to create genuine possibilities for participation in government by the working class and other working people, and if the masses fail to recognize this as such, then perturbations and crises are bound to follow government implies both direct participation--via various democratic mechanisms--in preparing, consulting and making decisions, and working people's control of processes of management and implementation.

This is also related to the proper selection of personnel, in which the party plays an essential role as a result of its Leninist principles of democratic centralism and its system of activity of branches and authorities of various levels. No social, economic or cultural progress can be attained without a never-ending process of selecting ideologically committed, talented and suitably trained initiators and organizers. The cadres should not be limited to a formalistic discharge of the tasks entrusted to them but should act boldly, showing a maximum amount of initiative and making the fullest possible use of their knowledge and experience.

At the same time, socialist democracy allows the broadest possible conscious and active participation of society in the implementation of the projected tasks. The more democratic the spread of responsibility for the attained results, the lower the risk of a conflict between those in whose hands the control processes are concentrated and society. The party of the working class, whose internal life is based on Leninist norms and principles, should be a model of socialist democracy and the main force inspiring its development in the state and society. If socialist democracy operates in the proper way, a majority of the people feel coresponsible for the effects and an obligation to participate actively in correcting errors, should these occur.

Thus conceived, socialist democracy is an indispensable element of the strength of the state and the stability of the working class. The need for a strong, legalistic and efficient state has been reflected in the strivings of generations of enlightened Poles and historical programs of left-wing and democratic social movements. This need is also powerfully borne out by contemporary experiences.

2. Analyses of the crises disclose that there were considerable gaps in Marxist-Leninist knowledge and the approach to the process of building socialism in Poland. These manifested themselves especially in arbitrariness and incompetence of many central and local leadership bodies during the 1970's. In particular, the following mistakes were made:

--a distorted picture of the working class, of all society and of social attitudes was painted for society and, as such, was accepted;

--the leadership believed that government was possible to centralistic command-type directives alone;

--the goals and methods of building socialism in Poland were based on insufficient theoretical foundations; in particular, universal laws were not adapted to Poland's specific conditions;



--research findings and expert opinions were not utilized to the extent they should have been, especially not information which may have pointed to dangers of imminent crises and permitted preemptive political and economic measures;

--conflicts which signaled possible serious crises at a later time were given inadequate or incomplete interpretations (especially the conflicts of 1968 and 1976).

Actual political decisions were virtually incompatible with the slogan about the working class' decisive role in a socialist country.

Before the great industrialization effort, Poland had hardly any modern, big-industrial working class in the full sense of the word. Later, it rapidly grew in size, its consciousness developed slowly. The contention that the working class--as the suzerain of the socialist system--is a natural carrier of socialist consciousness is correct.

However, it is an unwarranted simplification to infer that in order to insure preponderance of socialist ideology in society it suffices to increase the number of workers, because this view ignores the factor of spontaneity and the ideological-moral struggle which continues during the process of working class formation.

In the first years of people's Poland, this social class was composed mainly of traditionally-minded workers and people of rural origin taking their first industrial jobs. These two segments of the working class, despite their differing backgrounds, had one thing in common, namely they formed under capitalistic conditions. Their experiences from the capitalist period furnished them with a frame of reference for appraising what the new socio-political system in Poland had to offer to them. Liquidation of unemployment, placing the worker at the very top of the social hierarchy, the young worker generation's goods prospects for advancement by getting an education and taking jobs in modernizing industries, access to cultural facilities--all these attracted workers to the new system and made them identify themselves with it.

Generally, this involved working class generations born in 1930 or earlier. In a natural aging process, the proportion of these people in Poland's total workforce steadily diminished. The youngest of them are today at retirement age. This segment of the working class, which had great experience in the struggle against capitalism, was diminishing in size and thereby losing its influence on worker consciousness from the mid-1960's onwards, especially during the 1970's. Together with a negligence of the party's ideological-educational work, this process facilitates an understanding of why the August events so powerfully appealed to the young generation of workers. Experiences and ideological convictions of young workers in the 1970's and the early 1980's lacked many of the elements which had reinforced their fathers' strong commitment to socialism.

The party's incomplete recognition of the working class consciousness was bound to generate a tendency to play down and oversimplify the role of ideological-educational efforts and to treat institutions of socialist democracy both inside the party and in party-state or party-society relations in a very superficial and lip-service manner.

So, it is imperative to actively explore the status and development of working class consciousness, especially the way in which individual and collective working class interests manifest themselves and how they are changing for the younger generation. Above all, pertinent research findings and a Marxist-Leninist analysis must be utilized in the practical political activities of the party, of state agencies and social organizations.

Insufficient theoretical exploration of goals and methods of building socialism made it difficult for authorities to devise an adequate strategy (that is, a strategy adapted to historical heritage as well as to the current situation). This explains why authorities confined themselves to stop-gap and partial decisions only, which, with time, increasingly often were merely reactions to the pressure of exigencies and burdened (for instance the accelerated economic growth program launched in the 1970's) by a fear that yet another outbreak of social discontent might be imminent. This evasion of indispensable changes in political and economic government consequently made it necessary to adapt decisions to continually changing, uncontrolled situations.

The pursuit of socialist goals was hampered by insufficient theoretical explanation of socialism's universal principles in adaptation to specific Polish conditions, as well as by underrating the significance of active, honest and truthful ideological and educational activity. The centralistic-bureaucratic and voluntaristic approach to the problem of government methods implied a scornful attitude toward research findings and created little demand for expert opinions on the social situation. Social research institutions were rarely asked for opinions on methods of building socialism; if they were, their replies did not have to be accurate or specific. Representatives of governing bodies were often forced to rely on the superficial propaganda line of success, or even to manipulate information, rather than to discuss problems or come up with well-founded arguments.

Another factor that curbed possibilities for disseminating knowledge or building society's socialist consciousness was that often enough the social significance of teachers and their work conditions were clearly underrated.

3. Arbitrariness in economic decisionmaking and in practical activities often resulted in a lack of realistic foundations for the goals pursued. Plan targets were often not achieved, which automatically generated uncontrolled developments. This led, among other things, to a disintegration of the economic planning system, a development which in the 1970's was even given a "theoretical" justification in the form of the so-called open plans.

Two typical features in the mode of thinking of top economic leaders particularly affected the party line in this respect. One was their commitment to

spend more on heavy industry, even at the expense of other industries. This version of industrialization was, especially in the first several years of people's Poland, motivated by Poland's backwardness and by a desire to overcome it as quickly as possible. However, in the 1960's, and especially in the 1970's, when Poland's industry already had solid foundations and when cooperation with Comecon countries was feasible, it was fully possible to adopt a less onesided approach to investment structure, especially to enhance the food production's share. In addition, the consequences of this onesided investment policy were exacerbated by the failure to apply rigorous economic calculus in the investment process.

Any investment program must be intrinsically balanced, comprehensive and optimal. Without this, such a program can easily be caught in the trap of an uncontrolled investment frenzy, with some projects inevitably necessitating new ones, which puts new unbearable burdens on the economy and drives it deeper into foreign debt, something that happened in the 1970's. This unrealistic investment policy (especially in industries turning out capital goods) inevitably entailed an excessively high share of accumulation in the distribution of national income, which at times was tantamount to a fall in real wages and to curbing consumption rates of the working class and all working people.

As a corollary to this commitment to accelerated investment, especially in industries producing capital goods, there was an overall orientation to economic growth rather than to economic equilibrium.

Even during the 1960's, when endeavors were made to eliminate disproportions generated in the preceding decade, emphasis was put on heavily capital-intensive investment projects at the expense of consumer goods production. This ultimately drove up demand for materials and energy, which adversely affected the Polish economy's development, including its export possibilities.

Another serious weakness in economic management was that the role of agriculture in general economic development was underrated. This proved to be a major source of difficulties in achieving overall economic equilibrium. Also, this reinforced consumer goods shortages, especially of meat, which was a major and direct cause of the deteriorating atmosphere and tensions between working people and authorities. Agriculture was practically treated as a subsidiary sector of the economy and was forced to content itself with relatively low investment resources. The farming sector's demand for producer goods was inadequately met in the structure of industrial production. Actual deliveries of such goods lagged far behind farmers' demand. In addition, investment in agricultural projects generally had very low rates of return.

Poland's socioeconomic conditions are such that agriculture should be paid particular attention. In actual practice, though, a converse line was followed because of inconsistencies in agricultural policy. The authorities failed to insure linkage between stimulating production activity among all groups of rural population and modernizing and optimizing Poland's agrarian structure. Agricultural policies were implemented erratically and

inconsistently. Farmers' rates of return fluctuated. Consequently, the countryside was dominated by a sense of insecurity, which weakened motivations for engaging in production. The rural population was aging. Although positive changes were introduced after every crisis, old decisionmaking habits were soon resumed, which ultimately stalled the agricultural sector's development.

Equally inconsistent were economic and social policies concerning private craftsmen. The volatile policies on this issue proved detrimental not only to craftsmen themselves but to the economy as a whole.

Private crafts and small-scale businesses have a permanent place within the socialist economy. The only condition is that the authorities counteract--in collaboration with craftsmen's self-government bodies and through appropriate tax policies--pathological phenomena, including a greedy pursuit of profits incommensurate with labor inputs or attempts to exploit consumer market shortages.

The above-indicated deformations in economic management, which stemmed both from insufficient knowledge and old habits of thinking on the part of economic managers, as well as from the too slow and inconsistent reform of government methods, were bound to generate crises.

4. Crises developed when the working people felt that the living standards they had achieved might collapse, which gave rise to a surge of discontent and criticism. This happened despite indisputable, historic achievements in the process of transforming Poland into a modern industrialized country. Appreciation of these achievements was marred by the slow pace of social achievements, or even periodic collapses in social policy, the influence on the social consciousness of which was much more direct than that of production and national income indices. Also, inconsistencies in the price and wages policy triggered crises.

The system of old age and disability pensions as a part of social policy continually produced bitter feelings and a sense of injustice. Similar feelings were provoked by recurring disproportions in the rate of growth of incomes and wages between occupational groups and between classes and strata.

Society has not been opposed to income differentials, provided they were justified by varying labor and talent inputs. However, it was very critical of the growing injustice in the distribution of social benefits, especially goods, and unjustified privileges, which became endemic particularly in the 1970's. The burden of inflationary policies fell on the working masses, whereas private businessmen, particularly profiteers, benefited. The consequences of this are still felt.

The working people, above all the working class, were affected by the neglect of health care, education, and child care services and public transport facilities and, most importantly, by an acute housing shortage. In the second half of the 1960's and the second half of the 1970's, access to cultural assets, especially books, deteriorated, which was particularly frustrating as the



socialist state had awakened the people's cultural aspirations and had been vigorously promoting the development of the educational system. Disrupting the link between wages and work results and submitting to interest group pressures, especially groups involved in investments, and using the patronizing formula "the state subsidizes you" led to the state being treated as a welfare institution, to which one could only address demands, as it arbitrarily shaped prices and wages. Especially in the 1970's, the working class, particularly the young generation, developed an attitude of demanding. Under the conditions of acute social tensions, the authorities found it difficult to resist the terror of demands for higher wages and other payments. This greatly aggravated the crisis in the economy and social relations, especially in 1980 and 1981.

In the 1960's and 1970's, unconsulted, secretly prepared price hikes, which took society by surprise, led to tensions and even outbursts by the discontented working class. Intent on avoiding conflicts, the authorities tended to tolerate hidden price increases or to put off until later price, especially food price, rises which were necessary for maintaining economic equilibrium. As a result, price rises came in bulk and were a shock to the population. Withdrawing price rises in the face of fierce social conflict was a manifestation of the authorities weakness and incompetence, which demoralized large social groups and destroyed their understanding of the economy.

5. Political causes for the crises were connected with growing contradictions recorded during certain periods between the state of socialist democracy and the functioning of its mechanisms and institutions on the one hand and the level of social expectations of the working class and other groups of the working people on the other.

Society developed a strong conviction that, apart from the periods which directly followed the crises, when socialist democracy indeed developed, the authorities hampered its progress.

An expansion in autocratic centralism led to a decline in genuine public initiative and activeness of the working class and all working people. The Sejm and people's councils lacked a due political rank. Socioeconomic institutions such as worker's councils and self-management bodies, which were supposed to become a platform for working class activity, lost their active character after only brief periods of enlivenment. The youth movement weakened and became stiff in the 1960's and 1970's. The limitation of the role of trade unions was particularly gainful. Against such a backdrop, party members, as well as working people outside the party, emphasized the need to change the situation. The party and government leadership, however, failed to draw proper conclusions.

The discussion preceding the eighth party congress was a unique and strong manifestation of growing criticism within the PZPR and of the conviction that changes were necessary. Lack of correspondence between expectations of the party rank and file and the course of the congress and decisions adopted during it was another factor preventing a proper reaction on the part of the party to increasingly evident symptoms of an upcoming crisis.

A restricted openness of public life, an unjustified and tendentious blockade of information, and a lack of clear principles concerning journalism, literature and art, were some main reasons for growing tension in relations between the party and state leadership on the one hand, and the working class and other groups of working people on the other.

Development and modification of the law and legal norms did not correspond to the real state and needs of social development. There were no legal regulations concerning the special position of the PZPR and the political alliances in Poland's political system. The 1976 constitutional amendment was a step in this direction.

The leading role of the PZPR in the state should materialize on the basis of the observance of existing laws and guarantee the constitutional role of representative and executive bodies of the people's authorities, as well as of self-management and administration. Similar principles are obligatory in the party's relations with legal public organizations and associations. The observance of norms and practices of democratic centralism in intraparty life, and of the principles of the socialist rule of law by the institutions of the authorities and citizens are, in accordance with Lenin's instructions, necessary for the development of socialism.

It is the party's duty to encourage the development of the system of socialist democracy's institutions and to adjust this system to the level of the working class' maturity and needs. At the same time, a Leninist party should serve as an example and the most important element of this system, and as the main instrument of socialist democracy. Weaknesses in the proper understanding of the role of the party in socialist construction and, subsequently, a low effectiveness of the party's leading role in the state and society had a serious affect on many periods in socialist Poland's history.

In Leninist understanding, the party's leading role in society and its guiding role in the state means such a state of social relations and ties in which:

--the working class, as well as various strata and groups of working people grouped around it, consider their class and national interests as generally coinciding with the program and activities of the party. This happens when their long-term experience tells them that they have influence on the party program and activities. Efficient work of party branches and the prestige of party members in their communities are particularly important for creating such a situation and, in following, for public confidence enabling the party to expect that development guidelines it adopted will meet with general public approval;

--the party exerts a decisive ideological, programmatic and controlling influence on the personnel policy in the state and its institutions, shows initiative in this sphere, and plays a leading ideological and programmatic role in public organizations. This requires high qualifications and a proper work style of the party's branches and executive bodies, as well as active, statutory activities of basic party branches and party members in state institutions and public organizations.

The leading role of the party and its direct influence on the entire society, on all communities and generations, grows as socialism develops. At the same time the party, its branches, executive bodies and political apparatus, cannot be involved in direct management and detailed decisionmaking which comes within the jurisdiction of the state institutions, because, as experience has shown, this weakens the sense of a legal government and responsibility among the ruling apparatus.

Strengthening the role of the Sejm as the supreme authority in the state is one of the main ways to strengthen the socialist democracy. This can be achieved by an increase in the Sejm's activeness--encouraged by the PZPR and the political alliances--at plenary meetings, sessions of Sejm commissions, and in the form of informing the public about the course of the Sejm's work and debates, as well as by a more democratic electoral law, and, subsequently, by an increasingly accurate reflection of the class structure of society in the composition of the Sejm. It is also important that the Central Committee and the Politburo consider the PZPR caucus in the Sejm to be a spokesman for the party policy in the Sejm and an active partner in shaping this policy.

A similar attitude should characterize the party's approach to the system of people's councils, which had previously been considered to be of lesser importance than executive bodies, and to the principle and structure of local self-government and its small and, during certain periods, even diminishing role.

6. The party's success in playing its historical role is largely dependent on its composition and on developing intraparty life in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism.

Previous experience shows that a lowering of ideological political and moral criteria for admitting new members to the party took place during the periods preceding the conflicts and crises. A quest for the largest possible party membership was one of the most serious mistakes weakening the strength of PZPR branches not only at the time of great ordeals but also in everyday political and ideological work in different communities.

Violations of the principle of the open character of intraparty life, information blockade and restrictions imposed on discussions and on the freedom to criticize, were among the most serious deviations from the Leninist principles. Each crisis also revealed a weakening in intraparty democracy, and offenses against democratic centralism and its mechanisms. A common mistake consisted in treating democratic centralism as a sum total of centralism and democracy. Meanwhile the two are a dialectic unity or, to be more exact, a singular form of intraparty democracy guaranteeing internal discipline and ideological, political and organizational unity.

Development of democracy in intraparty life must lead to:

--an increase in party members' participation in shaping the program and general line of the party, and in the decisionmaking process at all levels of the party hierarchy according to their competence. The freedom to discuss

and criticize, and to participate in making decisions by voting is fundamentally important in this context. Decisions and resolutions adopted by the party must be obligatory for all party members;

--equal opportunities of all party members in electing the leaders of their party branches (from the basic to central levels) in accordance with electoral laws envisaged by the party statutes. Party members should also be given the opportunity to control the adherence of party authorities to resolutions adopted by the party and to participate in the discussion of decisions to be adopted by the PZPR authorities. Decisions adopted in this manner must be obligatory for all party branches subordinated to these authorities;

--the right and duty of PZPR members and branches to undertake independent initiatives and actions, provided these correspond with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the program and general line of the party, and with resolutions adopted by the party authorities ranking higher in the party hierarchy, and that these actions serve the implementation of the resolutions.

7. If internal democracy in the party and socialist democracy in the state are functioning well, the possibility that an incorrect personnel policy, which would bar the appointment of the best persons to top posts, might be adopted is very low. But if an autocratic style of government prevails, cadre selection, even in the party leadership is inadequate. This, of course, is not to say that in the past top posts were not held by persons of great knowledge, expertise or leadership abilities or endowed with indispensable ideological-moral qualities. Yet, if this happened, it was hardly ever an effect of the actual mechanisms of socialist democracy.

Contrary to intentions, personnel policy was often quite contingent in practice. Besides, within the existing system it was all but impossible to stall the growth of red tape and all its adverse consequences. This manifested itself, among other things, in an unwillingness to accept indispensable changes, in a commitment to perpetuate existing structures, in a habit of considering the state's vital interests from the vantage point of vested interests of individual sectors, regions or organizations.

Furthermore, this implied a deformation of the working class' leading role. In practice, this idea was often interpreted as meaning that a possibly large number of posts should be filled with party members. Not infrequently, such an attitude involved applying too lenient criteria in personnel selection and, worse still, made cynical people hoping to make a career or take a privileged post join the party. This automatically barred many members of the allied groups and large numbers of honest and able nonaffiliated people from holding responsible positions in the state apparatus, and curbed chances for adequate personnel selection.

In violation of the party's programmatic declarations, but sanctioned by actual practice, was the attitude of evaluating candidates for high posts by their readiness to succumb to superiors rather than by their individual,



genuine professional expertise or ideological-moral qualities. This became yet another major crisis-generating factor in the party's relations with the working class and with young people. Curbing the margin of freedom in candidate selection for top posts also curtailed party organizations' initiative and responsibility for personnel decisions.

The statutory internal-democratic mechanism of controlling the top leadership was not used in the party. As a rule, leadership changes were forced by major crises involving working class protests. This lack of control reinforced autocratic attitudes among some party leaders, augmenting the adverse effects caused by their personal idiosyncrasies, habits and modes of thinking as well as making them less responsive to criticism from inside the party and from society.

Concentration of powers and cumulation of party and state functions had a tendency to recur regularly. Lack of a clear line of division between competences of the Central Committee Secretariat and the government was most conspicuous in the 1960's.

In the 1970's, the prime minister tended to make his general decisions independent of the Central Committee and the Politburo. This resulted in blurring the division of competences between party and government leaders and in obscuring the top leaders' personal political and constitutional accountability for running the state.

Steady improvement in personnel policies is a basic prerequisite for a successful implementation of the socioeconomic program as well as a fundamental condition for regaining public trust and working class support. As it conducts its personnel policy in the name and on behalf of the working class, the PZPR must furnish the appropriate opportunities for advancement of people with high professional qualifications who identify themselves with the socialist state's objectives, whether they are members of the PZPR, the ZSL, the SD or are affiliated with no political group. Personnel decisions must be made in a democratic manner, and party organizations and bodies as well as state agencies should periodically submit their personnel policy for revisions.

8. An extremely powerful influence was exerted on the worsening crisis situations and the course of the crisis by the activation of the political opposition and its connections with foreign centers of antisocialist ideological and political subversion. The history of people's Poland clearly shows that the tides of attacks against the socialist state were rising at a time when the society perceived the emergence of a wide gap between the proclaimed and the actual results of the construction of socialism. However, the influence of the opposition was, as a rule, stronger when it came to intensifying the course of a crisis rather than sparking it off.

Poland's embarkation on the road of building socialism after World War II signified a great opportunity to win over to the cause a great majority of the people, who, during the implementation of this program, were to start identifying themselves politically with the new system. Despite the retention of some nonsocialist elements and influences and the vigorous activity

of antisocialist forces, the postwar years marked a significant step towards the implementation of this objective.

Perceptible progress occurred as a result of revolutionary reforms, of vast opportunities for the working people to come up with their own initiatives and of the exposure of the political enemy. Regardless of differences in world outlooks and convictions, an increasing number of people were beginning to think in terms of social property and the goals of socialism. At the same time, this narrowed the possibilities for action on the part of the political opposition (although the distortions in the system of exercising power between 1949 and 1955 did contribute to a surge in opposition moods).

The program of political reforms adopted by the party after the 1956 crisis seriously limited the social and political ground for antisocialist activity in larger social groups. The proponents of the so-called second period began to lose ground. But, in turn, the party's retreat from this program was conducive not only to the emergence of criticism, but also of programs which, to a varying degree, were opposed to socialism. The dogmatic conservative tendencies, the stagnation in the area of theoretical doctrines, were not conducive to bold and principled discussion and this, in turn, hampered an effective struggle and genuine exposure of the essence of revisionism, i.e., the tendencies and views contradicting the fundamental principles of socialism. Incidentally, many revisionists of that period later became the theoreticians and leaders of the antisocialist opposition.

The oppositional tendencies and phenomena slackened somewhat in the early 1970's. However, the signs of an advancing economic crisis and the failure to draw the proper conclusions from the events of June 1976 created conditions that were conducive to organized antisocialist activity (especially of the KSS-KOR and the KPN).

This activity stimulated the emergence of hostility toward the party and the popular state. It also greatly contributed to the intensity of the crisis of 1980-81, to anarchy in the economy and social life, and especially to the counterrevolutionary attack of the extremist forces which had dominated the Solidarity leadership against the party and the socialist state.

In this context, it is necessary to mention the extremely harmful role that has been, and still is, played by the subversive undertakings of imperialist centers hostile to people's Poland. Their activity has always grown in step with the political and military aggressiveness of the United States and the NATO states. As a result, outlays on political and ideological subversion were growing and the organizational structure of these centers was burgeoning. As for the effects of their operation, they were all the greater as the internal tensions and conflicts in the building of socialism worsened.

The experience of the past crises, and especially the last one, also shows that when communities ideologically and politically hostile to socialism operate within a state, and when the confrontational policy line of the imperialist states is strengthened, then conflicts between the authorities and society may lead to an emergence of a counterrevolutionary situation and the threat of a counterrevolution.

9. The legal principles of solving disputes and conflicts between groups of the working class and enterprises and state institutions, and especially the legal regulations governing strike situation, were not sufficiently clearly and unambiguously defined. Also, the shortage of precise legal regulations relating to the solution of extraordinary situations characterized by a massive, destructive onslaught against the legal order, the institutions of the state and the law enforcement forces proved to have negative consequences. Until the Poznan events of 1956, even the theoretical possibility of the emergence of such situations and conflicts was dismissed. The failure to draw appropriate conclusions from the sociopsychological and legal aspects of Poznan events was one of the causes of the authorities' blunders committed during the December 1970 events and made it impossible to prevent one more tragedy.

The commission is of the opinion that the fact that conflict situations which led to clashes and casualties were allowed to take place was, first and foremost, the result of a malfunctioning of state institutions and leading party bodies, and especially of the errors committed by some of the leaders. However, once the extremely dangerous, destructive assaults were launched against the legal order, against the institutions of the state and law enforcement bodies, the use of force was a legally justified duty of the authorities.

It is always necessary to differentiate between the protest of the working class and its contents and the form in which it is expressed. Instances of violating the law and the principles of social intercourse as well as of sowing anarchy and threatening the stability of sociopolitical life and the international position of the state, usually related to an activation of antisocialist and antistate forces, must not be tolerated.

Social crises in people's Poland have been caused not by an allegiance to the principles of socialism, but by deviations, shortcomings, and errors in implementing these principles under specific class conditions, in particular, by errors committed in methods of government. Every sign of accumulating contradictions, tensions and social conflicts encouraged forces hostile to socialism to take actions designed to aggravate these tensions and conflicts.

To prevent future crises, it is necessary to abide by the universal formulas of socialism, and especially by Lenin's rule that the implementation of these formulas must be adapted to specific conditions in a given country on the road to socialism. These universal formulas include social ownership of the means of production and planned production development, as well as the rule of the people, with the working class as the most prominent group, and its party playing the leading role in a socialist state.

Any recurrence of errors in methods of government and of distortions in the realm of the party's internal life should not overshadow the fact that the PZPR proved its political and moral honesty during all crises in Poland. Relying on its class sources and on socialism's ideological principles, the party always exposed evil and its sources, worked out programs for reeducation and purged its ranks. Many conclusions and experiences resulting from crises

were permanently incorporated into the system of principles of party and state activity.

The October 1956 upheaval in particular was helpful in clarifying the relation between general principles of socialist development and specific national conditions, in acknowledging the importance of national values and practical requirements of internationalism, in condemning and rejecting illegal administration methods, in reaching a lasting agreement with Polish believers while maintaining state-church separation and recognition by the church that socialism is Poland's existential foundation, and in embarking on a cultural policy which is open to all genuine human and artistic values in Polish and world culture.

The December 1970 events resulted in a better perception of social needs in the area of consumption, and Poland became more receptive to scientific and technological world achievements; numerous technological improvements were introduced in the national economy, legislation on social issues was expanded, the housing and auto industries grew considerably, and international contacts, including those in the areas of science and culture, were strengthened.

But it was only with the resolution of the Ninth PZPR Congress following the August 1980 crisis and a revaluation in internal party life that a program emerged for significant systematic changes in the economy and society. These changes, which correspond to the level of development of the Polish working class, peasants, and the intelligentsia, are a prerequisite for implementing authentic principles of socialism. In the spirit of Leninism, the ninth congress resolution defined a general line for party and state activities, including guarantees for preventing future crises and methods for solving social conflicts. The basic safeguard against a recurrence of crises is the determination and consistency of the party, of its members, bodies and branches, in fully implementing the ninth congress program. Progress in this program's implementation should be comprehensively assessed by the National Conference of Delegates, with resulting conclusions taken into account in the period preceding the 10th party congress.

#### B. The Resolution of the Ninth PZPR Congress as a Program for Overcoming the Present Crisis and Preventing Crises in the Future

Conclusions drawn from analyses of crises which occurred throughout the history of people's Poland should be addressed first and foremost to the party as the leading force in society and the socialist state. The party, more than anyone else, has to insure that crises do not recur in the future, that contradictions in the social sphere are solved in time and in accordance with working class interests, and that overcoming contradictions serves the principal aim of building socialism in Poland.

The basic guidelines of the party's policy were contained in the ninth congress resolution, which unequivocally defined principles for the party to observe in order that its policy be understood, accepted by the working class, and that the party may gain the support of all working people. These include:



- the principle of social justice as the basic socioeconomic guideline;
- the principles of socialist democracy and rule of law as the basic guidelines in the socialist state's internal policy;
- the principles of intraparty democracy and the party's ideological and organizational unity as the basic guidelines in party life; and
- the principles of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism as the basic guidelines in the activities of the PZPR and the people's state.

In implementing all these principles simultaneously and perceiving the ninth congress resolution in its integral and inseparable whole, the party is striving to gain working people's support for these principles. On the basis of these principles, the party is seeking to achieve conciliation between all political forces which recognize the permanence of the political system of people's Poland, the country's alliance with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, the supremacy of the popular state's interests and the leading role of the PZPR.

Implementation of the principles established at the ninth congress requires that ideological work inside the party and in the entire society be characterized by high standards, integrity and vigor. This is one of the most important domains of party activity. The party's ideological, Marxist-Leninist foundation determines its strength in exerting influence and exercising its leading role. Ideological involvement and genuine knowledge constitute a basis for effective participation on the part of citizens in influencing decisions pertaining to society and the state, and for providing individuals and groups with just and constructive targets for their activity.

A thorough analysis of experiences in the history of people's Poland--its achievements and progress, but also its failures and errors--should constitute a component of ideological work. Tensions, social conflicts and crises are part of the history of people's Poland, and should be presented and explained in accordance with the truth. If future conflicts are to be resolved in time and prevented from degenerating into crises, even the most dramatic developments must be explained and comprehended in accordance with historical facts rather than being passed over in silence.

The commission considers it a matter of utmost urgency that a textbook presenting the party's history against the background and in connection with the history of people's Poland be prepared and constantly studied. This knowledge should become an important instrument in shaping the consciousness of primarily the young party members and candidates, in telling the truth about the results of the labors of the working class and all the working people which have turned the course of Poland's history toward a construction of socialism under the party's leadership, and also about the difficulties and contradictions emerging during this process.

Emphasizing the fact that the resolution of the Ninth PZPR Congress should be treated as an integral whole, the commission points to the need for a permanent and consistent expansion of their role in specific PZPR activities, and in party-inspired undertakings of state authorities--the Sejm, Council of State, government, people's councils, and their executive bodies.

1. Socioeconomic contradictions accompanied by instances of social injustice, unjustified privileges, and material differences have played an extremely important role in all the crises. It is therefore necessary to monitor thoroughly and impartially the material situation of society--and especially of the working class--and to draw timely conclusions if irregularities are apparent. The Main Statistical Office [GUS], party and state social sciences centers, and trade unions, should be obliged to conduct regular research in this area, while the Central Committee, the Politburo and lower-level party bodies should regularly assess the socioeconomic situation, paying particular attention to how social justice is implemented in practice.

2. The country's economic situation has to be presented in a truthful and honest manner to the nation. Difficulties should not be concealed, nor achievements exaggerated, as this might give rise to unrealistic expectations. Mechanisms of economic reform should be presented constantly and explained in a reliable way, especially those aspects which link pay and price levels to productivity and efficiency. It is necessary to strengthen people's conviction that their financial situation depends on the effects of their own work, and on the performance of their enterprise, other factories and enterprises, and the entire economy. Social demagogy and popular economic misconceptions should be vigorously eliminated, as they shatter the social awareness of the link between genuine effects of their work--for individuals, as well as society--and people's aspirations in the area of consumption, without simultaneously promoting concern for an increase in work discipline and productivity, or for the growth of national income. More individual and group efforts should be directed toward strengthening social discipline and combatting such social plagues as alcoholism, profiteering, or parasitism.

[Polish society] has to be provided with broad and truthful information; there can be no return to "the propaganda of success" pursued in the 1970's, nor to "the propaganda of disaster" which followed. Both had a considerable influence on public consciousness, contributing to a deepening crisis of confidence in the party and people's authorities, and ultimately to a total negation of this confidence.

The authorities must not repeat the error of arrogance; they must take into account society's maturity, experience and feelings, as well as criticism--especially that voiced by the working class. On the other hand, they should not adulate the population, make unrealistic promises and pronounced opportunistic assessments dictated by short-term interests. Flattery obsequiousness, servility, and currying favors should not be encouraged or tolerated among leaders' associates and subordinates.

3. Policies in the sector of education--in factories and enterprises, schools, colleges and universities, youth and civil organizations, and the media--should be designed to shape civic attitudes and characterized by respect for work, social discipline, realistically moderate aspirations in the area of consumption, and a sense of joint responsibility for Poland's fate. There is a need to shape and strengthen party members' and all citizens' ability to oppose social, political, and national demagoguery, irrespective of the intentions of those demagogues who are creating new or reviving old myths, or deceiving society with promises of easy and speedy solutions. Active involvement in shaping correct attitudes has to be considered as an indispensable component in the work of all the units of the socialist, ideological and educational front. Party bodies and organizations involved in such activities have a duty to analyze regularly the behavior and attitudes of people responsible for the implementation of educational tasks, especially school teachers and university staff. Growth of PZPR members' knowledge and ideological commitment are a prerequisite for this task to be implemented.

4. The party attaches great importance to strength and efficiency in the functioning of the state, its structures, and apparatus. The state should be strong, fortified by its domestic and foreign policies' compatibility with the class interests of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia whose roots are these classes, with citizens' active participation in determining and implementing these policies, and effectively attaining short- and long-term national targets. Such a state would be characterized by good and thrifty management, by rule of law and justice, with unconditional respect for institutions and observance of the principles of social life.

Shaping a sense of joint responsibility for Poland's fate is a prerequisite of civic discipline. This requires the observance of the principles of socialist democracy, and consistent implementation of a program of democratic reform, which would strengthen the working people's sense of participation in the governing process.

As the party plays the leading role in Poland's political system the relations inside the PZPR exert a fundamental influence on the functioning of the state. The PZPR statute adopted at the ninth congress is an expression of party members' desire to implement intraparty democracy. Its observance is indispensable if the party intends to avoid another situation in which the leaders lose touch with the rank-and-file, and may pursue policies incompatible with the party's and the nation's interests. These prerequisites first and foremost include the following:

--democratic procedures for party elections and collective leadership;

--unity and discipline in party activity;

--elective bodies' supervision of the apparatus, which plays an extremely important and responsible role in the work of the PZPR;

--continual consultation with lower-level party bodies and branches by central institutions;

--cadre rotation at elective posts and within the apparatus;

--Central Committee's regular assessment of the work of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, with conclusions--including organizational conclusions--drawn from this assessment; and

--consistent implementation of the party's program adopted at the congress, and of resolutions adopted by party bodies.

6. The party should have at its disposal a system for gathering and analyzing signals which indicate a growth in tendencies liable to result in crises. Such data should be provided by several centers and channels independent of each other, so that the situation is presented in an objective manner, and subjective judgments are eliminated. Effective functioning of intraparty democracy and information--and especially PZPR leaders' continual, direct contacts with the working class and other professional communities--remains irreplaceable. The Central Committee and the Politburo should regularly assess the situation from the angle of social contradictions. The party's scientific centers should prepare a system enabling early detection of symptoms signaling an accumulation of contradictions and conflicts, so that the party and state can undertake timely endeavors toward easing tensions and preventing their development into crises.

7. Class struggle persists with considerable intensity during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, when the foundations for socialism are being laid. Centers of antisocialist opposition supported by imperialism are a reality, and their activities will have to be taken into account for a long time to come. Antisocialist forces cannot be ignored; revolutionary alertness and continual readiness to strive against enemies of socialism, remain a political imperative. It should always be borne in mind that the effectiveness of this struggle depends on whether party and state authorities are pursuing policies that are correct and comprehensible to the working people, and on their ability to rally public support for these policies. The basic methods of combatting the antisocialist opposition are to isolate it politically, and convince the workers that its activities run counter to national interests. Legal repression should also be resolutely employed, so that attempts to violate Poland's constitutional legal order do not go unpunished. The Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo should undertake a regular assessment of the antisocialist opposition's political influence and of the effectiveness of efforts to combat and limit it. The whole party must participate in this struggle.

8. The PZPR's assessment of phenomena, activities and ideas is founded on the interests of the working class. The correlation between workers' and national interests, which has been proven in the course of history, is becoming a foundation for a powerful, patriotic movement of Poles, joined together for the purpose of strengthening Poland's existing and realistic shape, namely its socialist shape. Together with allied political parties and lay



Catholic and Christian associations, as a co-initiator of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (PRON), the PZPR has to protect the right of all Poles--irrespective of their ideological inspiration or outlook on life--to take full advantage of their potential while keeping to the principles of Poland's Constitution and national agreement, the lasting targets of which include the following:

- insuring Poland's external security and the integrity of its borders and territory;

- insuring order, internal harmony, and a conflict-free solution to social contradictions; and

- insuring realistic conditions for improving the nation's material and cultural situation and for Poland's civilizational progress.

This requires that the party, all its members and bodies at all levels, actively support initiatives and social processes which contribute to the implementation of what are recognized as the supreme values of PRON's programmatic declaration. These include the following:

- socialist ideals of social justice, or furnishing equal opportunities for all citizens--party members and nonaffiliated individuals, believers and non-believers, people of all nationalities--to participate in public life; this also finds expression in assessing people according to their real attitudes, abilities, and merits;

- respect for efficient work and its effects, especially for people who make positive contributions in this area;

- rule of the people as genuine civic participation in the exercise power via representative and self-government bodies;

- dialogue and conciliation as the principal ways to overcome conflicting aims and interests, and struggle for Polish society's socialist identity and against whatever is harmful to Poland's interests;

- rule of law and a sense of civic responsibility, which requires propagation of political and legal knowledge and unconditional law-abidance by state institutions and by citizens;

- developing and expanding culture, which is understood as an expression of the nation's spiritual life; and

- respect for human dignity, politeness in interpersonal relations, and tolerances in the area of religion and world outlook.

Social reconciliation which was inscribed in the party's program at the ninth congress and is best expressed in the PRON movement, is not a tactical move or one forced by circumstances; it is a strategic concept with an unequivocal class orientation. Through social reconciliation, the PZPR hopes to win broad public support for its program, for the historically-established

win broad public support for its program, for the historically-established interests of the working class.

9. The PZPR recognizes independent and self-governing trade unions as an important component of socialist democracy, approaching them openly and recognizing them as partners. According to the party, the main principle of trade union activity is to represent and defend employee rights and interests in a broad sense in conjunction with the needs of national economy, national income growth, and shaping economic and social policies. All party members active in the reborn trade union movement should follow these principles as they were defined at the Ninth PZPR Congress.

CSO: 2600/324

INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS INTERVIEW AMNESTY RECIPIENT

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish No 253, 25 Oct 83 p 3

[Article by Krzysztof Walczak: "Conspiracy or Backyard Stealth"]

[Text] "I am familiar with the contents of article 2 of the 21 July 1983 law on amnesty. In connection with this, I want to avail myself of the amnesty, and I declare the following: Until 13 December 1981 I was a member of the Independent Students' Union. After martial law was imposed, I did not cease union activity, since I did not agree with the situation which reigned in the country at that time."

Piotr R., in his fourth year of studies at one of the Warsaw schools, is 26 years old and has an apartment, a wife, and a small child.

He does not want to say exactly what inclined him to come out of hiding. "The ground began to burn beneath my feet. I felt like a man who is nailed to a wall and who wants to get out of this situation. I wanted to have a clean conscience and to sleep peacefully. I wanted to have time at last for my studies and scientific work. An immeasurable amount of unfinished work had piled up."

There were several of them, and they included both scientific workers and students. Let us start from the top. Krzysztof L., the "spiritual leader," pushed and persuaded people to act. Waldemar A., a chemist and pyrotechnist of the group, made rockets for shooting leaflets into the air. Andrzej N., also a scientific worker at the Warsaw school, was connected with Bujak. And there were several students. They turned themselves in 2 or 3 weeks ago. All of them? Of the group to which Piotr belonged only Tomek D. is still hesitating. He is waiting. For what? He still has a little time. The chance will be gone after 31 October, the expiration date of the statutory time for turning oneself in as granted by the law on amnesty.

Piotr has already availed himself of that chance. "It is a load off my chest," he says in the presence of MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers. There are still many people who have not made the decision. Piotr belongs to those who have realized or suspect that their underground activity in the conspiratorial structures of Solidarity was known to

workers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Those who turned themselves in are reluctant to talk about their activity. The scientific workers from Piotr's group will not agree to meet with journalists. An interview with Piotr does not get anywhere, either. Concepts are muddled, and positions and views are inconsistent.

Political program? "I do not have a program. I never had one. I was a technical worker. I wanted to do something."

After 13 December he left his home. He hid at the homes of friends. "After about 14 days, when I saw that I was not being looked for, I returned."

In the spring of 1982 Piotr received a proposition--to join "opposition activity."

"After getting a package containing an ejector for the leaflets, I proceeded immediately to the place of the planned action, that is, to the roof of a building at the corner of Pulawski and Rakowiecki Streets. I lit the fuse. I knew that I had a couple of minutes to leave the place. The leaflets scattered from the roof onto Pulawski Street." That was in April. In July Piotr's group dispersed leaflets at the corner of Marszalkowski and Hozy Streets in the same manner.

Not only those initiated into opposition activity took part in the action of dispersing leaflets. The unawareness of younger classmates was also made use of. This was the group of the "deceived."

The MSW officers say that several people belonged to the "deceived" group, including, among others, Maciej A., Jacek W., Ireneusz B., Piotr R., Dariusz S., and Anna and Andrzej M. For a chocolate bar or a pair of stockings, often coming from charitable aid, they executed simple tasks. They only made certain whether or not, on the top floor in the given building, the exit onto the roof was open. Nothing more. Simple tasks, but the outcome could be serious--a sentence. Many of them did not realize what they were doing. Here, a small service for a chocolate bar.

Others waited for information from the "deceived." The pyrotechnist Waldemar A. already had the leaflet launcher ready. Piotr R. fired the shot.

Why? For what purpose? With whom and over what did he want to fight?

"...I thought that there were people who were hoping for this action from us," says Piotr. "No, it was not childishness. At least that is what I thought at the time. And today? Well, I think that a strong authority and radical and hard solutions are necessary. Otherwise we will not get out of the crisis."

A surprising statement. Piotr's father is also surprised by it. Who knows what his son's fate would have been were it not for the amnesty. The authorities gave him the chance to end conspiratorial activity and turn



himself in--without arrests and consequences for the future. Piotr has an open path to school. He himself says that he neglected his scientific work. He is well set up in life. His parents bought him an apartment. Piotr is just fixing it up. But, on the other hand, he grumbles about everything. There is no furniture, there is not enough money to last until the first, and one has to struggle for every trifle.

"I am not pleased with what is happening in the nation," says Piotr:  
"I do not see any prospects for myself!"

The reporter from SZTANDAR MŁODYCH and I look at each other in amazement. Both of us rent subtenant apartments. Ahead of us are many years of waiting before we have what Piotr has from day to day. And how many like us are there? Yet somehow none of us is wringing his hands and talking about the "darkness of despair."

Piotr R. and the group with which he was connected have not dispersed leaflets for 2 or 3 months. Why is this so? Has the "underground" been broken up? Former activists are turning themselves in more and more often. Piotr says that many of his friends are still hesitating and putting off making a decision. But they will make it, he affirms, for there are few people who can endure that emotional state and strain. That is one matter. And here is the second, more important one: if you fight about something or with someone, you have to be strong and have the support of society. When that is lacking, then conspiracy, the so-called underground struggle and the dispensing of leaflets, resemble backyard stealth.

Let us summarize this meeting.

From what Piotr R. and the MSW officers who organized the meeting told us, it becomes clear that the "conspiratorial group's" activity was known to the investigative authorities. They know, as we were told, about still other, similar conspiratorial undertakings, which evoke a smile of compassion rather than some more serious apprehension.

"We want," they say, "to avoid arresting these young people; we want them to return to a normal life. And that is why we invited journalists here. Let Piotr R.'s and his friends' story serve as a warning of sorts and at the same time as a lesson.

"There is still time. You can still turn yourself in. We are waiting, but 'backyard conspirators' and their families, too, must realize that the law is the law. The deadline of the amnesty with regard to turning yourself in occurs on 31 October."

9451  
CSO: 2600/199

PZPR OFFICIAL DESCRIBES PARTY-UNION TIES

PM291514 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 10 Nov 83 p 3

[Interview with Stanislaw Gabrielski, director of PZPR Central Committee Social and Vocational Affairs Department, by Lucjan Pracki--date, place not given]

[Text] Pracki: Last August party and government leaders met union activists from the whole country at the 'Baildon' steelworks. In September, the Central Committee Politburo and the Government Presidium met to discuss the realization of recommendations passed at that first meeting. Union issues were given much consideration at the 10th, 12th and 13th plenums. Recently the first meeting took place between representatives of party leadership and chairmen of the new union organizations operating above enterprise level. Contacts dictated by current work situations are becoming everyday practice. Can all this be seen as an expression of a new style in the cooperation between the party and the trade unions?

Gabrielski: Contacts are indeed lively and this does confirm the fact of the realization of the line adopted at the Ninth PZPR Congress, a line of socialist renewal in which cooperation, as between partners, with vocational and social organizations constitutes the basis of party policy. The 13th Plenum resolution states that in everyday party work priority significance is given to those political and ideological initiatives which serve to consolidate ties with the working class and with all working people. These ties are realized first and foremost through cooperation with workers' mass organizations--in particular with trade unions and workers' self-management structures.

Pracki: According to what principles is this cooperation being developed? Does it not restrict the independence of those organizations?

Gabrielski: The party and the trade unions share the same working-class character and they both defend the same interests of the working people. This is the origin of the community of their aims and aspirations. This is also why their mutual assistance and cooperation are so important. In contrast to the practice of the past period, they are based on the principles of partnership, respect for the other side's independence, and granting the other side a right to hold its own opinions. The party has

drawn conclusions from its past experience. In accordance with the standpoint defined at the 10th Central Committee Plenum, party organizations and structures have a duty to support and assist the trade unions in carrying out their statutory tasks and functions; safeguard their position of independence with respect to state and economic administration; ensure that their rights and their duties, as well as their opinions, are respected; help them in settling their disputes; and cooperate with them in carrying their valid suggestions and recommendations into effect. In addition, it is a party member's duty to directly participate in union activity.

Pracki: This last obligation is not yet being carried out in any widespread manner....

Gabrielski: This is true. We have not yet been successful in galvanizing the whole party into contributing to a revival of the trade union movement. That is why both the 12th and the 13th Central Committee plenums had put such emphasis on the importance of doing just that. It follows from our fundamental and ideological premises that PZPR members must not stand outside the unions. Acting out of their deepest conviction, they should work within union ranks, and they ought, through their activity on behalf of the interests of the working man, to win the unionists, along with entire milieus of working people, over to party policy. I expect that in the course of the recently launched report and election campaign every executive body and every enterprise committee will carry out an assessment of their performance in discharging this important task.

Pracki: How could one characterize the current situation in the process of trade union development?

Gabrielski: We have a steadily expanding and--most important--a self-organizing movement here, a movement which has already reached the proportions of an important social and political phenomenon. In keeping with our earlier prognosis and in spite of the boycott applied by the political adversary the union movement keeps gaining ever-increasing understanding and support from the workers. It is being built through the joint effort of party members and those who do not belong to the party: former members of all previous union formations are finding a place for themselves within it. The architects of the reborn unions are united through their will to serve the workers' cause. It was earlier than anticipated that this movement entered the phase of organizing structures operating above the enterprise level and evolved a new, numerous and bold aktiv which preserves strong links with its working environment and is open to cooperation with our party. In short, the unions are becoming an important factor in the development of socialist democracy.

Pracki: And yet there is still no lack of obstacles to their development....

Gabrielski: Quite. Some work forces continue to doubt whether the new unions can effectively defend the workers' interests. Those people have to be understood and convinced with facts. Obstacles are also raised

by some representatives of the administration who are either unfamiliar with, or unwilling to respect, the rights of the unions. In cases of that kind party organizations should take all possible steps to support the unions in enforcing their well-justified rights.

Another, more delicate and complex question is that of the disputes which sometimes arise between the unions and self-management bodies over the issue of their respective competence. Obviously, things can be remedied here to a large extent by the interpretative commentary on the regulations which is currently being prepared, and also by mediatory action on the part of party organizations. But the most important thing is to foster the realization that both the unionists and self-management activists are representatives of the same work forces and that they should cooperate closely with each other in the latter's interests. The struggle for a socialist profile for the trade unions also continues to be a vital issue. Therefore we are determined to join the fight against all manifestations of subversion on the part of the political adversary. In this area the unions should find a particularly active ally in party organizations.

Pracki: The trade unions are starting their work in a very difficult period. They need to achieve some success to lend them credibility. Does this not carry within it the danger that they will seek for success at any price?

Gabrielski: We discussed this at our recent meeting with the leaders of the new unions, and the same issue was also discussed at the 13th plenum. We want to persuade the unions and self-management bodies that they cannot strive for one-sided, apparent benefits for their work forces, since such attempts are bound to backfire against their own interests. Under our crisis conditions it is inevitable that if wages are forced up--to give just one example--without a corresponding increase in production and productivity, then inflation will rise to reach disaster proportions, a disaster which will hit the working people. Many union organizations and self-management bodies comprehend the nature of the problem--and the danger--and they take it into consideration in their work programs.

Pracki: The party's consistent stance in the matter of realizing the recommendations submitted by trade unionists at, say, the Katowice meeting, is particularly noteworthy. Decisions concerning that issue [reference unknown] were made at the highest level. Is that going to be the rule?

Gabrielski: I think that that will depend on the weight of the matters submitted. In Katowice some 100 recommendations were submitted which were of fundamental significance to the future of the union movement. That was why the method of their realization was decided upon at the level of the highest political and state authorities. It also expressed the regard in which the party held those millions of trade unionists who were courageous enough to take upon themselves the effort of organizing the new unions during such a complex period, and who--as everything seems to indicate--chose the correct line of action.



Pracki: What line was that?

Gabrielski: From the start they created strong ties connecting the newly recreated unions with class tradition, with workers' democracy and with the socialist system, and that defined unequivocally the union's ideological profile and suited the long-term interests of the working people. They also make use of everything that was good in the August [1980] social agreements with the working class, and in the experience of the old unions. Despite the existing barriers this creates a good basis for the continuing development of strong, independent and class-based unions, that is, the kind of unions that both the workers and their workers' party have in mind.

Pracki: What matters are now the subject of particular concern for the party and the trade unions?

Gabrielski: First and foremost those which, as a result of the Katowice meeting, featured among the decisions of the Central Committee's Politburo and the Government Presidium. The main concerns are to work out a formula for social consultations and to increase the role played in those by the trade unions; to approve a new model of collective labor contracts and--possibly--to introduce enterprise-level social agreements; to analyze the results of the consultations and to implement a new wage system; to carry out an analysis of and introduce essential alternations into the principles of creating and managing enterprise funds, especially the social welfare and housing funds; to create favorable conditions for the restoration and effective functioning of the social labor inspectorate; and so on.

Pracki: In the decisions issued by the Politburo and the Government Presidium the realization of many union recommendations was entrusted--either partly or totally--to party organizations and instances. This is a novel method. What does it mean in practice for, say, party and union organizations at enterprise level?

Gabrielski: We have already discussed the principles and some of the tasks involved in their mutual cooperation. But the needs, as well as opportunities, are much greater. It is, for example, necessary to create among work forces an atmosphere of well-disposed interest in the work of the unions and to advertise their achievements in direct conversation with the people as well as through the factory loudspeaker networks. It is also essential for both sides to learn the difficult art of partnership and agreement, and how to establish their respective standpoints over the most important issues. Party members can give a great deal of help with the shaping and implementation of union programs. But at the same time the observations and conclusions of the members of class-based unions constitute important signals of workers' needs and attitudes and they can influence the shape of party programs. Thus, we need each other. That is why we must not forget about the necessity of making periodic assessments of the work that party members do within trade unions and in workers' self-management bodies, or that of laying down individual tasks for party members in those areas.

Pracki: While at the same time recognizing the unions' right to autonomy".

Gabrielski: Of course; that is a basic requirement. We must be careful to avoid any arbitrary attitudes and also not to force our own opinions on them. After all, we are dealing with independent and self-governing unions which basically sort out their own problems by themselves and which themselves work for their position in their enterprises and in the country. The party's task is to support their constructive activities and initiatives.

Pracki: Thank you for the conversation.

CSO: 2600/343

DZIEKAN DESCRIBES PARTY CADRE POLICY

AU231507 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 19 Nov 83 pp 1, 6

[Interview given by Brig Gen Tadeusz Dziekan, head of the PZPR Central Committee Cadre Department, to Marek Henzler and Jan Ruranski: "Cadres Without Secrets"---date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Henzler, Ruranski] The government is working with the curtain up, General Jaruzelski has often stressed. We would like to see this principle applied by the party. Cadre policy is one of the most important spheres of party activities, especially in our system in which the party fulfills ideological and leading functions. Public opinion is vitally interested in this subject. Hence this interview.

[Dziekan] I am not surprised by this interest. Cadre policy is such an extensive sphere that only some of its elements can be discussed in an interview. Beginning with the Ninth Party Congress, the entire party and all its cells and organizations have begun--with the curtain up--consistent efforts to overcome the neglects accumulated in the 70's and to rectify the errors of cadre policy.

The openness of the party's cadre activities is best documented by the party's electoral system. Over 50 percent of the party's regular workers are appointed through democratic elections during the accountability-election campaign and the remaining workers are appointed by the collective approval of the party executive bodies and cells.

The PZPR's leading role in society and guiding role in the state is responsible for the fact that one of the party's most important tasks is to define the aims and lay down the principles of cadre policy and to control their implementation.

That the party does its work with the curtain up is proved by the fact that the 13th Central Committee Plenum's document entitled "The Main Principles of the PZPR's Cadre Policy" has been given extensive publicity by the press and has been circulated. These principles illustrate and constitute an open directive of the party's cadre policy.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Every governing party in the world appoints its own people to the key posts. This is a normal mechanism of government.

However, in our country the so-called nomenklatura is viewed rather negatively by the public, which regards this table as a list of the names of those who can man these responsible posts rather than a list of the posts to be manned by the people recommended by the party.

[Dziekan] First, I would rather we abandon the term nomenklatura. We should use instead the term which denotes the procedure followed by party organizations when appointing leading cadres. Second, already the Ninth Party Congress criticized the formal-bureaucratic approach to (using the old term) nomenklatura (which was excessively developed), voluntarism in the party's cadre decisions, the frequent cases of the so-called musical chairs rotation of posts, and the too narrow social base from which to recruit cadres.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Are there many posts that the party has to approve politically?

[Dziekan] From the lowest through the highest post in the country, some 10-14 percent of posts had to be politically approved by the party cells in the old days. After the administrative reform and the new division of the country into 49 voivodships this ratio increased to 16 percent. At the moment the number of the leading posts to be approved by party cells is being reduced. The appointments to certain posts have been regulated by the laws. For example, the higher school law has introduced the election of the rector and deans. The enterprise law has introduced the appointment of managers through competition. This does not mean that the party is indifferent to those posts, but the thing is that we have to employ a democratic system. We have to present candidates for such posts and to create the mechanisms of effectively publicizing the people important for the party.

Fully sharing the arguments of the Central Committee members, who have recommended caution in this regard, and exercising every bit of prudence, we will be able to reduce the number of posts at the central and all voivodship levels that require the consultation and approval of the party.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Before each plenary session of the Central Committee of the Sejm, rumors appear about who is to be promoted and who is to "go down." Many people associate the openness of political life with, for one, the openness of cadre policy. What should be revealed when preparing cadre decisions?

[Dziekan] We can be as keen on proving that the openness in question does exist as we can be frank in asserting that the process of preparing cadre decision may not be fully open, not only for political, but for human reasons as well. I think there is no need to more amply justify the familiar principle that cadre decisions are made by the person or teams appointed by law. This is how proposals are made for cadre changes in Sejm deputies' clubs, the Central Committee plenums, in the committees for cooperation, the people's councillors, members of self-government



bodies, and so on. I do not know whether it is necessary to develop your question, except that, unfortunately, there is nothing we can do about rumors and that we have in Poland exceptionally many "experts on cadres."

[Henzler, Ruranski] The issue of the openness of certain cadre decisions is now of much greater social significance because various institutions of social control are still not fully functioning. People are afraid that appointments are made in some unknown places and that the public not only has no influence over such appointments, but does not even know about them.

[Dziekan] I will answer this question. I can cite arguments in favor of the openness and the collective making of these decisions. This is so in the case of every voivoda and deputy voivoda, who are appointed by the premier. Such appointments are always preceded by consultations with the appropriate people's council. At the beginning of martial law this system operated in perhaps a slightly restricted form. Cadre changes in the leadership of party cells were and are made in a similar manner. Cadre decisions have to be known at first only to the persons who are authorized to make them. Despite appearances, the number of such persons is not small. For example, in a voivodship there are 80-180 such persons--members and candidate members of the voivodship committee. If there are, say, 30,000 or so party members in a voivodship, it is impossible to consult everyone of them. This is a physical impossibility. Voivodship committee secretaries are dismissed and elected by members of party cells, who themselves, when elected, have been given a mandate of trust and the authority to make decisions on behalf of their electors.

I fully share your view on and concern for the genuine functioning of the institutions of public control over cadre policy. In the PZPR this function should also be fulfilled by the present accountability-election meetings and conferences.

[Henzler, Ruranski] We often hear people say that self-government bodies, enterprise managements, and even trade unions have powers regarding cadres, but the party organizations in enterprises have no such powers.

[Dziekan] This is a misunderstanding. I have said many times that party organizations have no power to "give away" leading posts. However, the point is that the primary party organizations' inspiring and controlling role becomes increasingly stronger. At present, in line with the PZPR statute, the parent primary party organization must clear all the cadre decisions concerning party members. Since the Ninth Party Congress no PZPR candidate for a leading post at the central level has been appointed without the opinion and recommendation of his primary party organization. It goes without saying that the opinion in question concerns the attitude and activities of the candidate for a leading post and is not a kind of "posting" to a given post.

[Henzler, Ruranski] What about the appointments of nonparty people? What about, say, Catholic groups?

[Dziekan] These people are no longer merely single individuals holding posts at the highest level. Everywhere, from top to bottom, cooperation commissions manned by the party and the political parties are active. These commissions discuss and decide on the leading appointments in state, representative, and self-government bodies. The commissions composed of PZPR, ZSL, and SD members discuss and adopt--with increasing frequency and effectiveness--joint proposals regarding candidates for appointment to the key leading posts at the central and local levels.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Since martial law has been abolished and military commissars recalled, one can sometimes hear: "The commissars have departed, but the colonels and generals are still there." In other words: to what extent do the military share in the government?

[Dziekan] I am a little surprised by such opinions in view of the fact that, for example, no one bothers about how many lawyers or former teachers occupy leading posts. Everyone knows that there are in the Armed Forces officers who are trained and much experienced in the work of the organizational, economic, technical, or party echelons of the Armed Forces. As for the officers who have been recently started to work in the party, administration, or the economy, the views about the numbers of such officers are exaggerated. Before martial law was introduced, 23 such officers had been appointed and 80 were appointed during martial law, that is, 103 altogether. This should be compared with about 180,000 leading posts countrywide. I propose that your readers should evaluate this fact.

[Henzler, Ruranski] What posts are these officers occupying?

[Dziekan] The post of the chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, the posts of four ministers, of two first secretaries of the voivodship committees, of 10 voivodas, including the mayor of Warsaw, of four deputy voivodas and deputy mayors, of three city and gmina managers, of one university rector, of seven secretaries of the voivodship committees (none of them was appointed; all of them were elected), and of 21 secretaries of the city, precinct, gmina, and plant committees. Fourteen officers also hold managerial posts of industrial associations and enterprises. There are also officers who are vice ministers, heads of departments and heads of sections and bureaus. I am one of the five officers chosen for work in the PZPR Central Committee.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Does the Central Committee Cadre Department have influence over the setting up of certain organizational units and on the excessive expansion of organizational structures, which at times seem to be "havens for cadres?"

[Dziekan] We know the problem and we are constantly pressing for efforts to streamline organizational structures and cut down the number of leading posts. Improving and simplifying organizational structures is a task for the cadre and other departments. One of the problems we continue to combat is various advisors, whose numbers often exceed reasonable dimensions. No doubt advisors are necessary, but we do not want several advisors doing the job of one advisor. We do not want advisors to advise one another.

[Henzler, Ruranski] We have heard many positive observations about the cadre systems used in the Armed Forces. Are these systems being transferred to the "civvy street?"

[Dziekan] Yes, to a great extent.

[Henzler, Ruranski] The PZPR statute states that the Central Committee controls party members in leading posts and issues and withdraws party recommendations.

[Dziekan] This statutory provision is very democratic, and we view it with extreme care. It is like a sharp scalpel, but it is necessary because the party's authority is involved. Unfortunately, some recommendations are issued too rashly and have to be withdrawn later on. We have to be careful in this respect. In 1981 and up to mid-1982 2,420 persons were recalled from leading posts. This number included 106 persons who were recalled for disciplinary reasons, 65 in whose case party organizations asked for withdrawing their recommendations, 302 who lost the ability to manage their enterprises and work forces, and 810 who were recalled for other reasons, some of them being disciplinary reasons.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Following the attacks against them in the previous years, can our leading cadres be sure of their posts and get down to the real business of managing their enterprises, institutions, and work forces?

[Dziekan] Yes. I would like to stress that the movement of cadres can solve nothing by itself. What is decisive is the quality of cadres. This quality will be evaluated mainly on the strength of a proven and socially approved effectiveness of performance at the given leading post. Changes in cadres will take place, if only through the increasingly more frequently practiced competitions for managerial posts. We are in favor of such competitions because they are a more democratic and objective way of appointing people to leading posts.

[Henzler, Ruranski] Many personal cliques, informal setups, and so on have been demolished in the past few years. Has the party created any mechanisms to counter the organizations of new cliques and so on in the party apparatus, administration, or enterprises?

[Dziekan] We have created many mechanisms, beginning with the amendments to the party statute adopted by the Ninth Party Congress and, mainly, the documents on cadre policy adopted by the 13th Party Plenum. "The Main Principles of the PZPR's Cadre Policy" are the basis of the nascent uniform system of the cadre policy in the party and the state. These principles cover all the issues we have discussed in this interview.

Other documents define the duties and powers of the regular party workers, the procedures by which party cells appoint persons to leading posts, and the directives on creating and using the cadre reserve.

As ever, the success of these principles will be determined by practical implementation, that is, by the correctness of cadre decisions.

DAILY LISTS AMNESTY RECIPIENTS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 257, 29-30 Oct 83 p 4

[Article by PAP correspondent: "Taking Advantage of the Blessing of Amnesty: Successive Individuals Reveal Illegal Activity"]

[Text] The law on amnesty of 21 July 1983 designated-- as is well known--31 October 1983 as the final date for disclosure of illegal activities. The press spokesman for the minister of internal affairs has informed the PAP correspondent that in the final week the number of persons who have decided to reveal themselves has increased considerably.

Before 28 October a total of 536 persons had come forward, among them:

in Bielsko Biala, a six-member group of workers from the Chemical Plants in Oswiecim, who disclosed underground activity carried out in 1982-83 in this plant that consisted, among other things, of the distribution of illegally issued letters and the carrying out of financial drives to support activities at cross purposes with the law;

in Radon, eight workers from the General Walter Metal Plants, who affirmed that during martial law they had distributed illegal publications and had also collected financial assets;

in Rzeszow, Zbigniew Szyffner, a physician in the Predom-Zelmer Home Equipment Plants, who revealed that during martial law he had edited, composed, and distributed illegal letters and leaflets. As Z. Szyffner affirmed, his motive for revealing his underground activity was the conviction that he was hurting Poland's interests and that the leaders of these activities were concerned only with themselves;

in Warsaw, Andrzej Niedek, manager of the educational equipment laboratory of the Department of Geography at Warsaw University, who declared in turn that during martial law he had participated in underground activities, fulfilling the role of a messenger and distributor of leaflets. In disclosing his activities, he stated, among other things, that conspiratorial activity is senseless in the present sociopolitical situation;



in Warsaw, Slawomir Miastkowski, a law student and former employee of the Poltel Film Studio, also announced his association with organs of persecution. He acknowledged that after martial law was introduced he carried out illegal activity, distributing conspiratorial newspapers and giving legal assistance to persons acting against the obligatory legal order. Beginning in April 1982 he organized leaflet activities and participated in editing underground periodicals, and he also aided employees of an illegal radio station;

in Wroclaw recently, self-disclosures were made by Krystyna Kolano, Ludwik Dybalski, Jerzy Kobusinski, and Zbigniew Swiatek, workers at the Fadroma Building Machinery Factory, who, during martial law and after its suspension, collected contributions in the plant and then turned them over to an individual who furnished them with the means to distribute illegal publications;

All of those who came forward were given amnesty after complying with the formalities required by the regulations of the amnesty law.

Among the many individuals who revealed their identities, recently self-disclosures were made abroad by, among others, Marek Mikolajczuk, Henryk Jagielski, Adam Debowski, and Bogdan Felski, members of the so-called Solidarity Information and Coordination Office in Bremen [FRG], who presented themselves at the Polish diplomatic post in Cologne, declaring that in connection with the law on amnesty passed by the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic, they were abandoning their activity and closing the above-mentioned office. They all also declared their desire to return to Poland.

8729

CSO: 2600/204

PROPOSED CHANGES IN PASSPORT LAW DISCUSSED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 248, 19 Oct 83 pp 1, 6

[Unattributed article: "PRON Evaluates New Drafts: Citizens' Right to a Passport"]

[Text] On 18 October 1983 the Commission on Legislation and Rule of Law of the National Council of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON] gathered for its first meeting. The subject of the analysis undertaken by the commission was the prepared or already functioning legislation regulating essential sectors of social life.

And, thus, Konrad Straszewski, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, presented particulars of the supplement being prepared for the passport law. The basic intention of the changes made is the desire for passport proceedings to be conducted in a manner that is clear and understandable for any citizen wanting to travel abroad. Therefore, all decisions made concerning this matter will have to be justified in a way that does not produce doubt. This concerns negative decisions especially. Until now the motivations for such decisions have been extremely vague, prompting understandable social reservations. Envoys also reported having reservations.

The minister informed everyone that a refusal to grant a passport can be justified only by a preparatory, legal, or executive procedure taking place in relation to someone's being tried for an offense based on a public accusation. A negative decision also can be handed down to protect a state secret, defenses, and state security as well as important economic interests of the country, and also when the state cannot guarantee consular protection to a citizen or if riots are taking place in the country of destination.

The new regulations are also intended to regulate the situation of persons who have refused to return to Poland. If they are willing, these people will be assured of Polish consular protection, and nothing will stand in the way of their eventual return to Poland. No one among those who have not returned should feel repudiated by the fatherland or wronged by a decision of the passport officials.

Minister Straszewski informed the commission members that efforts to create a system guaranteeing a passport to every citizen are ongoing. For the time

being it is being planned that the minister of internal affairs be empowered to excuse citizens from turning in their passport each time they return from abroad. Beginning 1 January 1984 it will be possible to keep at home important passports to the socialist countries, and in the future it will be possible to keep passports to other countries as well.

Deputy Maria Budzanowska, chairwoman of the Chief Lawyer's Council, made observations on the proposed solutions on behalf of the commission. Among other things, she stated that changes in the passport law constitute an essential element of the socialist renewal, documenting that this process is not only declaratory but also has been realized. The law also has enormous significance for the normalization of social relations, for the building of unity among Poles--both those in the country and those in diaspora. Lawyer Maria Budzanowska gave a positive evaluation of the directions of the proposed changes while remarking that some of them are incomplete, as if they had not been finished.

The internal control over decisions that is planned in the supplement to the passport law is insufficient in the opinion of the deputy as well as other members of the PRON commission. Establishing judicial control over these provisions by the Chief Administrative Court would have essential significance in this regard. The commission members recalled that the PRON congress had come out in favor of this solution. The possible participation of lawyers in passport proceedings also was considered. The commission's particular position on the matter of passports will be worked out and presented to the Sejm.

Moreover, the PRON commission familiarized itself with the social consequences of the law on amnesty and evaluated the implementation of laws on social pathologies. Lawyer Andrzej Elbanowski, chairman of the commission, led the deliberations.

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